THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE v LIM TEAN
11 cases cited
Catchwords
Practice Areas
Counsel (3)
Case Significance
The Law Society of Singapore v Lim Tean [2026] SGHC 78, decided on 10 April 2026 by the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges comprising Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon (delivering judgment), Tay Yong Kwang JCA, and Andrew Phang Boon Leong SJ, addressed disciplinary proceedings against advocate and solicitor Lim Tean. The Law Society, represented by Chenthil Kumar Kumarasingam of Withers KhattarWong LLP, sought Lim Tean's striking off the roll under section 98(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, alternatively a five-year suspension and a $30,000 fine under section 83(1). Disciplinary proceedings were initiated following a complaint by Lim Tean's former client, Mr Suresh Kumar s/o A Jesupal; the Law Society had preferred three charges with alternatives but withdrew the Third Charge when Mr Suresh declined to testify, proceeding on the remaining two charges. Oral hearings commenced on 11 May 2022. The case is significant both for the gravity of the sanction sought — striking off — and for the involvement of the Chief Justice's court, which convenes under the Legal Profession Act for the most serious professional conduct matters.
Summary
The Law Society of Singapore v Lim Tean
SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
10 April 2026
Case summary
The Law Society of Singapore v Lim Tean [2026] SGHC 78
Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges / Originating Application No 5 of 2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Decision of the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges (delivered by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon):
Outcome: The Court 3 Supreme Court Judges (C3J) found that there was no due cause for disciplinary sanction against the respondent in respect of the First Charge and its alternative. The First Charge alleged that the respondent had, without just cause, received and/or retained a cheque for the sum of $30,000 (the “Cheque”) despite having been discharged by the complainant (“Mr Suresh”) on or about 13 November 2019. This was alleged to be grossly improper conduct in the discharge of the respondent’s professional duty under s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2009 Rev Ed) (“LPA (Cap. 161)”) or in the alternative, misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA (Cap.161). The C3J found that there was due cause for disciplinary sanction in respect of the Second Charge, which related to the respondent’s breach of r 3(1) of the Legal Profession (Solicitors’ Accounts) Rules (Cap. 161, 1999 Rev Ed) (“LPSAR”) for failing to deposit client moneys into the law firm’s client account. The C3J imposed a financial penalty of $30,000 on the respondent.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
• It is trite that the Law Society of Singapore (the “LSS”) bore the legal burden of proving the guilt of the respondent legal practitioner beyond a reasonable doubt. It sought to do so by relying essentially on documents alone after Mr Suresh refused to give evidence in support of its case. The LSS did not challenge the authenticity or admissibility of the acknowledgment forms signed by Mr Tarmmar Razu s/o Doriasamy (“Mr Razu”) and Mr Suresh, in which they appeared to have acknowledged that they received the respective sums of $22,200 and $5000 from the respondent. The LSS also did not contest the respondent’s contention that the meeting on 26 November 2019 between the respondent, Mr Razu and Mr Suresh had taken place and that those payments had been made. Once this was put forward by the respondent and it was unchallenged by the LSS, it became necessary to consider the significance of these facts to the case the LSS had advanced: at [51]-[53].
• The Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) had failed to recognise that the Third Charge and the First Charge were inextricably linked, in that both related to the respondent’s receipt and handling of the Cheque. The Third Charge was withdrawn upon Mr Suresh’s refusal to testify against the respondent on the Third Charge relating to the misappropriation of the Cheque. But the same could be said of the allegations underlying the First Charge: at [54].
1 This was an application made by the LSS for an order under s 98(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) for the respondent to be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the LPA. The LSS asked for the respondent to be struck off the roll of advocates and solicitors and, in the alternative, for him to be suspended from practice for a period of five years and to be fined $30,000.
Background to the application
2 Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against the respondent following a complaint made by Mr Suresh, who had been the respondent’s client. The LSS preferred three charges with alternatives against the respondent. The LSS subsequently withdrew the Third Charge and its alternative when it became evident that Mr Suresh was not willing to testify at the oral hearing of the matter.
3 The LSS proceeded with the remaining two charges:
a. First Charge: the respondent had received and/or retained the Cheque despite having been discharged by Mr Suresh on or about 13 November 2019. This was alleged to be grossly improper conduct in the discharge of the respondent’s professional duty under s 83(2)(b) or misconduct under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA (Cap. 161).
b. Second Charge: while practising with Carson Law Chambers (“CLC”), the respondent did not pay the sum of $30,000 he received into CLC’s Client Account. This was alleged to be a breach of r 3(1) of the LPSAR, such breach amounting to grossly improper conduct under s 83(2)(b) or misconduct under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA (Cap. 161).
