THEODOROS KASSIMATIS KC v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE & Anor

[2024] SGCA 36 Court of Appeal 25 September 2024 • CA/CA 17/2024|CA/CA 16/2024 • 22 min read
14 cases cited Cited by 2 cases

Catchwords

Legal Profession — Admission — Ad hoc

Practice Areas

Legal Profession

Judges (3)

Belinda Ang Saw Ean Coram Judith Prakash Coram Sundaresh Menon Delivered

Counsel (8)

Advocatus Law LLP Firm Attorney-General's Chambers Firm Christopher Anand s/o Daniel Counsel Respondent Hay Hung Chun Counsel Respondent Poh Hui Jing Claire Counsel Respondent Saadhvika Jayanth Counsel Respondent Theong Li Han Counsel Respondent Yeo Yi Ling Eileen Counsel Respondent

Parties (4)

Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore Respondent Law Society of Singapore Respondent Edward Fitzgerald KC Appellant Theodoros Kassimatis KC Appellant

Case Significance

Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another appeal [2024] SGCA 36 was decided by the Court of Appeal, comprising Sundaresh Menon CJ, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA and Judith Prakash SJ, which heard the matter on 18 September 2024 and delivered a reserved judgment on 25 September 2024, with Sundaresh Menon CJ delivering the judgment of the court. The decision concerned Civil Appeals Nos 16 and 17 of 2024: the first brought by Theodoros Kassimatis KC and the second by Edward Fitzgerald KC, both King's Counsel of England, against the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore and the Law Society of Singapore as respondents.

The appeals arose from applications for ad hoc admission, made in Originating Applications No 696 of 2023 and No 811 of 2023 in the matter of section 15 of the Legal Profession Act 1966, and were connected with Court of Appeal / Civil Appeal No 2 of 2023 and Court of Appeal / Summons No 16 of 2023. The catchwords identify the issue as the ad hoc admission of foreign counsel under the Legal Profession Act, and the judgment framed the appeals as engaging the question of whether foreign counsel seeking such admission could do so. The respondents were represented by counsel from Advocatus Law LLP and the Attorney-General's Chambers, including Christopher Anand s/o Daniel, Hay Hung Chun, Poh Hui Jing Claire, Saadhvika Jayanth, Theong Li Han and Yeo Yi Ling Eileen.

[2024] SGCA 36 explained

THEODOROS KASSIMATIS KC v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE & Anor ([2024] SGCA 36) is a Singapore judgment decided by the Court of Appeal on 25 September 2024. It is categorised under Legal Profession. Within this corpus it has since been cited by 2 other reported Singapore judgments, a measure of how often later decisions have referred to it. This page summarises what the reported decision covers and links the primary sources — the full judgment, the statutes it cites, and the other cases it engages with — so the decision can be read in context. It is reference information, not legal advice, and it does not state the outcome or any holding beyond what the official judgment records.

What is [2024] SGCA 36 about?

THEODOROS KASSIMATIS KC v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE & Anor ([2024] SGCA 36) is a Court of Appeal decision from 2024. Its published catchwords are “Legal Profession — Admission — Ad hoc”, which indicate the subject matter the judgment addresses. The full reasoning and orders are in the judgment itself, linked below.

Which legislation does [2024] SGCA 36 consider?

The judgment refers to High Court said that the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161), Legal Profession Act (Cap 161), and Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185). The statutes cited are listed in full on this page, each linking to its primary text.

What earlier Singapore cases does [2024] SGCA 36 cite?

Among the in-corpus authorities it refers to are [2024] SGHC 24. The complete list of cases cited, and of later cases that cite this decision, is shown on this page.

How influential is [2024] SGCA 36?

Within this corpus, [2024] SGCA 36 has been cited by 2 later reported Singapore judgments. That count reflects references from other decisions held in this corpus only and is a conservative lower bound on how often the case has actually been cited.

