TAN JINXIAN v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

 

10 March 2026

Case summary 

Tan Jinxian v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2026] SGCA 10 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA): 

Outcome: The court dismissed an appeal against conviction and sentence for four charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”), including a capital charge for trafficking not less than 38.78g of diamorphine. The court also dismissed a criminal motion seeking permission to adduce fresh evidence.

Background

1. The appellant, Mr Tan Jinxian, was tried and convicted on four proceeded charges under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “MDA”): Public Prosecutor v Tan Jinxian [2025] SGHC 37 (the “GD”).

a. The first charge was for having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking not less than 38.78g of diamorphine, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the MDA (“First Charge”).

b. The second and third charges were for trafficking not less than 7.22g of diamorphine and 17.62g of methamphetamine, respectively, to one Chu Kok Thye (“Chu”), offences under s 5(1)(a) of the MDA (“Second Charge” and “Third Charge” respectively).

c. The remaining charge was for possession of a packet of synthetic cannabinoid, an offence under s 8(a) of the MDA (“Fifth Charge”).

2. On 27 January 2021, the appellant was asked by one “Paul” to collect something from Marsiling. The appellant collected a blue bag (“Blue Bag”) at Marsiling and received WhatsApp voice messages from “Paul” describing what he had just collected as “Sio Zui” (literally “hot water” in Hokkien). The appellant then drove to Hotel Boss and placed the Blue Bag in his hotel room. The appellant thereafter picked up Chu, his roommate, from their shared residence and returned with Chu to Hotel Boss. While at Hotel Boss, the appellant: (a) took out the contents of the Blue Bag; (b) removed the yellow tape wrapped around those contents; (c) observed that the contents were brown granular substances; (d) placed those contents into three new brown paper bags; and (e) placed one brown paper bag in a white bag (“White bag”) and the remaining two in the Blue Bag.

3. On 28 January 2021, at about 11.55am, the appellant was arrested together with Chu at the carpark of Hotel Boss. At the time of arrest, the appellant was carrying the White Bag and the Blue Bag, which jointly contained the diamorphine that formed the subject of the First Charge.

4. As the appellant did not qualify for sentencing under the alternative regime in ss 33B(1) and 33B(2) of the MDA, the trial judge (“Judge”) imposed, in respect of the First Charge, the mandatory death sentence under s 33(1) read with the Second Schedule to the MDA. The Judge also imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment in respect of the remaining proceeded charges.

5. The appellant appealed against his conviction on the First, Second and Third charges. The appellant also appealed against the death sentence imposed upon him, though the appellant did not appeal against the sentences imposed in respect of the Second and Third Charges. The appellant did not appeal against his conviction and sentence in respect of the Fifth Charge. 

6. Separately, the appellant filed a criminal motion seeking permission to adduce “additional evidence” to raise a new defence.

Decision 

7. The appellant applied to adduce factual assertions by way of affidavit claiming that the diamorphine in his possession belonged to Chu, that he was holding the bags on behalf of Chu, and that he was to return the bags to Chu. He sought to rely on this to raise a new defence of bailment. The court rejected this application: at [16]–[24].

8. Fundamentally, the bailment defence was not legally sustainable. The act of trafficking, as defined in s 2 of the MDA, was constituted by, among other things, the act of transportation. Ownership of the drugs was never a necessary element of the offence. The appellant’s new case rested on the notion that he had already delivered the drugs to Chu, and that his subsequent possession of the drugs was incidental to his carrying of the drugs, on behalf of Chu, from the hotel room to the car. However, this still amounted to trafficking: at [24].

9. Additionally, the appellant could not provide a satisfactory explanation for why the “additional evidence” which was readily available at trial was not adduced earlier. Further, the new defence of bailment was incompatible with the position that had been taken at trial. Both reasons disqualified the application on the basis that it failed to satisfy the Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (“Ladd v Marshall”) conditions of non-availability at trial, reliability and relevance: at [25]–[34].

10. The court agreed with the Judge that the requisite elements for the First Charge were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: at [36].

