Public Prosecutor v Teo Hwee Peng

Teo Hwee Peng, an officer of the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) since April 1999, claimed trial to 12 charges under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. They alleged that between July 2018 and July 2019 he obtained, attempted to obtain or agreed to accept gratification from two Chinese nationals working as sex workers in Singapore, Liang and Cheng, for arranging Special Passes so they could stay. Liang became an overstayer, was arrested on 16 October 2018 and received a Special Pass two days later. She later pleaded guilty to vice and corruption charges and gave evidence before leaving Singapore. Cheng died on 27 August 2021, so only her statements to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau were available.

The Principal District Judge convicted Teo on the 1st to 8th charges, involving Liang (an attempt to obtain an iPhone, sexual gratification, a red packet, four loans and a cash sum of $2,100 to $2,200), and acquitted him of the 9th to 12th charges. He was sentenced to 33 months' imprisonment and a penalty of $2,634.57. Teo appealed against conviction, and the Prosecution appealed against the acquittals on the 10th to 12th charges, involving Cheng, in Magistrate's Appeals Nos 9094 and 9159 of 2023. Sentence was left to a separate decision.

1. Whether Liang was a credible witness.
2. Whether the elements of the 1st to 8th charges were proved, including whether the 1st and 8th charges were duplicitous and whether Teo's claimed intelligence purpose rebutted the presumption of corruption.
3. Whether Liang's evidence about Cheng was hearsay and whether Cheng's statements deserved more weight.
4. Whether the 10th to 12th charges were proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Teo offered no evidence of a motive for Liang to lie, as Public Prosecutor v GCK and another matter [2020] 1 SLR 486 requires. She already held a Special Pass he had arranged and chose to be repatriated. Her account was consistent and supported by WeChat messages and transfer records.

The 1st and 8th charges were not the same offence: one concerned an iPhone as an inducement, the other cash as a reward, and an attempt to obtain gratification is itself a completed offence, distinguishing Tan Khee Koon v Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 SLR(R) 404. Minor inconsistencies reflected fading memory. The s 8 presumption applied, and the court rejected Teo's claim that he was cultivating informants as an afterthought: he had no authorisation, did not assess them, coached Liang for her arrest, and gave inconsistent accounts. The small red packet and the loans formed part of a transactional relationship, and repaying a loan did not remove the corrupt element.

What Teo himself told Liang was direct evidence, not hearsay. Cheng's statements were voluntary, self-incriminating and corroborated by Liang, WeChat records and Teo's own evidence, and a wrong date did not undermine them. The court found he sought $1,500 for helping Cheng and, by refusing her cash until she obtained a pass, agreed to accept a later reward. Applying the unusually convincing standard in GII v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 SLR 578, Cheng's detailed account of the 27 July 2019 visit, consistent with CCTV of Teo leaving at 1.34am, proved the 11th charge.

The High Court dismissed Teo's appeal against conviction on the 1st to 8th charges, allowed the Prosecution's appeal against acquittal, and convicted Teo on the 10th, 11th and 12th charges, leaving sentence to be decided separately.