WANG PIAO V LEE WEE CHING

Facts

Wang Piao sued Lee Wee Ching in HC/OC 406/2022 on a loan agreement under which, the claimant said, he advanced US$1,100,000 and the defendant agreed to repay US$1,950,000 within about six months. In his defence, the defendant said the money he received was for buying equipment (an Apek Vantage unit) on behalf of the claimant and his associates, so it was not really a loan, and that he did not recall signing the agreement. On 14 April 2023 an Assistant Registrar granted the claimant summary judgment for US$1,950,000 plus interest, finding no triable issue or bona fide defence; the defendant's counsel had conceded below that the funds were disbursed to and received by him.

The defendant appealed, engaged new senior counsel for the appeal, and then applied in HC/SUM 1463/2023 to amend his defence in eight respects and to add two defendants to his counterclaim. The new points included a changed timeframe, lack of consideration, illegal moneylending, non-receipt of the money, variation by conduct, a contingent-payment reading of the agreement, a penalty defence and set-off. The application was heard before the appeal against summary judgment.

Issues

1. Whether the Rules of Court 2021 impose a more restrictive approach to amending pleadings.
2. What framework governs amendments to a defence sought after summary judgment has been entered.
3. Whether the proposed amendments raised real issues in controversy or plausible defences.
4. Whether allowing the amendments would be just, given prejudice and a second bite of the cherry.

Holding

Goh Yihan JC dismissed the defendant's application to amend his defence and add parties to the counterclaim. Absent agreement, costs submissions of up to seven pages each were to be filed within 14 days, and the parties were to seek a hearing date for the appeal against summary judgment.

Reasoning

The judge held that the 2021 Rules are more restrictive only for amendments sought less than 14 days before trial; otherwise the earlier principles still apply, and the Ideals do not add a general restriction. He set out a three-step framework: identify the stage of proceedings, since later applications need stronger grounds; ask whether the amendments would allow the real issues to be decided, which looks at good faith and materiality; and ask whether allowing them is just, chiefly considering prejudice not compensable in costs and a second bite of the cherry. After summary judgment, amendments are post-judgment and should be allowed sparingly. The court looks at whether the defences were always maintained, contrasting Ricky Hwa with Invar Realty, and the applicant must show a fair or reasonable probability of a bona fide defence.

Applying this, the case resembled Invar Realty. The defendant accepted that the amendments arose from substantially the same facts already pleaded, yet raised them only on appeal, and the non-receipt point would undo his counsel's concession on which judgment was based. None of the amendments was plausible. The new timeframe contradicted his own affidavit; parting with the money was consideration; his own description of a long relationship of trust and dealing between friends was inconsistent with illegal moneylending; the variation plea lacked particulars; the contingency reading did not follow from the agreement's plain words and could be decided summarily; the penalty rule did not apply to a claim for a debt; and no set-off survived. In any event, the claimant's prejudice could not be fully met by costs, the amendments were a backdoor appeal, and they were a second bite of the cherry since all could have been raised before summary judgment.

From the judgment