ER KOK YONG (YU GUORONG) v TAN CHENG CHENG (CHENG QINGQING) (AS CO-ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF SPENCER TUPPANI) & 2 Ors

Facts

Spencer Tuppani died at the hands of his father-in-law on 10 July 2017. Er Kok Yong, known as Jason, sued the three co-administratrixes of Spencer's estate (his widow Tan Cheng Cheng, her sister Tan San San, and his former wife Keh Lay Hong) in Suit No 438 of 2021, claiming sole beneficial ownership of a BMW M6 registered in Spencer's name. The suit was tried with a related suit over a property, decided in [2023] SGHC 38.

Mr Er's case was that he and Spencer agreed in late 2013 that Spencer would buy the car in his own name and hold it on trust for Mr Er, who would pay for it. Spencer paid a $30,000 deposit and $236,000 by credit card in February 2014 and took a five-year loan from BMW Financial Services. Mr Er said he reimbursed Spencer $266,000 in cash and paid the loan instalments, apart from periods when, by amendments made mid-trial, he said a friend, Lim Soon Hwa Lawrence, had bought the beneficial ownership from him for S$420,000.00 and later sold it back for S$340,000.00. He relied on a common intention constructive trust, or alternatively a resulting trust.

The administratrixes denied the claim, saying any payments were made because Mr Er used the car. They counterclaimed S$1,108,076.00 that Spencer had paid to Mr Er in eight tranches between 26 August 2014 and 23 May 2017, saying he held it on a presumed resulting trust and must account for it.

Issues

1. Whether Mr Er proved a common intention constructive trust making him sole beneficial owner of the car.
2. Whether, alternatively, Mr Er was entitled to the car under a resulting trust because he made all the financial contributions.
3. Whether the counterclaim on the 2014 payments was time-barred, and whether Mr Er held the remaining payments on a resulting trust and had to account for them.

Holding

The High Court dismissed Mr Er's claim and also dismissed the administratrixes' counterclaim. Each side was ordered to bear its own costs.

Reasoning

On the constructive trust, the court found Mr Er's case incoherent and unbelievable. His story of two sales to and from Lawrence surfaced only in mid-trial amendments, contradicted his original pleading that Lawrence merely paid instalments for using the car, and said nothing of Spencer's position. No record of the cash payments between the two men existed. Spencer's assistant said Spencer told her Mr Er would pay the instalments because he would be using the car. Mr Er and Lawrence gave shifting accounts of why their WhatsApp group chat was unavailable, so the court found Mr Er unwilling to produce it and drew an adverse inference under s 116, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act 1893. The widow's early acknowledgment of his interest was reasonably explained.

On the resulting trust, documents showed Spencer made the deposit and credit card payments, and there was no evidence that Mr Er reimbursed him in cash; his explanation about borrowing from his father was invented under questioning. The price was in fact $601,800, which he did not show he paid. His and Lawrence's payments were more likely for their use of the car.

On the counterclaim, the Limitation Act applies to resulting trusts, and the administratrixes proved neither possession nor conversion of the money under s 22(1)(b), so the 2014 payments were time-barred. For the three later payments, totalling $203,600, the court rejected Mr Er's claim that they repaid loans, but the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted: Spencer made transfers for years without records or requests for repayment, unlike his careful records for the car. In any case, following Tan Yok Koon v Tan Choo Suan and another and other appeals [2017] 1 SLR 654, they had to prove fiduciary duties including a duty to account, and offered no evidence of any.

From the judgment