Soh Chee Wen v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

1 CA/CCA 40/2022 and CA/CCA 41/2022 were the respective appeals of Mr Soh Chee Wen (“First Appellant”) and Ms Quah Su-Ling (“Second Appellant”) (collectively, the “Appellants”) against their convictions and the sentences that were meted out to them in the General Division of the High Court. The Appellants, between 1 August 2012 and 3 October 2013 (“Relevant Period”), masterminded a scheme (“Scheme”) to artificially inflate the markets for, and in turn manipulate the prices of, three counters that were being traded on the Mainboard of the Singapore Exchange, namely Blumont Group Limited, Asiasons Capital Ltd and LionGold Corp Ltd (collectively, “BAL”). They carried out the Scheme by controlling, coordinating their use of, obtaining financing for, and conducting illegitimate trading activity using an extensive web of 187 trading accounts held with 20 financial institutions in the names of 60 individuals and companies. As a result of the Scheme, the prices of BAL shares had been artificially inflated and when this could no longer be maintained, the prices fell sharply on 4 and 7 October 2013 (“the Crash”).

2 Arising from their involvement in the Scheme, the Appellants were charged with and convicted of various offences:

a. Ten charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 197(1)(b) of the Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed) (“SFA”), which prohibited “[f]alse trading and market rigging transactions”. Six of these ten charges concerned the markets for BAL shares (“False Trading Charges”) while the remaining four concerned the prices of BAL shares (“Price Manipulation Charges”).

b. 153 charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit offences under s 201(b) of the SFA, which prohibited the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the subscription, purchase or sale of securities (“Deception Charges”).

c. Six charges of being a party to conspiracies to commit the offences of cheating and dishonestly inducing property to be delivered, under s 420 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”) (“Cheating Charges”).

These 169 charges are referred to collectively as the “Conspiracy Charges”.

3 Additionally, the First Appellant was convicted of:

a. Three charges of being concerned in the management of BAL while being an undischarged bankrupt, contrary to s 148(1) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) (“Company Management Charges”).

b. Five charges of perverting the course of justice contrary to s 204A of the Penal Code, and a further three charges of attempting to pervert the course of justice contrary to s 204A read with s 511 of the Penal Code (collectively, “Witness Tampering Charges”).

4 The Judge sentenced the First Appellant to an aggregate of 36 years’ imprisonment and the Second Appellant to an aggregate of 20 years’ imprisonment. On 10 October 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellants’ appeals against their convictions.

5 In this judgment the court deals with the Appellants’ appeals against their sentences, which were dismissed.

6 The First Appellant’s argument that it was unfair to hold him responsible for the Crash and for the entirety of the volume of trades carried out during the Relevant Period, as some of these trades were executed by his accomplices and not by him, was foreclosed by the court’s decision on the Appellants’ appeal against conviction. In any event, the First Appellant had embarked on a scheme to manipulate the markets for and artificially inflate the prices of the BAL securities to achieve his own ends. He was broadly aware of his accomplices’ trading activities and saw this as a necessary consequence of the need to keep the Scheme going. He had to and did assume the inherent risk of a market collapse ensuing from the scale and extent of the market manipulation that was involved: at [16]–[17].

7 The aggravating factors relied upon by the Judge are consistent with the established offence-specific factors for each category of the First Appellant’s offences. With regard to the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges, the Judge rightly considered: (a) the substantial scale of the Scheme; (b) the extent of planning and premeditation that went into the development of the Scheme; (c) the level of harm occasioned by the Scheme; and (d) the fact that the Scheme was carried out for financial gain, which reflected the extent of the Appellants’ personal benefit from the Scheme: at [20].

8 As to the Deception Charges, the Judge rightly considered: (a) the massive scale and (b) extent of the deception; as well as (c) the transnational nature of the Scheme: at [22]–[23].

9 The sentences imposed for the False Trading, Price Manipulation and Deception Charges were in line with the relevant precedents. The Appellants’ offences were far more serious than those in the precedents that were cited. It was also seriously aggravating that the Scheme was an endeavour to subvert the very purpose for which the SFA was introduced, namely, to regulate market activities and to ensure transparent dealing in the market: at [31] and [34].

10 The court rejected the First Appellant’s reliance on cases pre-dating Parliament’s toughened stance on market rigging offences. Cases pre-dating these developments had no precedential value: at [39] and [41].

