Iskandar bin Rahmat and others v Attorney-General of Singapore

High Court

[2024] SGHC 122 · HC/OA 306/2024 ( HC/SUM 1124/2024 ) · cites 14 cases (13 Singapore, 1 foreign) · cited by 3 cases

The question

Do prisoners awaiting capital punishment have a constitutional right to free counsel after their appeals?

The answer

No. The High Court held Article 9(3) gives a right to counsel of one's choice who is willing and able to act, not to be given counsel, and allowed the Attorney-General's application to strike out the claim.

Step 1: What happened

The applicants, Iskandar bin Rahmat and 35 others, were each convicted of a capital offence and awaiting capital punishment. They alleged that the Legal Aid Scheme for Capital Offences (LASCO) had a policy of not assigning counsel for post-appeal applications. In Originating Application No 306 of 2024 they sought a declaration that this policy was inconsistent with Arts 9 and 12 of the Constitution, and damages. The Attorney-General applied in Summons No 1124 of 2024 to strike out the application under O 9 r 16(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2021 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The Attorney-General did not contest that the policy existed.

Under the LASCO Guidelines, counsel is assigned for capital trials and may be extended to appeals, with assignment ending when the appeal is decided. The applicants relied on a court e-mail of 14 November 2017 stating the Registry's policy not to assign LASCO counsel for post-appeal applications, refusals of their later requests, and a clause in LASCO consent forms. At the hearing on 9 May 2024 the applicants, who had filed no written submissions despite directions, orally sought an adjournment of four to five weeks, saying they were jailhouse litigants. Although strictly no affidavit evidence could be considered on such an application, the Judge considered their affidavits to deal fully with their arguments.

Step 2: What the court had to decide

  1. Whether the applicants should be granted an adjournment to file written submissions.
  2. Whether the LASCO policy breached the right to counsel under Art 9(3) or an alleged right of access to justice under Art 9(1) of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the LASCO policy breached the right to equality under Art 12(1) of the Constitution.

Step 3: How the court reasoned

On the adjournment, the Judge held that the applicants, having brought OA 306 themselves, must have known its basis, and two weeks was enough even with the constraints of prison.

On Art 9(3), the right is to consult and be defended by counsel of one's choice who is willing and able to act. Nothing in its text gives a right to be provided with counsel, still less free counsel. The policy might reflect allocating resources to accused persons yet to be tried or preventing abuse, and the principle of finality applies even in capital cases once appeal and review have run their course. LASCO was entitled to adopt or change its policy. The capital nature of the punishment did not allow the court to read in rights the Constitution did not contain, and earlier Court of Appeal decisions had rejected the claim that costs provisions deter lawyers from acting.

The Art 9(1) and fettering arguments failed on the facts. The applicants were sentenced on the basis of their convictions after trial and appeal, not because of the policy, and a person without free representation can still engage counsel; the policy was not unreasonable.

On Art 12(1), applying the test in Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v Attorney-General [2021] 1 SLR 809, the applicants had to show they were equally situated with those treated differently. The earlier instances they cited predated the policy, which came into existence in late 2017 or after, and the Ilechukwu matter arose from a motion filed on 5 April 2017. No post-policy case of LASCO counsel for a post-appeal application was shown. The Judge also noted the many applications by largely the same applicants and warned that meritless applications would be struck out.

From the judgment

“The right to counsel in Art 9(3) cannot be interpreted as a right to be provided with counsel, much less counsel that is given at no cost.”

[2024] SGHC 122 at [20]

Step 4: The order

The High Court refused the adjournment and allowed the Attorney-General's striking-out application, striking out OA 306 in its entirety, including the damages claim, as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. As the Attorney-General sought no costs, no order as to costs was made.

Terms in this case

Striking out
A court order removing all or part of a pleading or other document, for example because it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous or vexatious, or is an abuse of process. It can end a claim or defence without a full trial.
Cause of action
The set of facts that gives a person a legal right to sue another person and ask the court for a remedy, such as a breach of contract or an act of negligence.

Court record

Key facts

Court High Court
Decided
Judge Dedar Singh Gill
What the case was about Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

Source: [2024] SGHC 122, High Court, decided — eLitigation. Updated .

Statutes cited

Cases cited (14)

SLR (9)
  • [1996] 1 SLR(R) 853
  • [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649
  • [2016] 3 SLR 135
  • [2021] 1 SLR 67
  • [2021] 1 SLR 809
  • [2022] 2 SLR 1018
  • [2022] 2 SLR 668
  • [2023] 4 SLR 1133
  • [2023] 4 SLR 1760
MY (1)
  • [1980] 2 MLJ 201

Cited by (3)

Related cases

Other Singapore judgments on the same subject, most closely matched first.

Referenced in

Statutes interpreted in this judgment

Read the full judgment

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Source: eLitigation ([2024] SGHC 122)

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