How does Singapore's Court of Appeal interpret statutory damages for trade mark counterfeiting under the Trade Marks Act?

In Louis Vuitton Malletier v Ng Hoe Seng [2026] SGCA 22, the Court of Appeal, led by Hri Kumar Nair JCA, revisited the statutory damages framework under s 31(5)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1998, addressing whether damages of up to S$1.45 million are calculated per goods or per infringing act using a purposive interpretive approach.

[2026] SGCA 22 — LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER v Ng Hoe Seng (formerly trading as EMCASE SG)

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE

6 May 2026

Case summary

Louis Vuitton Malletier v Ng Hoe Seng (formerly trading as EMCASE SG) [2026] SGCA 22

Court of Appeal – Civil Appeal No 30 of 2025

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Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Hri Kumar Nair JCA):

Outcome: The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against a decision to grant S$200,000 in statutory damages for trade mark infringement involving the use of a “counterfeit trade mark” under s 31(5)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 (2020 Rev Ed).

Pertinent and significant points of the judgment

• This judgment interprets the statutory damages regime for trade mark infringement involving the use of a “counterfeit trade mark” under s 31(5)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 (2020 Rev Ed) (“TMA”). It also elucidates the considerations relevant to the different factors under s 31(6), which are to be considered by the court in awarding statutory damages under s 31(5)(c) of the TMA.

1 This was an appeal against the decision of a judge in the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) to grant S$200,000 in statutory damages under s 31(5)(c) of the TMA.

Background to the appeal

2 Louis Vuitton Malletier (“Appellant”) was the proprietor of 13 “Louis Vuitton” trade marks registered in Singapore (“Registered Marks”). It commenced an action for trade mark infringement against Ng Hoe Seng (“Respondent”) and obtained judgment in default as the Respondent was absent in the proceedings below: at [4] and [7].

3 The Respondent operated an online store through Instagram, advertising, offering or exposing for sale goods affixed with signs identical to one or more of Registered Marks without the Appellant’s consent (“Offending Goods”). There were nine types of Offending Goods: at [5].

4 A judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) deemed the Respondent’s infringement to involve the use of a “counterfeit trade mark”. This entitled the Appellant to statutory damages under s 31(5)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 (2020 Rev Ed) (“TMA”), which the Judge assessed to be S$200,000: at [8] and [14].

5 The Appellant, dissatisfied with the Judge’s interpretation of s 31(5)(c) and the quantum of damages awarded in light of the factors under s 31(6), appealed.

Decision of the Court of Appeal

6 The court allowed the appeal. It addressed two main issues: at [22(a)].

a. First, whether the Judge erred in his interpretation of s 31(5)(c) of the TMA, in particular his finding that the prescribed statutory damages limits did not apply on a “per mark” basis; and

b. Second, whether the Judge erred in his assessment of the statutory damages awarded to the Appellant.

7 There were two possible interpretations of s 31(5)(c)(i) of the TMA – the S$100,000 limit may apply to: (a) each type of goods or service on which counterfeit marks have been used, regardless of the number of counterfeit marks used on those goods or service (“Per Goods Interpretation”); or (b) each counterfeit mark used in respect of each type of goods of service (“Per Mark Interpretation”). Similarly, there were two possible interpretations of s 31(5)(c)(ii) – the aggregate S$1m limit may apply: (a) to each action, regardless of the number of types of goods or services on which counterfeit marks were used (“Per Action Interpretation”); or (b) to each counterfeit mark used, ie, Per Mark Interpretation. The Appellant argued in favour of the Per Mark Interpretation while the Respondent supported the Judge’s finding that the Per Goods Interpretation and the Per Action Interpretation applied: at [27].

8 The court found that the plain text of s 31(5)(c) of the TMA supported the Per Goods Interpretation and the Per Action Interpretation. If Parliament intended for damages to be assessed on a “per mark” basis, it would have used clear words to that effect. The references to “a registered trade mark” and “a counterfeit trade mark” in the opening words of s 31(5) in the singular described the nature of the action that triggered the assessment of damages regime. Similarly, the phrase “in relation to which the counterfeit trade mark has been used” in s 31(5)(c)(i) described the type of goods relevant to the assessment: at [29]–[30] and [69(a)].

