Vikramathithan A/L Rasu v AK Equine Pte Ltd

Facts

Vikramathithan a/l Rasu v AK Equine Pte Ltd concerned Originating Application No 1147 of 2024 in the General Division of the High Court. The applicant, a farm worker employed by a company that trained and traded racehorses, sought to restore the company to the Register after it was struck off on 5 February 2024, so that he could sue it for a workplace accident he alleged had happened at the Singapore Turf Club on 8 November 2021. He said a bird startled the horse he was riding back to the stable and he was thrown onto the road.

A work injury compensation claim was lodged, and on 10 October 2023 a notice of computation awarded him $11,207.98. Feeling this was too low, he withdrew that claim on 31 October 2023 to pursue a common law claim instead. It was undisputed that little was done for about nine months; he blamed two earlier sets of lawyers. His present solicitors, appointed on 18 July 2024, found the company had been struck off. A letter of demand went to the company's insurer on 1 October 2024 and this application was filed on 4 November 2024, days before the three-year limitation period expired.

Issues

1. Whether the intended personal injury claim was already time-barred
2. Whether s 344G(3) of the Companies Act 1967 lets the court make a limitation direction
3. Whether a limitation direction should be made on these facts
4. Whether the requirements for restoring the company to the Register were met

Holding

The court allowed the application, granting leave to restore the company to the Register so the applicant could pursue his claim for the alleged incident. It also made a limitation direction excluding the period from 1 October 2024, when the letter of demand was sent, until the date of restoration. Costs were dealt with separately, with the court suggesting they be reserved to the end of the underlying claim.

Reasoning

The court held the claim prima facie time-barred. Under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act 1959 a personal injury action must be brought within three years, so time ran out on 8 November 2024. A letter of demand is not an action, and slowness by earlier lawyers could not extend the period at the company's expense.

As this appeared to be the first time the point arose in Singapore, the court invited further submissions. Both sides agreed, and the court held, that the very broad discretion in s 344G(3), recognised in Bijynath s/o Ram Nawal v Innovationz Pte Ltd (Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, intervener) [2020] 4 SLR 534, includes power to make a limitation direction, as English courts do under the equivalent UK provision.

Following the English cases, the court asked whether the striking off caused the failure to sue in time and whether a direction would be just. On causation, the focus was on the underlying claim, judged on probabilities. The letter of demand and the amended application asking that the claim be preserved from the time bar showed he was gearing up to sue, and nobody would expect to sue a struck-off company without first restoring it. Delay within the limitation period carried little weight. On justice, the absence in Singapore of a discretionary extension for personal injury claims, unlike s 33 of the UK statute, meant refusal would leave him without remedy. The claim was not obviously unmeritorious: lack of eyewitnesses, the place of the incident and foreseeability were matters for trial, and there were plausible arguments on non-delegable duties.

For restoration, the applicant was an aggrieved person, the application was within six years, and restoration was just because it served a practical purpose. Choosing a common law claim over statutory compensation was not objectionable.

From the judgment