DXB v DXC

Facts

A client, anonymised as DXB, engaged a law firm, DXC, under an engagement agreement dated 4 April 2024. The work ran until 22 October 2024 and the invoices were delivered by 10 December 2024 at the latest. The client did not pay them beyond an initial retainer, first objected on 20 June 2025, and the firm began an ICC arbitration on 24 July 2025 to recover its fees. In its Answer of 8 October 2025, while still within time, the client reserved its right to have the bills taxed and to allege that the invoices may have been overinflated.

Outside the 12-month period, the client applied in Originating Application No 405 of 2026 under s 120 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 for assessment of the bills. Because of the time elapsed, an order could be made only under special circumstances proved to the court's satisfaction. The client relied on what it called an ambiguity in the dispute resolution clause, which referred both to taxation and to arbitration, and on allegations that one of the firm's lawyers, Mr X, had deliberately inflated his time entries. Andre Maniam J gave an ex tempore judgment.

Issues

1. Whether the claimed ambiguity between arbitration and assessment in the engagement agreement was a special circumstance.
2. Whether the client's allegation of fraudulent overcharging by one lawyer was a special circumstance.
3. Whether the court records should be sealed and the parties anonymised.

Holding

The court dismissed the application for an out-of-time order referring the bills to assessment. In view of the pending arbitration, it sealed the court records for this application and ordered the parties anonymised, but declined to seal the records of assessment proceedings that would not now take place. The client was ordered to pay the firm $24,089 (all in) in costs.

Reasoning

Relying on Kosui Singapore Pte Ltd v Thangavelu [2015] 5 SLR 722, the judge treated the 12-month rule much like a limitation period: special circumstances must explain and excuse the client's failure to apply in time. The client knew of its right to tax from the outset and chose to wait for the tribunal's jurisdiction ruling, applying only after being pressed at the arbitration hearing. Events after the period could not explain inaction within it. If it wished to defer assessment, it should have applied in time and asked the court to hold the matter in abeyance. Lun Yaodong Clarence v Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP [2025] 1 SLR 849 showed that an arbitration clause does not bar assessment.

A bare allegation of fraud is not enough. The alleged inflation concerned only Mr X, whose billed hours were less than half of the invoiced amount, yet the client sought assessment of all the invoices. Its explanation that it lacked evidence until Mr X's reply witness statement was hollow, since its earlier memorial had already suggested his entries may have been deliberately inflated, and it had called the invoices excessive in June 2025. Viewed with the regular fee updates and the client's earlier assurance about funding, no special circumstances were proved. The judge did not comment on the merits of the fraud allegation, as the arbitration was pending.

From the judgment