4 Mr Suresh was the plaintiff in a District Court suit which concerned a motor vehicle accident claim. Mr Suresh sought damages for personal injuries he sustained in a road traffic accident in 2012. On 21 March 2017, Mr Suresh obtained interlocutory judgment in the District Court suit against the defendant for 100% of the damages to be assessed and costs to be agreed or taxed. On 23 October 2018, Mr Suresh engaged the respondent to act for him, and on 8 October 2019, CLC obtained Final Judgment in the District Court Suit in favour of Mr Suresh, for, among other things, the judgment sum of $50,000.
Facts pertaining to the First Charge
5 On or around 13 November 2019, Mr Suresh appeared to have terminated the respondent’s engagement, and appointed another law firm, Messrs Joseph Chen & Co (“JCC”) to act for him in place of the respondent. On 13 November 2019, JCC wrote to CLC, informing the respondent that he/CLC had been discharged as Mr Suresh’s solicitor and that Mr Suresh had cross-claims against CLC. CLC acknowledged receipt of JCC’s letter on the same day, at 1.30 pm. JCC filed a Notice of Change of Solicitor and the accompanying Certificates of Services, and served a copy of the same on CLC and Messrs Willy Tay Chambers (“WTC”) at 1.59 pm. WTC represented AXA Insurance Pte Ltd, who was the insurer of the defendant (in the District Court Suit).
6 On 14 November 2019, WTC sent a letter to CLC enclosing the Cheque from AXA. The Cheque was issued in favour of CLC as interim payment of the judgment sum in the District Court Suit.
7 On 15 November 2019, the Cheque was presented for payment into CLC’s office account.
8 On 18 November 2019, JCC informed WTC by a letter of the same date that it had taken over the conduct of the District Court Suit and submitted a draft final judgment for endorsement. On 19 November 2019, WTC replied to JCC, and explained that AXA had made the advance payment of $30,000 to CLC. On 25 November 2019, Mr Suresh himself, and not through JCC, wrote to the respondent to demand payment of $30,000 by 5pm on 26 November 2019.
9 On 26 November 2019, the respondent attended a meeting with one Mr Razu who was a friend of Mr Suresh, Mr Suresh and his wife. The respondent alleged that at the meeting, he paid $5000 to Mr Suresh and $22,200 to Mr Razu in cash and that this was in accordance with Mr Suresh’s instructions. The respondent also produced acknowledgment notes allegedly signed by Mr Suresh and Mr Razu as evidence of these payments.
10 The respondent filed a Notice of Appointment of Solicitors on 26 November 2019 and a Notice of Change of Solicitors on 27 November 2019 in DC 387 (the “Notices”), reflecting that CLC had been appointed to act for the plaintiff in DC 387.
11 On 23 March 2020, Mr Suresh submitted a complaint against Mr Lim to the LSS. On 3 June 2021, a DT was constituted to formally investigate Mr Suresh’s complaint. The DT held that the LSS had established the facts of the First Charges based on the respondent’s admissions and the documentary evidence, and that the respondent’s attempts to dispute these facts lacked credibility and were inconsistent with his overall conduct and the evidence that had been adduced in the proceedings. The respondent therefore failed to raise a reasonable doubt in respect of the LSS’s case.
Facts pertaining to the Second Charge
12 The DT held that the respondent had neither claimed nor shown that he came within any of the exceptions to r 9 of the LPSAR. The LSS had therefore shown that the respondent had breached r 9 of the LPSAR by failing to deposit client’s monies into a client account.
13 The DT accordingly held that pursuant to s 93(1)(c) of the LPA (Cap. 161), there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under s 83 in respect of both Charges.
Decision
Whether there exists due cause for sanction in respect of the First Charge and the Second Charge (collectively, the “Charges”)
The First Charge
14 The C3J found that due cause of sufficient gravity had not been shown in respect of the First Charge. The First Charge alleged that the respondent had, without just cause, received and encashed the Cheque without the authority of and contrary to the instructions of Mr Suresh. The central factual issue was whether, on the evidence, it may be found beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Suresh had discharged the respondent as his solicitor on or about 13 November 2019: at [48]–[50].