11 As for the Cheating Charges, the Judge correctly identified and gave appropriate weight to the relevant aggravating factors. These factors included: (a) the value of property involved; (b) the extent of harm caused; (c) the difficulty of detecting the First Appellant’s offences; (d) his efforts at preventing victims from recovering their losses; (e) the duration of his offending; and (f) the harm he caused to Singapore’s reputation as a financial centre: at [45].

12 The First Appellant did not raise any arguments directly relating to the Company Management Charges: at [47].

13 In relation to the Witness Tampering Charges, the sentences imposed were in line with precedent. This was so considering: (a) the serious nature of the predicate charges and the First Appellant’s motivation for offending; (b) the significantly more severe effect of the First Appellant’s offending; and (c) the far greater degree of persistence, premeditation and sophistication with which the First Appellant had committed the offences: at [57].

14 The Judge was wholly alive to the risk of double counting and had expressly rejected those of the Prosecution’s arguments which could have led to this: at [61].

15 To the extent that the First Appellant sought to argue that the Judge had double counted the same aggravating factors across the various categories of charges, this argument failed to appreciate the differences in the mischiefs targeted by each category of offences: at [63].

16 To the extent that the First Appellant sought to argue that where an offender commits multiple offences, the aggravating factors present in all of these offences can only be applied to one of the offences, this argument was incorrect as a matter of principle. In this regard, a distinction should be drawn between aggravating factors that are specific to an offence and the cumulative aggravating features which are present in a case. Where multiple distinct offences have been committed, if specific aggravating factors are present in each offence, the sentence for each offence should be appropriately enhanced. On the other hand, cumulative aggravating features are those which ordinarily have primary relevance at the later stage of sentencing, when considering whether the aggregate sentence should be enhanced by consecutive sentencing: at [64].

17 The one-transaction rule did not arise in the present case, as the Appellants’ offences were not even proximate to one another. Further, the one transaction rule would not have assisted the Appellants, for the offences in each category of charges were concerned with protecting different legally protected interests. They could not be regarded as forming a single transaction: at [67]–[68].

18 The aggregate sentence of 36 years’ imprisonment imposed on the First Appellant was proportionate to his overall criminality. He had carefully coordinated the Scheme, which was of a massive scale, with the aim of subverting the very purpose for which the SFA was introduced (see [34] above), and he thereby caused very significant harm to the market and its stakeholders. In doing so, he had also severely harmed Singapore’s reputation as a financial hub: at [72].

19 The Second Appellants’ reliance on the Judge’s observation that she was merely the First Appellant’s “girl Friday” assistant did not assist her. The Judge had already accorded due weight to her relatively lower level of culpability as compared to the First Appellant in sentencing her, and there was a limit as to how far the Second Appellant could take this argument on appeal. This was especially so since she elected not to give evidence during the trial. It was also not accurate to state that the Second Appellant’s culpability was lower than the First Appellant’s in all aspects. In respect of the False Trading and Price Manipulation Charges, the Second Appellant had, unlike the First Appellant, also abused her position as CEO of a company to advance the Scheme: at [76].

20 It was unfair to enhance the Second Appellant’s sentence on account of the persistent and ill-founded allegations of bias and impropriety advanced against the Judge. This was because counsel for the Second Appellant (“Mr Sivananthan”) had informed the court that these allegations were advanced on his own initiative and without the Second Appellant’s instructions. There was no basis for the court to go behind litigation privilege or to reject Mr Sivananthan’s account of what transpired: at [79].

21 The court thus upheld the aggregate sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment imposed on the Second Appellant: at [93].

22 Mr Sivananthan had acted improperly, not only in repeatedly casting spurious allegations against the Judge below without his client’s instructions, but also in his subsequent repeated attempts to downplay the severity of these allegations. His conduct caused the Prosecution to incur unnecessary costs. It was thus appropriate to impose a personal costs order on Mr Sivananthan: at [82], [89] and [90].

23 The court acknowledged that Mr Sivananthan had subsequently apologised for and withdrew his allegations of judicial bias. He also tendered a formal written apology to the court. Although this did not absolve Mr Sivananthan of his misconduct, he had expunged some of its sting. In the circumstances, it was just to order that Mr Sivananthan be subjected to a personal costs order of $10,000 payable to the Prosecution. Subject to his compliance with the costs order and his remaining true to the aforesaid retractions and apologies, the matter could be laid to rest there: at [91]–[92].