Nimisha Pandey & Anor v Divya Bothra

Facts

Nimisha Pandey sold a property to Divya Bothra in 2015 for S$4m under a sale and purchase agreement signed for the then-minor buyer by her father. Title passed in July 2016 before the price was paid, because the families were close. Ms Pandey later sued in HC/OC 138/2023 for a balance of S$626,422, and an Assistant Registrar granted her summary judgment for that sum. The buyer appealed in HC/RA 196/2023 and, alongside the appeal, applied in SUM 3265 to amend her defence and counterclaim and in SUM 3266 to adduce further evidence.

The buyer had taken shifting positions. She first pleaded that her father had paid the full price by cheque in 2016; in related caveat proceedings she and her father said both parents had paid in 2016. She then pleaded that she had overpaid as of 2018, relying on two remittances and the deposit. Her proposed third position was that her mother and her mother's company had a running account with the claimants, under which about US$62m had been advanced between 2011 and 2019, more than covering the balance. She also sought to plead estoppel, a time bar defence, a set-off based on a bank facility, and refinements to her counterclaim.

Issues

1. Whether a defendant should be allowed to amend her defence after summary judgment to introduce a running account defence and an estoppel defence
2. Whether the other proposed amendments to the defence and counterclaim should be allowed
3. Whether further evidence should be admitted on appeal under the Ladd v Marshall requirements as applied in Anan Group

Holding

The High Court allowed SUM 3265 in part and dismissed SUM 3266 entirely, with costs of $12,000 to the claimants. The running account and estoppel amendments were refused, while the time bar and bank facility defences and the counterclaim amendments not dependent on the running account were allowed. The buyer was given time to file her amended pleading, and the hearing of the appeal itself was deferred to a later date.

Reasoning

Applying the approach in Wang Piao v Lee Wee Ching, amendments after judgment should be granted sparingly to protect finality, and the court considers whether the defence was always maintained, whether it is material, and whether the amendment would give a second chance at something missed earlier. Unlike Hwa Lai Heng Ricky, where the defence had been run before the Assistant Registrar, the buyer had advanced three inconsistent positions. Her explanation that she had relied on her parents and new solicitors had recharacterised the facts was unconvincing, particularly as her father had filed affidavits giving two different accounts without mentioning any running account.

The running account defence also lacked merit. Although a running account is a recognised cause of action, the authorities cited, Bajaj Textiles and Mitfam International, required the same parties to the claim and the account. The price was owed by the buyer to the seller, while the alleged account was between the buyer's mother and the claimants; any claim on it belonged to the mother. The buyer's own authorisation of a payment described as a property consideration payment undermined the account, and its balance when the agreement was signed was unknown. The estoppel defence depended on it and fell with it.

The time bar defence was allowed because laches had been pleaded originally, and the bank facility defence because it had been raised before and stood apart; their merits could be tested later. The counterclaim was still at the pleading stage.

On further evidence, Ladd v Marshall applied with some rigour, as the decision followed a hearing on the merits though not a full trial. The buyer had two earlier chances to present the material, and since the running account amendment was refused, the evidence could not influence the result.

From the judgment