Capajet Pte. Ltd. v EV Technology Pte. Ltd. & 3 Ors

Facts

Capajet Pte Ltd lent S$3,360,000 to EV Technology Pte Ltd (EV Tech) to fund the purchase of 29% of the shares in Stradbroke Investments Pte Ltd, whose main asset was a building at 152 Ubi Avenue 4; a company associated with Capajet held the other 71%. A loan agreement dated 18 April 2023, but executed around August 2023, stated that the loan was repayable on demand. EV Tech made partial repayments but none after September 2024. In HC/OC 834/2024 Capajet sued for the balance, which it put at $2,801,376.80. EV Tech accepted it owed money but said the loan was repayable by instalments and that the written agreement was back-dated and made only to show Capajet's auditors and bankers. EV Tech and related parties also counterclaimed against Capajet, Ms Zhao FeiYan and others for unlawful means conspiracy over the management of Stradbroke and the building.

A judge of the General Division dismissed Capajet's appeal against the refusal of summary judgment and dismissed applications by Capajet and Ms Zhao to strike out the conspiracy counterclaim against them. In the Appellate Division, Capajet sought a declaration that permission to appeal was needed (AD/SUM 2/2026) and permission to appeal against both decisions (AD/OA 2/2026), and Ms Zhao sought permission to appeal against the striking out decision (AD/OA 5/2026).

Issues

1. Whether permission is required to appeal against a decision dismissing an application for summary judgment
2. Whether the summary judgment decision raised a question of importance or a prima facie error of law warranting permission to appeal
3. Whether permission to appeal should be granted against the refusal to strike out the unlawful means conspiracy counterclaim

Holding

The Appellate Division allowed SUM 2, declaring that permission was required, and dismissed the applications for permission to appeal in OA 2 and OA 5. There was no order as to costs for SUM 2; Capajet was ordered to pay costs of $8,000 (all-in) for OA 2 and Ms Zhao $4,000 (all-in) for OA 5.

Reasoning

Under the Fifth Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, permission is needed to appeal an order giving permission to defend. Following Sinwa, a dismissal of a summary judgment application has the same practical effect, as the matter goes to trial, and is consistent with the scheme of requiring permission where substantive rights are not finally disposed of.

Permission may be granted for a prima facie error of law, a question of general principle decided for the first time, or a question of importance. The court found no inconsistency between the robust approach in Mirae Asset and the remarks in Qroi; both applied settled principles to their facts. The judge reasonably found triable issues, including whether the agreement was meant to have legal effect and whether repayment was on demand, even if some defences might not ultimately defeat the agreement. Capajet's complaint about the lack of evidence was really a challenge to findings of fact. The court agreed that, having found a prima facie case, the judge should have granted permission to defend rather than dismissing the application, and explained that the two orders are conceptually distinct under O 9 r 17(7) and carry different costs consequences. But permission to appeal is not granted on a point that would not change the outcome, as the case would go to trial either way.

On striking out, the threshold is high: a claim must be obviously unsustainable. The meaningful participation language in Kapital Fund applied established pleading principles to a conspiracy to procure a breach of contract and raised no question of importance; the judge was entitled to confine it to its facts. Questions about whether the pleaded losses were recognised, and arguments about payments, were for trial. Intention to injure could be inferred from pleaded facts, the counterclaim did plead intent to injure, and the victims pleaded were an ascertainable class.

From the judgment