AFFANDI BIN MOHAMED HASSAN v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

14 April 2026

Case summary: Affandi bin Mohamed Hassan v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2026] SGCA 17  

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Decision of the Court of Appeal (comprising Tay Yong Kwang JCA, Steven Chong JCA and Ang Cheng Hock JCA)(delivered by Tay Yong Kwang JCA)

Outcome: The court dismissed an appeal against conviction and sentence for a capital charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) for trafficking not less than 24.64g of diamorphine. The court also dismissed a criminal motion seeking permission to adduce new evidence. 

1. The appellant was tried in the General Division of the High Court for one charge of having in his possession not less than 24.64 grams of diamorphine for the purpose of trafficking, an offence under s 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (the “MDA”) and punishable under s 33(1), or alternatively, s 33B of the MDA (the “Capital Charge”).

2. At the trial, the undisputed facts were that on 10 December 2020, the appellant was arrested in the flat where he resided. Three sets of drugs (referred to at the trial as the “A”, “B” and “D” drugs) were recovered from different locations within the flat. The appellant was in possession of all the drugs and he knew that the drugs contained diamorphine. There were other drugs found in the flat (referred to at trial as the “C” and “E” drugs) but these were not the subject matter of the Capital Charge.

3. The appellant was assessed by Dr Derrick Yeo Chen Kuan (“Dr Yeo”) from the Institute of Mental Health who opined in his psychiatric report that although the appellant was likely suffering from Opiate (Heroin) Use Disorder, he was not of unsound mind at the material time of the offence and he was fit to plead in court.

4. The Prosecution’s case at the trial was that the appellant intended to traffic in the “A”, “B” and “D” drugs. The appellant did not dispute that he intended to traffic in the “A” and “D” drugs. In relation to the “B” drugs, his defence was that they were solely for his own consumption. In relation to the “D” drugs, his defence was that he was only a courier: he had agreed to work for one “Ah Kwang” to take delivery of the “D” drugs on instructions from Ah Kwang and to hold on to them before passing them to one “Salim” and one “Pekboon”.

5. The trial judge found that the appellant intended to traffic in the “B” drugs, as both the “A” and “B” drugs were found in the appellant’s bedroom and were packed in the same manner, using the same plastic bags. Further, the appellant conceded that he had no reason for failing to inform in his fourth investigative statement that the “B” drugs were solely for his own consumption, when he had readily done so for the “C” drugs. He raised the consumption defence only at the trial.

6. The trial judge also rejected the appellant’s claim that his role in relation to the “D” drugs was restricted to that of a courier. The appellant’s evidence at the trial was riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions and flaws. He could not provide a consistent narrative as to why the “D” drugs were in his possession nor what he was supposed to do as a courier for Ah Kwang.

7. Having found that all elements of the charge were satisfied, the trial judge convicted the appellant on the Capital Charge.

8. To qualify for the alternative sentencing regime under s 33B(1)(a) of the MDA, an offender must receive a certificate of substantive assistance (“CSA”) from the Public Prosecutor and prove that his involvement in the offence was restricted to the acts of a “courier”. Although the appellant received a CSA from the Public Prosecutor, as the trial judge found that the appellant’s involvement in the offence was not restricted to that of a courier, the appellant could not avail himself of the alternative sentencing regime. He was therefore sentenced to the mandatory death penalty.

9. The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence. He also attempted, by way of a criminal motion, to adduce a psychiatric evaluation report by Dr Rajesh Jacob (“Dr Rajesh”) from Promises Healthcare Pte Ltd for the purpose of explaining that the inconsistencies arising from his statements and oral testimony could be attributed to his mental condition.

10. The court dismissed the criminal motion as there was no good explanation for why the new evidence was not adduced at the trial. The appellant blamed his former counsel for various things, including not explaining and advising on the importance of Dr Yeo’s report. He also stated that he felt that during the conduct of his trial, his former counsel were not putting in their full effort and thought that he was not clever enough to understand. However, he failed to provide any evidence for this. His previous counsel had also refuted this accusation and provided ample evidence of their efforts to explain the relevant documents to him over multiple interviews. The appellant signed a confirmation that his only defence in relation to the “D” drugs was that he was only a courier. The appellant could not argue that he was so confused by his mental condition that he did not understand what he was doing when he signed the confirmation as this took place more than two years after his arrest and psychiatric assessment by Dr Yeo. It was also not stated by Dr Rajesh that the appellant was suffering from a mental condition when he signed the confirmation: at [20]–[28].

11. Further, Dr Jacob’s report only stated that the appellant was suffering from an abnormality of the mind caused by his moderate opioid use disorder at the material time of the offence. It therefore could not explain the inconsistencies in his oral testimony, which were given more than two years after his arrest: at [30].

12. The criminal motion was another clear instance of a convicted person seeking a retrial under the guise of introducing further evidence. The Court of Appeal has expressed its approval of making baseless allegations against trial counsel, especially when these are made by lawyers: at [31].

13. The court also agreed with the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence and his factual findings and his reasons for convicting the appellant on the Capital Charge and sentencing him to the mandatory death penalty. Once the criminal motion was dismissed, there was nothing to explain the inconsistencies arising from the appellant’s statements and his oral testimony in relation to the “D” drugs. The various procedural arguments raised by the appellant in his appeal were also rejected by the court: [35]–[48]. The court also agreed with the trial judge that the consumption defence was an afterthought. In any event, the amount of diamorphine in the “B” drugs could not change the trafficking charge into a non-capital charge.