Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng

Ms Lee Cheng Mui and her younger brother, Mr Lee Say Yng, are tenants-in-common of 65 Taman Mas Merah, a semi-detached house. In Originating Claim No 867 of 2023 he sued her for trespass by ouster, claiming the rent he had paid for alternative premises. In WhatsApp messages on 15 and 16 August 2021, after he said he planned to move back, she offered him two options: buy her half share or sell the house, adding that they could not live together. He went on renting a two-bedroom apartment at Corals at Keppel Bay.

At the close of his case she submitted no case to answer and sought to strike out the claim as an abuse of process. The trial judge found ouster between 16 August 2021 and 11 April 2024 and awarded S$146,400, the rent for 12 November 2021 to 11 April 2024, with costs of S$62,232.40 on the State Courts' scale. She appealed in Civil Appeal No 69 of 2025 against liability, damages and costs.

1. Whether the judge erred in finding ouster between 16 August 2021 and 11 April 2024
2. Whether the claim was barred by laches or should have been struck out as an abuse of process
3. Whether damages based on the full rent of the apartment were excessive
4. Whether the costs order made below was wrong

On liability, the judge had not relied on the message from the respondent's wife, so no hearsay issue arose; in any event what mattered was the appellant's failure to answer it. Her own messages, fairly read, refused him entry unless he bought her out or agreed to sell. Neither her defence nor her counsel's email of 11 April 2024 communicated a change of position, since both attached conditions. The judge had not shifted the legal burden of proof; he simply noted that she gave no evidence to displace the plain meaning of her messages.

As registered co-owner, the respondent had good title unless the contrary was proved, and there was no signed written declaration of trust as s 7 of the Civil Law Act 1909 requires, so his claim lay at common law and laches did not apply. No collateral purpose was shown, and the complaint that the judge acted as a family counsellor was meritless.

On quantum, the majority adopted, with one modification, the approach in Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025] HCA 34: the claimant must prove that the steps taken were reasonably required to repair the consequences of the tort, after which the defendant must plead and prove a failure to mitigate. As the two properties differed, the apt comparison was rent, and the apartment's rent was below the expert's market rent for the house, so loss was proved. The appellant pleaded no alternative course and, having elected not to open her case, led no evidence. Sole rather than shared occupation was a red herring because her tort caused it, and the wife's occupation, the reference to Sydney and unproved property expenses did not reduce the award. Costs followed the event; her offer concerned separate sale proceedings, and the judge had already accounted for partial success and the refusal to transfer the case.

Woo Bih Li JAD agreed on the law but held that the expert had valued the house on the basis of sole occupation, ignoring that the respondent was entitled only to shared occupation, so loss was not proved on that evidence.

The Appellate Division, by a majority, dismissed the appeal on liability, quantum and costs, and ordered the appellant to pay costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements. Woo Bih Li JAD dissented on quantum only and would have limited the damages to half the market rent of the house.