National University Hospital (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Soh Keng Cheang Philip

National University Hospital (Singapore) Pte Ltd (NUHS), which operates the National University Hospital, brought Bankruptcy No 4826 of 2024 against Mr Soh Keng Cheang Philip, a former patient. The debt came from his failed negligence suit against the hospital, which the High Court dismissed on 26 October 2021, leaving him liable for hospital bills, costs and interest; the statutory demand was for $292,001.24.

Before the hearing, Mr Soh wrote to the court that he had been permanently disabled since his surgery, lived in a nursing home, had no income and would not contest the application. On 6 February 2025 an assistant registrar made the bankruptcy order on an uncontested basis. According to the affidavit of NUHS' Chief Financial Officer, the hospital's medical social workers had confirmed only at 12.59pm that day that Mr Soh was in a nursing home and relied on subsidies, and the Chief Executive Officer instructed at about 1.33pm that the application be withdrawn. Staff could not reach the solicitor in charge, who was already at the hearing.

The next day NUHS' solicitors asked to withdraw the application. The court directed a formal application, and NUHS filed Summons No 699 of 2025 under s 7 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA), asking that the order be rescinded, or alternatively recalled under the court's inherent jurisdiction, so that the bankruptcy application could be withdrawn. Mr Soh supported the request.

1. Whether s 7 of the IRDA allows the court to rescind a bankruptcy order that was properly made, and on what principles that discretion is exercised.
2. Whether the creditor's change of mind before the hearing, which did not reach its counsel in time, justified rescinding the bankruptcy order.
3. Whether any countervailing factors weighed against rescission.

On the scope of the power, the court traced s 7 back to English bankruptcy law and to the Bankruptcy Ordinance 1888 of the Straits Settlements, noting that local authority was sparse and obiter. Drawing on English cases such as Fitch and Papanicola, it held that the power applies to any order made under the IRDA and is discretionary, unlike annulment, which requires that the order ought not to have been made. The applicant bears the onus, and the discretion is used cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. The usual question is whether the order should stay in force given changed circumstances or fresh evidence that makes a material difference, even if that evidence could have been produced earlier; delay, any prejudice to the respondent, candour, countervailing factors and attempts merely to reargue the same case all count. The court may also act where justice demands it to correct obvious injustice or abuse of process.

On the facts, the court found that the creditor's change of mind had come before the order was made, barely an hour before the hearing, and that no blame lay with either party or counsel for the instructions failing to arrive. The affidavit explaining these events was found candid and detailed, and there was no delay in seeking relief. The court agreed with counsel for NUHS that this was an a fortiori case compared with Fitch, where creditors changed their minds only after the orders. Had the full facts been known on 6 February 2025, the court would have granted permission to withdraw, so a different result would have followed.

No countervailing factors were found. Any other creditors of Mr Soh remained free to bring their own applications, and the private trustees did not object, had not begun administering the estate and sought no orders on fees. The court added that, if needed, it would also have rescinded the order to correct an obvious injustice, since NUHS had chosen on compassionate grounds not to pursue the debt through bankruptcy.

The assistant registrar allowed the application and rescinded the bankruptcy order made on 6 February 2025. With the order set aside, NUHS was granted permission to withdraw the bankruptcy application, with no order as to costs since neither party sought them.