HOWE WEN KHONG ROCKY & 6 Ors v ATTORNEY-GENERAL CHAMBERS

Facts

Seven individuals, all members of the Transformative Justice Collective, an unincorporated group that describes its purpose as seeking the abolition of the death penalty, brought Originating Application No 1213 of 2025 against the Attorney-General. They sought declarations, operating retrospectively, that the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 read with its Second Schedule (MDP) was unconstitutional for breaching Arts 9(1), 12(1) and 93 of the Constitution.

Several applicants were founding committee members who had campaigned on the death penalty. Three were sisters of men convicted and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty under s 33(1) and later executed. The application was filed with four applicants on 28 October 2025, and the other three were added on 18 November 2025. The applicants acted in person, with Mr Howe making the main submissions. The Attorney-General said they lacked standing and that the challenge failed on the merits in any event.

Issues

1. Whether the applicants had locus standi to bring the constitutional challenge, whether through private rights, public rights or any other basis.
2. Whether the mandatory death penalty under the Misuse of Drugs Act breaches the right to life and personal liberty in Art 9(1).
3. Whether it breaches the equal protection guarantee in Art 12(1), including through the reasonable classification test or a principle of proportionality.
4. Whether it is inconsistent with the vesting of judicial power in Art 93.

Holding

Hoo Sheau Peng J dismissed the application. The applicants had no locus standi on any basis, and in any event the challenge failed on the merits: the mandatory death penalty was consistent with Arts 9(1), 12(1) and 93. Parties were directed to file short costs submissions.

Reasoning

On standing, a challenge based on private rights requires a violation of the applicant's own constitutional rights. The applicants had not shown that the MDP had been or would be invoked against them; opposition to the death penalty and grief on familial and reputational grounds were not enough. Following Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v Attorney-General [2024] 1 SLR 414, the suggestion in Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 that an unconstitutional law's mere existence may suffice related to offence-creating provisions, which the MDP is not. There was also no real controversy. For public rights, no special damage was shown beyond the satisfaction of righting a perceived wrong, and the narrow exception for egregious breaches of public duty was not engaged.

On Art 9(1), the right to be heard is a procedural right aimed at a fair trial on guilt. A convicted person can still be heard within the s 33B framework, and the MDP is imposed only after a fair trial. The Caribbean decision in Nervais v R rested on international obligations, which do not form part of Singapore law without legislation, and whether a sentence should be mandatory is a matter for Parliament. Proportionality has never been part of Singapore constitutional law, and adopting it would offend the separation of powers.

On Art 12(1), the quantity of drugs is an intelligible differentia under both versions of the reasonable classification test. The argument that offenders of different culpability are treated alike had in substance been rejected in Ong Ah Chuan and in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SLR 489, which held that the capital threshold is a matter of policy for the legislature and bears a rational relation to the Act's object. Since the MDP did not breach Arts 9(1) or 12(1), the Art 93 argument, which depended on those breaches, fell away.

From the judgment