Summary

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
25 September 2024
Case summary
Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another appeal
Court of Appeal – Civil Appeals Nos 16 of 2024 and 17 of 2024 [2024] SGCA 36
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Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon):
Outcome: The Court of Appeal dismissed part of the appeal against the decision of the judge sitting in the General Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) in Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another matter [2024] SGHC 24.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
•  The Court of Appeal held that foreign counsel, in seeking ad hoc admission to practice as an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore and to represent his or her client in a specific case, cannot address the court on the merits of the application for ad hoc admission.
Background to the appeal and the material facts
1 Mr Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed (“Jumaat”), Mr Saminathan Selvaraju (“Saminathan”), Mr Datchinamurthy a/l Kataiah (“Datchinamurthy”), and Mr Lingkesvaran Rajendaren (“Lingkesvaran”) (collectively, the “Claimants”) were each accused of an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “MDA”). They were each convicted at trial and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Their respective appeals against their conviction were also dismissed.
2 The Claimants filed various civil applications. In one of the applications, the Claimants argued that ss 18(1) and 18(2) of the MDA are incompatible with the presumption of innocence and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Rev Ed). The application was dismissed by the General Division of the High Court, and the Claimants filed an appeal against the High Court’s decision in CA/CA 2/2022 (“CA 2”). CA 2 was deemed withdrawn due to the Claimants’ failure to file the required documents in time. The Claimants then applied to reinstate the appeal and for an extension of time to file the required documents. The application was dismissed by a single judge sitting in the Court of Appeal. The Claimants filed another application in CA/SUM 16/2023 (“SUM 16”) for the full Court of Appeal to reconsider the matter, set aside the decision by the single judge, and reinstate CA 2.
3 The appellants, Mr Theodoros Kassimatis KC and Mr Edward Fitzgerald KC (collectively, the “Appellants”), applied for ad hoc admission to practice as advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore under s 15 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “LPA”) to represent the Claimants in CA 2 and SUM 16. The Attorney-General and the Law Society of Singapore objected to their admission.
4 In the course of the Appellants’ applications, a preliminary issue arose as to whether they were entitled to address the court on the applications since they were not yet admitted to practise as advocates and solicitors of the Supreme Court of Singapore (the “Preliminary Objection”). The Judge held that they were not entitled to do so and also dismissed their substantive applications for ad hoc admission. The Appellants appealed against the Judge’s decision. The Court of Appeal first ruled on the Preliminary Objection.
Decision of the court
5 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the Preliminary Objection (at [37]).
6 The error that the Appellants made was in keeping their unwavering focus on s 34(1)(e) of the LPA, which led them to overlook other relevant provisions of the LPA, including ss 15, 29, 32 and 33 (at [18] – [19]).
7 Section 34(1)(e) of the LPA only applies to s 33 and does not apply to s 32. A self-represented person in the true sense of that term is not practising and does not seek to practise as an advocate and solicitor and does not fall within s 32 of the LPA. He or she may nonetheless potentially offend the prohibition against specific acts in s 33 of the LPA, which explains the necessity for such exemption in s 34. However, the entire foundation for the Appellants’ ad hoc admission is that they are legal practitioners, and in seeking to present arguments on the merits of their applications for ad hoc admission, they are really advancing the interests of the Claimants in seeking to be represented by the Appellants. The Appellants cannot arrogate to themselves what is exclusively the privilege of those admitted as advocates and solicitors as provided in s 29(1) of the LPA (at [21] – [23]).
8 Section 32 of the LPA is not identical to s 33, even though there is some overlap in the sense that one who practises as an advocate and solicitor will necessarily do some of the acts in s 33. Section 32 is a broader provision that prohibits the unauthorised practice as an advocate and solicitor, while the latter is a narrower and more specific prohibition targeted at specific acts done, which are within the exclusive preserve of an advocate and solicitor. These are prohibited regardless of whether they are done in the context of practising as an advocate and solicitor (at [24] – [26]).
9 There is a necessary link between an application for ad hoc admission under s 15 of the LPA and the underlying case for which such admission is sought (at [27]).
10 There are three reasons why the Appellants cannot address the court on the applications and the appeals. First, while the form of the application under s 15 of the LPA may be that it is made by the foreign counsel, the substance is that it is an application for the benefit of the client in the underlying matter. This is not a case of someone acting for oneself but of someone seeking permission to act for someone else in another matter. They are not in the same situation as self-represented persons, and s 34(1)(e) of the LPA does not extend to allowing one to “act personally” when, in substance, that person is putting himself or herself out as advocates for the true litigants, which, in essence, is what the Appellants are doing. This would not lead to any inconsistency between ss 15(3) and 33 of the LPA as contended by the Appellants. An applicant can file the prescribed applications and swear the affidavits for ad hoc applications because they are expressly permitted to do so under s 15 of the LPA (at [28] – [33]).
11 Second, the Appellants’ arguments overlook the distinction between the prohibition in s 33 of the LPA against acts, and the more general prohibition in s 32(1) against a person practising as an advocate and solicitor. By addressing the court on their applications for ad hoc admission, the Appellants would be practising as an advocate and solicitor by appearing for and advancing the interests of the Claimants in having the Appellants represent them as their advocates and solicitors. This also sets apart an applicant applying for ad hoc admission application under s 15 of the LPA from an applicant applying for admission under s 12. Section 34(1)(e) of the LPA is also inapplicable to s 32 (at [34]).
12 Third, the question of whether to grant an application for ad hoc admission is not just a matter of form. These are hurdles that have been put in place to ensure that foreign counsel cannot represent parties to litigation unless these conditions are met. They illustrate that, first, at its heart, an application under s 15 of the LPA is primarily concerned with the rights of the parties to the underlying litigation and not with the rights or interests of the applicants for ad hoc admission. Second, these potentially difficult issues and hurdles, which concern questions of domestic policy, should be dealt with by the court with the assistance of local counsel, not foreign counsel, because it cannot be gainsaid that the former are best placed to assist the court on such matters (at [35] – [36]).
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.

