Diana Foo v Woo Mui Chan

Facts

Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan was the assessment of damages in Suit No 510 of 2021 in the General Division of the High Court, following the court's earlier finding in Foo Diana v Woo Mui Chan [2023] SGHC 221 that the defendant had defamed the plaintiff. The plaintiff, an advocate and solicitor in practice since about 2005, had been the defendant's friend until disputes arose over money the defendant allegedly owed her.

The defamation lay in two statements. Statement 1, a public Google review on the Law Society's page posted around 2018, said the plaintiff had bullied the defendant and forced her into illegal deals. Statement 2, a complaint to the Law Society on 3 March 2020, alleged that the plaintiff lent her money, asked her to help move money in a Vietnam deal, made sexual advances and used vulgarities. The court had rejected justification for Statement 1 and found the defendant malicious, defeating qualified privilege, for Statement 2.

The plaintiff sought general damages of $300,000 and aggravated damages of at least $50,000, saying her losses from lost clients and referrals were at least $500,000. The defendant argued for $30,000 in all, stressing that neither party was a public figure and that publication was limited.

Issues

1. Whether loss of earnings, business and clientele can be claimed as general damages in defamation
2. Whether the plaintiff proved any such financial loss
3. What general damages each statement warranted
4. Whether aggravated damages and an injunction should be granted

Holding

The court allowed the claim in part, granting judgment for the plaintiff for a total of $41,250: general damages of $25,000 and aggravated damages of $6,250 for Statement 1, and general damages of $8,000 and aggravated damages of $2,000 for Statement 2. It rejected the claim for lost earnings and business and refused the injunction. Costs were to be heard separately.

Reasoning

Preferring Dingle and Calvet over older English cases, the court held that lost earnings, business and clientele are pecuniary loss and so special damage, which must be pleaded and proved, and cannot be folded into general damages. Because the defendant had clearly understood that such loss was alleged, the court still considered it, but found no evidence at all: no invoices or accounts showing a fall in income, and only estimates and opinions from a client and two property agents. Figures drawn by extrapolating from precedent awards could not prove the plaintiff's own financial loss.

On general damages, Statement 1 was of moderate severity because its bare, vague allegations were less credible; Statement 2 was more serious because it was sworn by statutory declaration, made by a supposed client and gave detail. Neither party had public standing, and the court rejected the argument that defaming a lawyer is worse than defaming a politician. A late marketing report on search clicks was disregarded as improperly adduced and of no value. Statement 1 drew a single reaction and one comment, so publication was low, with only limited grapevine effect. Statement 2 reached only Law Society bodies, and the dismissal of the complaint and the liability judgment largely vindicated the plaintiff there, leaving mainly hurt feelings. The court declined to treat its indignation or deterrence as separate factors, since they belong to punitive damages.

Aggravated damages were justified by malice, which was res judicata for Statement 2 and shown for Statement 1 because the defendant could not genuinely believe it, by a hopeless plea of justification run on shifting stories, and by an apology that came only at the very end. Benchmarking against recent cases rather than inflating older awards, the court fixed Statement 1's general damages near those in Mark Yeow, set Statement 2's at about a third of that, and added a 25% uplift. No injunction was needed since the post was removed and there was no sign of repetition.

From the judgment