9 Moreover, s 2 of the Interpretation Act 1965 (2020 Rev Ed) expressly stated that “words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular”. This was also made clear in Chang Peng Hong Clarence v Public Prosecutor [2024] 2 SLR 722: at [31]–[32].

10 The legislative purpose of the statutory damages regime in Singapore was to compensate the claimant and deter the defendant and other potential infringers, but not to punish the wrongdoer. This dual purpose must be achieved within boundaries that bore a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the claimant or benefit derived by the defendant: at [42], [44], [45] and [69(b)].

11 The courts in Singapore have not assessed damages on a “per mark” basis, despite similar statutory language in s 31(2) of the TMA referring to “an action for an infringement” in the singular: at [46] and [69(c)].

12 Although Singapore enacted the statutory damages regime to fulfil its US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement obligations, it did not adopt wholesale the US legislation or its principles in awarding statutory damages. The statutory damages regime in the US involved punitive considerations, including implementing a tenfold uplift in the limit for wilful infringement. In contrast, the statutory damages regime in Singapore was not meant to punish. The statutory limits remained the same regardless of whether the infringement was negligent, inadvertent or wilful: at [62]–[65] and [69(d)].

13 Under s 31(6)(a), the flagrancy of infringement may be assessed by reference to the number of counterfeit marks used, the number of types of goods as well as the scope of the defendant’s operations: at [77(a)].

14 The assessment of loss suffered by the claimant under s 31(6)(b) should consider whether the field of business activities of the parties gave rise to direct competition. Nonetheless, where the infringement involved the sale of counterfeit goods which were significantly cheaper than the genuine goods, the loss of sales was unlikely to be significant. Beyond direct commercial loss, there was also damage to exclusivity, reputation and goodwill: at [77(b)].

15 Under s 31(6)(c), the defendant’s benefit may be measured by estimating the profit margins. The advantage of free-riding off the quality associated with the registered marks was also relevant: at [77(c)].

16 There were two aspects to the deterrence factor under s 31(6)(d). General deterrence may account for the prevalence of counterfeit luxury goods and the ease with which online platforms facilitate infringement. Specific deterrence required consideration of the defendant’s conduct: at [77(d)].

17 Given that the statutory limit was S$100,000 for each type of goods or service in relation to which the counterfeit trade mark had been used (s 31(5)(c)(i)), the more principled approach was to assess damages based on the factors in s 31(6) in respect of each of the nine type of goods in this case: at [83].

18 On the facts, the Respondent’s infringement was highly flagrant and warranted both general and specific deterrence. He was evasive and uncooperative throughout the proceedings and was a recalcitrant infringer who breached the injunction. The only factor militating against a higher award of damages was the fact that the scope of the Respondent’s operations appeared to be limited. However, there was ultimately no evidence before the court as to the true extent of the Respondent’s counterfeiting operations: at [85]–[88].

19 Damages should provisionally land on the higher side of the mid-point of S$50,000 per type of goods. This provisional figure was subject to adjustments based on the factors specific to each type of goods. The nine different types of goods were divided into four broad categories. The categories were conceptualised based on several factors, including: (a) the quantum of the Respondent’s sales and/or advertising (based on the limited evidence before the court); (b) the price disparity between the Offending Goods and the same type of products without the counterfeit marks associated with the Registered Marks; and (c) whether the Appellant dealt in the same type of goods: at [90].

20 In this case, S$510,000 in statutory damages was awarded to the Appellant: (a) S$70,000 each for phone cases, key cases and pouches/purses; (b) S$60,000 each for watch straps and card wallets/holders; (c) S$50,000 each for passport covers, phone bags and spectacle cases; and (d) S$30,000 for cigarette cases: at [91]–[95].

This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.

LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER v Ng Hoe Seng (formerly trading as EMCASE SG)

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How does Singapore's Court of Appeal interpret statutory damages for trade mark counterfeiting under the Trade Marks Act?

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