Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad and others v Attorney-General of Singapore

High Court

[2023] SGHC 346 · HC/OA 987/2023 ( HC/SUM 3096/2023 ) · cites 13 cases (12 Singapore, 1 foreign) · cited by 1 case

The question

Can prisoners challenge a law on post-appeal capital case applications before it comes into force?

The answer

No, here. The High Court held the prisoners lacked standing because the law's provisions had no legal effect yet, and their claim under constitutional Arts 9 and 12 had no chance of success, so it struck out their application.

Step 1: What happened

In HC/OA987/2023, 36 prisoners awaiting capital punishment, led by Mr Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad, sought declarations that two provisions added to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 by the Post-appeal Applications in Capital Cases Act 2022 (the PACC Act) were void as inconsistent with Arts 9 and 12 of the Constitution. The PACC Act sets up a procedure for post-appeal applications in capital cases: a prisoner must first obtain permission from the Court of Appeal, which must consider, among other things, whether the application has a reasonable prospect of success (s 60G(7)(d)), and may deal with a permission application summarily by written order without a hearing (s 60G(8)).

The PACC Act was passed on 29 November 2022 and published in the Gazette on 13 January 2023, but had not come into force. The applicants said that the reasonable-prospect requirement was oppressive and predictive, and that summary disposal would stop them addressing the court on an application on which their lives depended. The Attorney-General applied in HC/SUM 3096/2023 to strike out OA987 under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The applicants acted in person.

Step 2: What the court had to decide

  1. Whether the applicants had standing to challenge provisions that were not yet in force
  2. Whether there was a viable claim that ss 60G(7)(d) and 60G(8) were inconsistent with Art 9 of the Constitution
  3. Whether there was a viable claim that the provisions breached the equal protection guarantee in Art 12

Step 3: How the court reasoned

The court accepted that the burden of showing no reasonable cause of action lay on the Attorney-General, while the applicants still had to show a viable claim. On standing, it applied the three requirements in Karaha Bodas and Tan Eng Hong v Attorney General [2012] 4 SLR 390. The provisions had no legal effect yet, so they did not engage the applicants' rights; any post-appeal application could currently be filed without reference to them. A future prospect of operation was not enough, by analogy with Tan Seng Kee v Attorney-General and other appeals [2022] 1 SLR 1347. Nor was this the rare case where a law's mere existence violates rights: the provisions were procedural, not a criminal prohibition that affects conduct by its existence. There was therefore no real controversy and no real interest.

On Art 9, the right to a fair trial had to be seen across the whole process, and these provisions apply only after appeals are exhausted, where finality carries great weight. Preliminary merits filters and summary disposal without an oral hearing are familiar features of the legal system. The test does not require the court to predict outcomes; applicants are expected to put their full case forward. Art 9 does not guarantee an oral hearing, and the procedure clarifies rather than blocks access to justice.

On Art 12, applying the approach in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General [2021] 1 SLR 809 as the one more favourable to the applicants, the differentia was prisoners awaiting capital punishment. The object of preventing abuse of process was not circular, as such prisoners have an incentive to file last-minute applications and there had been recent instances of this. The relation between differentia and object easily withstood scrutiny.

From the judgment

“Access to justice does not require a criminal system to allow unmeritorious applications brought at the tail end of the criminal process to progress to the fullest extent.”

[2023] SGHC 346 at [54]

Step 4: The order

Hoo Sheau Peng J allowed the Attorney-General's application and struck out OA987 under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021, holding that the applicants had no standing and that the claim had no chance of success.

Terms in this case

Abuse of process
Use of court proceedings for an improper purpose or in a way that is unfair or oppressive to the other side. The court may strike out or stay proceedings that abuse its process.
Cause of action
The set of facts that gives a person a legal right to sue another person and ask the court for a remedy, such as a breach of contract or an act of negligence.
Striking out
A court order removing all or part of a pleading or other document, for example because it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, or is an abuse of process. It can end a claim or defence without a full trial.

Court record

Key facts

Court High Court
Decided
Judge Hoo Sheau Peng
What the case was about Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

Source: [2023] SGHC 346, High Court, decided — eLitigation. Updated .

Statutes cited

Cases cited (13)

SLR (11)
  • [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649
  • [2006] 1 SLR(R) 112
  • [2012] 4 SLR 390
  • [2013] 4 SLR 1
  • [2015] 1 SLR 26
  • [2016] 3 SLR 135
  • [2021] 1 SLR 809
  • [2022] 1 SLR 1347
  • [2022] 2 SLR 1018
  • [2022] 2 SLR 1197
  • [2023] 4 SLR 1133
MY (1)
  • [1996] 4 MLJ 233

Cited by (1)

Related cases

Other Singapore judgments on the same subject, most closely matched first.

Referenced in

Read the full judgment

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Source: eLitigation ([2023] SGHC 346)

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