What was at issue in Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General [2024] SGCA 36?

[2024] SGCA 36 concerned the ad hoc admission of foreign counsel under section 15 of the Legal Profession Act 1966. The Court of Appeal heard appeals by Theodoros Kassimatis KC and Edward Fitzgerald KC, King's Counsel of England, against the Attorney-General and the Law Society of Singapore.

Which judges heard the ad hoc admission appeals in [2024] SGCA 36?

Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v Attorney-General and another and another appeal [2024] SGCA 36 was decided by the Court of Appeal, comprising Sundaresh Menon CJ, Belinda Ang Saw Ean JCA and Judith Prakash SJ, in a reserved judgment delivered on 25 September 2024.

Statutes Cited

High Court said that the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) Cases on this Act →
Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) Cases on this Act →
s 15
Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185) Cases on this Act →

Cases Cited (14)

SG (4)
[2018] SGHC 207 [2021] SGHC 154 [2022] SGHC 291 [2024] SGHC 24
SLR (10)
[1988] 1 SLR(R) 281 [1992] 3 SLR(R) 113 [2002] 1 SLR(R) 751 [2004] 4 SLR(R) 411 [2015] 4 SLR 1064 [2016] 5 SLR 179 [2017] 2 SLR 850 [2022] 1 SLR 1347 [2022] 3 SLR 731 [2023] 1 SLR 1437

Cited By (2)

[2024] SGCA 49
THEODOROS KASSIMATIS KC v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE & Anor
[2024] SGHC 274
Mohamad Shafee Khamis

Referenced in

Statutes interpreted in this judgment

Legal Profession Act Misuse of Drugs Act

Legal concepts & references

Legal Profession — Admission

Judgment

Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.

Read on eLitigation

Source: eLitigation ([2024] SGCA 36)