Sang Cheol Woo v Charles Choi Spackman and others
[2024] SGHC 299 · HC/S 211/2019 ( HC/RA 186/2024 ) · cites 20 cases (14 Singapore, 6 foreign) · cited by 1 case
Does the Riddick principle stop a party relying on an affidavit filed in other proceedings?
Not here. The High Court held the principle binds non-parties but covers only material disclosed under compulsion of a court order, which the affidavit was not, and dismissed the appeal against leave to amend.
Step 1: What happened
Sang Cheol Woo sued Charles Choi Spackman and eight other defendants in Suit No 211 of 2019. The suit was split into two stages. In the first stage the High Court decided, in a judgment of 30 November 2022, that a Seoul High Court judgment against Mr Spackman could be enforced in Singapore. The other defendants had agreed to be bound by that decision. The second stage, on the plaintiff's conspiracy claims against all defendants, had not yet been heard.
In separate defamation proceedings, the plaintiff filed his 6th affidavit on 4 April 2024. In it he said he had a contingency fee arrangement with Kobre & Kim LLP, his foreign counsel, under which he would pay the firm an additional amount out of what he recovered by enforcing the Korean judgment. The 2nd and 3rd defendants, Mr Spackman's brother-in-law and wife, said this might contradict his evidence at the first-stage trial that he had no agreement to share the fruits of the proceeding with a third party. They applied to amend their Defence to plead that the fee arrangement was prohibited under Singapore law and that the claim was tainted by maintenance or champerty and so an abuse of process. An Assistant Registrar allowed the amendments, and the plaintiff appealed in Registrar's Appeal No 186 of 2024.
Step 2: What the court had to decide
- Whether proceedings remained afoot under O 20 r 5(1) of the Rules of Court 2014 after the first-stage judgment.
- Whether the amendment application was an abuse of the court's process or a backdoor appeal.
- Whether the Riddick principle binds non-parties and covers an affidavit not filed under a court order.
- Whether the proposed amendments raised a real question that was not factually or legally unsustainable.
Step 3: How the court reasoned
On jurisdiction, the judge applied the Court of Appeal's reading in Shanghai Shipyard of the words "at any stage of the proceedings", under which the power survives judgment while something still remains to be done. Here the liability of the 2nd and 3rd defendants on the conspiracy claims was undecided, so proceedings against them were still on foot.
On abuse of process, the application could not be called a bad-faith or collateral attack because the affidavit relied on was filed only after the first-stage judgment. Emjay was distinguished, since there the limitation clause existed when liability was tried. The judge also relied on counsel's confirmation at the hearing that the two defendants would not reopen the judgment or the enforceability of the Korean judgment.
On the Riddick principle, the judge held that it must apply to non-parties, agreeing with Dennis Foo that otherwise a party could defeat it by handing documents to a third party. But the principle was not engaged here. Reading ED&F and Priscilla Lim together, the judge found no inconsistency: ED&F made clear that the principle applies only to material disclosed under compulsion of a court order, and the affidavit was not.
On the merits of the amendment, contracts savouring of maintenance or champerty remain void at common law even though the tort was abolished. It was undisputed that the foreign firm acted as instructing solicitors under a contingency arrangement. The judge accepted that the plaintiff's earlier answer may have been shaped by the question asked and did not find untruth, but some inconsistency remained on the face of the two statements, and the arrangement itself was not in evidence. Whether the claim was affected would depend on the facts. The amendments could not be called fanciful, and any prejudice could be met by costs.
“maintaining the distinction between parties and non-parties would allow for the absurd situation where any party to proceedings bound by the Riddick principle would be able to easily undermine the principle by simply passing the document in question to a third party”
[2024] SGHC 299 at [46]
Step 4: The order
Kwek Mean Luck J dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, leaving in place the Assistant Registrar's order granting the 2nd and 3rd defendants leave to amend their Defence. Parties were directed to file written submissions on costs of not more than 5 pages within a week if they could not agree on costs.
Terms in this case
- Abuse of process
- Use of court proceedings for an improper purpose or in a way that is unfair or oppressive to the other side. The court may strike out or stay proceedings that abuse its process.
- Pleadings
- The formal written documents in which each party to a civil case sets out the facts it relies on, such as the statement of claim and the defence. They define the issues the court has to decide.
- Affidavit
- A written statement of facts that a person swears or affirms to be true, used as evidence in court proceedings. Making a false statement in an affidavit can be a criminal offence.
Court record
Key facts
| Court | High Court |
|---|---|
| Decided | |
| Judge | Kwek Mean Luck |
| What the case was about | Civil Procedure, Abuse of Process |
Source: [2024] SGHC 299, High Court, decided — eLitigation. Updated .
Judge
- Kwek Mean Luck Delivered the judgment
Parties
- Funvest Global Pte Ltd Defendant
- Plutoray Pte Ltd Defendant
- Spackman Media Group Limited Defendant
- Starlight Corp Pte Ltd Defendant
- Vaara Pte Ltd Defendant
- Charles Choi Spackman Defendant
- Kim Jae Seung Defendant
- Kim So Hee Defendant
- Richard Lee Defendant
- Sang Cheol Woo Plaintiff
Counsel
- WongPartnership LLP Firm
- Fan Wai Leong, Benson
- Lin Weiqi Wendy
Statutes cited
Cases cited (20)
- [2020] SGCA 64
- [2021] SGHC 154
- [2022] SGHC 298
- [2022] SGHC(A) 5
- [2006] 2 SLR(R) 268
- [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453
- [2010] 1 SLR 52
- [2012] 4 SLR 546
- [2015] 2 SLR 578
- [2015] 4 SLR 597
- [2020] 2 SLR 695
- [2020] 2 SLR 912
- [2021] 2 SLR 584
- [2022] 1 SLR 643
- [1963] Ch 199
- [1975] QB 613
- [1997] QB 881
- [2019] EWHC 2651
- [2024] EWHC 552
- [2015] NSWSC 2104
Cited by (1)
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Will a court extend a writ that expired more than a decade earlier?
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Can documents disclosed in a Singapore suit be used to check compliance with a foreign discovery order?
High Court · 25 April 2024 · [2024] SGHC 106 -
Does a judgment creditor need permission to use examination evidence in a foreign claim against a director?
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Read the full judgment
The judgment itself is on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2024] SGHC 299)
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