11. Since the appellant was arrested with the White Bag and the Blue Bag in his hands, the element of possession was proven. The appellant also failed to rebut the presumption in s 18(2) of the MDA, viz that he knew the nature of the controlled drug in the Blue Bag he collected at Marsiling. As this court observed in Gobi a/l Avedian v Public Prosecutor [2021] 1 SLR 180 (“Gobi”) at [57(a)], a claim that one simply did not know what he was carrying would not usually suffice to rebut the s 18(2) presumption. Instead, the accused must establish a positive understanding that was incompatible with the presumed fact. In this case, the appellant did not utter any belief at all as to what he thought or believed he was carrying. His claim of ignorance as to what the contents of the Blue Bag were did not satisfy the Gobi inquiry: at [37]–[38].

12. As for the element of possession of the controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking, the appellant submitted that this was not proven, for he had already completed delivery of the Blue Bag to Chu by the time he was arrested on 28 January 2021. At trial, the appellant claimed that he had assumed Chu to be the intended recipient of the Blue Bag. The court agreed with the Judge’s rejection of this submission, as:

a. the appellant did not offer a reasonable explanation for his assumption as to the identity of the intended recipient;

b. the appellant’s instructions from Paul did not name Chu as the intended recipient;

c. the appellant did not put to Chu that it was Chu who asked to meet him;

d. the voice messages and missed calls from Paul to the appellant strongly suggested that the appellant was to retain the contents of the Blue Bag pending further instructions from Paul; and

e. the appellant agreed under cross-examination that he had no basis to assume that the Blue Bag was meant for Chu: at [39]–[43].

13. The court also observed that even if the appellant’s submission was believed, the offence of trafficking would still be made out, as s 2 of the MDA defines trafficking to include “give, administer, transport, send, deliver or distribute”: at [42]–[44].

14. The appellant submitted that the Judge erred in finding that he failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his involvement in the offence underlying the First Charge was restricted to the acts of a courier pursuant to s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA. Specifically, the appellant asserted that he was still awaiting further instructions from Paul at the time he was arrested, and thus, his separation of the bundles (described above at [2]) would be facilitative of transporting the diamorphine to their intended recipients: at [45] and [47].

15. The court observed that this submission contradicted the assertions the appellant sought to advance in his affidavit, viz that he had already completed delivery of all the diamorphine to Chu by the time he was arrested: at [48].

16. The court also observed that the appellant’s submission was founded on a flawed understanding of the law. In Zainudin bin Mohamed v Public Prosecutor [2018] 1 SLR 449 (“Zainudin”) at [80], this court noted that the central feature of the inquiry into whether an act of division and repacking was incidental to transporting, sending or delivering the controlled drug (and thus, within the ambit of s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA) was the offender’s evidence as regards the purpose or reason for the act of division and repacking: at [46].

17. However, in the instant case, the appellant had not offered any evidence as to why he had divided and repacked the diamorphine in the Blue Bag. The appellant invited the court to infer that he had repacked the diamorphine to facilitate transportation. However, this was not what was required under s 33B(2)(a) of the MDA and Zainudin, which required the offender to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he was a courier: at [49].

18. In any event, the court agreed with the Judge’s inference that the appellant’s involvement in repacking the diamorphine extended to subdividing the diamorphine into smaller quantities, and that the appellant was awaiting further instructions from Paul as to how the diamorphine in his possession was to be delivered. Accordingly, the court agreed with the Judge that the appellant’s act of repacking was consistent with steps taken for the purpose of distribution and sale rather than for mere facilitation of delivery: at [50]–[55].

19. Lastly, the court agreed with the Judge’s findings on the Second and Third Charges, and the appellant’s conviction on the same. It was never put to Chu that he had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant, and in the court’s view, Chu had no reason to falsely implicate the appellant on the Second and Third Charges in the trial below, since he was already serving sentence for MDA offences which mirrored the appellant’s Second and Third Charges. Additionally, the court observed that Chu’s evidence was consistent with the objective evidence adduced at trial below. That the appellant was a drug supplier was supported by the WhatsApp correspondence exchanged between the appellant and three other persons, wherein he offered to sell them drugs: at [56].