ISKANDAR BIN RAHMAT v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Facts

Iskandar bin Rahmat was convicted after trial on 4 December 2015 on two charges of murder under s 300(a) of the Penal Code and sentenced to death. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 3 February 2017 in Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 505. Two petitions for clemency were rejected, and his execution was scheduled for 5 February 2025. Over the years he had taken part in many post-appeal proceedings, including a challenge to the Law Society's dismissal of his complaint against his trial lawyers, which failed in the Court of Appeal in CA/CA 9/2020.

Two days before the scheduled execution he filed Criminal Motion No 2 of 2025, seeking permission under s 394H of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 to apply for review of the dismissal of his appeal, and a stay of execution. He appeared in person. The motion was heard by a single Judge of the Court of Appeal. His two main grounds were that his trial lawyers had given inadequate assistance, citing ten alleged failures, and that the trial judge had interfered excessively in the trial.

Issues

1. Whether the complaints about inadequate legal assistance could found a review application.
2. Whether the allegations of excessive judicial interference were sufficient material, and whether there was unexplained delay in raising them.
3. Whether a stay of execution should be ordered.

Holding

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application summarily without an oral hearing under s 394H(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code, refusing both permission to make a review application and the stay of execution.

Reasoning

Under s 394H(6A), the court considers whether the statutory conditions are met, any delay, compliance with filing requirements and whether the review has a reasonable prospect of success. Following Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127, the applicant must show material almost certain to satisfy s 394J.

On the first ground, nine of the ten alleged failures had already been put to the Court of Appeal in CA 9/2020 and rejected. Recasting them as inadequate assistance was an attempt to relitigate and an abuse of process, barred by s 394K(2)(b). The remaining complaint, about attendance notes, showed no incompetence and caused no material prejudice; his defence of private defence in a sudden fight had been put at trial and rejected. The Court of Appeal had also properly considered and rejected fresh psychiatric evidence on diminished responsibility, and there was no unequal treatment under Art 12(1) of the Constitution.

On the second ground, he said he learned of the relevant law in 2020 yet did nothing until 3 February 2025, and he admitted preparing the application since April 2023. The court inferred intentional delay. On the merits, the instances he cited were matters of case management within the trial judge's remit, and his speculative allegations came nowhere near showing a miscarriage of justice almost conclusively. His other complaints of factual and legal error reflected only disagreement with adverse findings.

On the stay, the pending constitutional challenge in HC/OA 972/2024 concerned provisions that came into force long after his appeal and, as held in Mohammad Azwan bin Bohari v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 SLR 1271, had no bearing on his conviction or sentence.

From the judgment