15 The LSS bore the legal burden of proving the guilt of the respondent legal practitioner beyond a reasonable doubt. Critically, the LSS did not challenge the authenticity or admissibility of the acknowledgment forms signed by Mr Razu and Mr Suresh, in which they appeared to have acknowledged that they had received the respective sums of $22,200 and $5000 from the respondent. The LSS also did not contest the respondent’s contention that the meeting on 26 November 2019 (the “26 November 2019 Meeting”) between the respondent, Mr Razu and Mr Suresh had taken place and that those payments had been made. The LSS’s only contention was that it was not essential to their case to refer to any meeting between Mr Suresh and the respondent. But once this was put forward by the respondent, and it was not challenged by the LSS, it became necessary to consider the significance of these facts to the case the LSS had advanced. The LSS’s failure to challenge the acknowledgment forms and the 26 November 2019 Meeting, showed that it did not discharge its burden of proving the First Charge beyond a reasonable doubt: at [51].
16 The DT had erred in failing to consider and make the appropriate findings in relation to the alleged meeting of 26 November 2019, and in dismissing their significance without adequate analysis. The 26 November 2019 Meeting was not challenged by the LSS and was acknowledged by Mr Suresh to have occurred. These events could explain why the respondent waited until 26 November 2019 to file the Notice of Change of Solicitors: at [53].
17 The DT also failed to recognise that the Third Charge and the First Charge were inextricably linked, in that both related to the respondent’s receipt and handling of the Cheque. The Third Charge alleged that the respondent misappropriated the sum of $30,000 belonging to Mr Suresh, but this was withdrawn due to Mr Suresh’s refusal to testify. The same could be said of the allegations underlying the First Charge: at [54].
The Second Charge
18 The C3J found that due cause of sufficient gravity had been shown in respect of the Second Charge. The respondent did not seriously challenge that he did not pay the $30,000 into CLC’s Client Account. The sum of $30,000 received by the respondent from WTC which was interim payment of the settlement sum due to Mr Suresh constituted client’s money, which is governed by r 3(1) of the LPSAR. The respondent did not dispute that he had received the Cheque which constituted client money and that he had failed to deposit the Cheque into CLC’s client account. The respondent even maintained that his firm did not even have a client account. The respondent also did not contend that he came within any of the exceptions under r 9 of the LPSAR: at [55]–[59].
19 Liability for breaches of the LPSAR was strict, if not absolute. The respondent’s ignorance of the LPSAR requirements was not an excuse for breaching them. Knowledge of the LPSAR requirements was a fundamental requirement applicable to all solicitors, who ought to be familiar with the rules and deemed to be aware of their existence and applicability: at [61].
If so, what is the appropriate sanction to impose on the respondent under s 83(1) of the LPA
20 The C3J held that a financial penalty of $30,000 was the appropriate sanction because there was no finding of dishonesty against the respondent. There were no mitigating factors and several aggravating factors including (a) the respondent’s cavalier attitude towards the responsibilities incumbent on solicitors to manage and handle client moneys in accordance with the applicable rules, (b) the respondent’s unsatisfactory conduct when JCC alleged that the respondent had been discharged and (c) the respondent’s status as a senior practitioner with over 25 years of experience at the material time: at [70]–[74].
Conclusion
21 The C3J found that there was due cause shown under s 83(1) of the LPA in respect of the Second Charge, and ordered the respondent to pay a penalty of $30,000. Costs were fixed at $12,000, to be borne by the respondent: at [76].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.
What sanction did the Law Society seek against Lim Tean in [2026] SGHC 78?
The Law Society of Singapore sought Lim Tean's striking off the roll of advocates and solicitors under section 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, alternatively a five-year suspension from practice and a $30,000 fine. The application was heard by the Court of 3 Supreme Court Judges on 23 January 2026, with judgment delivered on 10 April 2026.
What triggered the disciplinary proceedings against Lim Tean in Law Society of Singapore v Lim Tean [2026] SGHC 78?
Disciplinary proceedings arose from a complaint by Mr Suresh Kumar s/o A Jesupal, a former client of Lim Tean. The Law Society preferred three charges with alternatives; the Third Charge was later withdrawn when Mr Suresh declined to testify at the oral hearing, which had commenced on 11 May 2022.
Statutes Cited
Legal Profession Act (Cap 161)
Cases Cited (11)
SG (1)
[2021] SGMC 37
SLR (10)
[1999] 1 SLR(R) 266 [2005] 4 SLR(R) 320 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 699 [2011] 4 SLR 1184 [2012] 3 SLR 150 [2018] 5 SLR 1261 [2019] 5 SLR 358 [2020] 4 SLR 736 [2023] 4 SLR 1280 [2025] 5 SLR 700
Judgment
Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2026] SGHC 78)