JEH v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Facts

The appellant, JEH, owned a flat that she leased to six tenants from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2024, while she and her daughter lived mainly at her partner's flat. On 17 June 2023, shortly before the Primary 1 registration exercise began on 4 July 2023, she falsely reported to a registration officer that she had moved back to her own flat. Using that address, which was within one kilometre of the school, she secured her daughter a place under the home-school distance priority in Phase 2C. A condition of admission was that the daughter live at the flat for 30 months.

In June 2024 she emailed the school about a change of address back to her partner's flat. When told her daughter might be transferred, she said they would stay at the flat, and she again falsely reported a change of address to her flat. School staff visited the flat twice and found only tenants. Between 6 August 2024 and 7 October 2024 she gave false accounts of her residence to the vice principal on five occasions, in meetings and emails, and asked the tenants, directly and through their agent, to say she and her daughter lived there.

She pleaded guilty to an amalgamated charge under s 182 of the Penal Code of giving false information to a public servant, and a charge under s 20(a) of the National Registration Regulations, with the earlier false address report taken into consideration. In Public Prosecutor v JEH [2025] SGMC 68 the District Judge imposed one week's imprisonment on each charge, to run concurrently, although the Prosecution had sought fines. She appealed in Magistrate's Appeal No 9183 of 2025, seeking a fine of $9,100.

Issues

1. Whether the appellant could depart on appeal from the Statement of Facts she had admitted, and whether the District Judge had prejudged the sentence.
2. Whether the custodial threshold was crossed for the amalgamated false information offence.
3. Whether one week's imprisonment for the national registration offence was manifestly excessive.
4. Whether the aggregate sentence of one week's imprisonment was manifestly excessive.

Holding

The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentences of one week's imprisonment for each offence, running concurrently. It also confirmed that, for an amalgamated charge, the Magistrate's Court could impose up to a $20,000 fine and/or four years' imprisonment. The court considered the sentence lenient but declined to enhance it, having no submissions or precedents on the point.

Reasoning

On the procedural points, the court held that it was improper for the appellant to suggest on appeal that she had lived at the flat and had not sought priority by proximity, contrary to her unqualified admission of the Statement of Facts. Counsel's first duty is to the court. Sentencing is for the court, not bound by the parties' positions, and a judge putting a provisional view to the parties is proper; the allegation of prejudgment was withdrawn and should never have been made.

On the false information offence, the court applied Koh Yong Chiah v Public Prosecutor [2017] 3 SLR 447 and found appreciable harm. The school had to spend significant resources on visits, meetings and emails to uncover the truth, which on its own justified custody, unlike Henry Wong, where the offender admitted the truth at the first meeting. Places under Phase 2C are finite, so at least one other child was, or risked being, deprived of a place, and such conduct risks eroding public confidence in the registration system. The court disagreed that rising prevalence must be shown before custody can be the starting point. Culpability was also high: she knew the statements were false, planned the scheme, lied five times, involved seven others and persisted for at least 15 months. Repetition in an amalgamated charge was a further reason for custody. Her lack of antecedents was neutral because she faced multiple offences, and her personal circumstances were not exceptional.

On the registration offence, the court found her culpability high: she made the false report shortly before registration, corrected it once she thought she had succeeded, and then repeated the falsehood when the school began investigating. The court added that the District Judge could have treated the TIC charge as aggravating without double counting.

On the aggregate, the District Judge rightly gave weight to general deterrence and did not apply an escalation principle. The court indicated that it might have ordered the sentences to run consecutively at first instance.

From the judgment