KATCHU MOHIDEEN BAZEER AHAMED v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Facts

Mr Katchu Mohideen Bazeer Ahamed, a Singapore citizen, ran a scheme in 2019 that recruited Singaporean bailors for foreign accused persons, who or whose families paid him a fee. According to the Statement of Facts he admitted without qualification, he worked with a lawyer who referred clients to him, briefed bailors to memorise details so that they would appear to be genuine bailors, and promised them they would bear no cost if the accused absconded. The charge concerned 7 November 2019, when he agreed to indemnify Mr N Ammaran against any liability as surety for an accused person charged with affray, on bail of $5,000; Mr Ammaran was paid $500.

He faced three charges under s 106A(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), which makes it an offence to knowingly enter into an agreement indemnifying a surety to a bail bond. On the first day of trial he pleaded guilty to one charge, with the other two taken into consideration, and the District Judge imposed six weeks' imprisonment. In Magistrate's Appeal No 9074 of 2024, after several changes of position and adjournments, he argued that s 106A was unconstitutional or, alternatively, that a fine should replace the prison term. This was the first prosecution under s 106A.

Issues

1. Whether s 106A of the CPC infringes Article 9 of the Constitution for being absurd or vague
2. Whether s 106A of the CPC infringes Article 12 of the Constitution for being discriminatory
3. Whether the sentence of six weeks' imprisonment was manifestly excessive and should be a fine

Holding

The High Court dismissed the appeal. It rejected the constitutional challenge to s 106A of the CPC and upheld the sentence of six weeks' imprisonment. Bail was later extended pending the appellant's Criminal Motion No 13 of 2025 seeking to refer questions of law to the Court of Appeal.

Reasoning

On Article 9, the court held that the absurdity test protects a fair process and does not allow the court to examine the substance of a law. The appellant's points, that an indemnity does not inevitably lead a surety to neglect his duties and that it was absurd to allow an accused to post a personal bond but not to fund a surety, attacked the substance and efficacy of the provision, which the courts do not question. Nor was s 106A vague: it voids bail indemnity agreements and makes knowingly entering one an offence, whether or not the surety performs or the accused absconds. The court added observations on sureties who borrow money for bail, leaving them for future consideration.

On Article 12, the challenge failed at the threshold because s 106A does not prescribe a differentiating measure. It applies to any person, whether accused, bailor or third party, who knowingly enters such an agreement. Release on personal bond and release on bail with sureties are governed by different considerations, and the accused does not choose between them.

On sentence, there was no actual harm since the accused named in the charge did not abscond, but the potential harm was real: the bailor treated his job as done once bail was granted, and such professional bailors defeat the purpose of sureties. Culpability was high given the appellant's pivotal role, planning and knowledge that the scheme was wrong, and his main motive was financial. With two similar charges taken into consideration and the scheme running for over a year after the provision came into force, the District Judge was right not to treat him as a first offender. General deterrence was dominant and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.

From the judgment