Kishor Kumar a/l Raguan v Public Prosecutor

Mr Kishor Kumar A/L Raguan, a prisoner awaiting capital punishment, was convicted in HC/CC 2/2020 on 28 January 2022 of trafficking in four packets containing not less than 36.05 grammes of diamorphine, which he delivered to his co-accused on 29 July 2016. He received the mandatory death sentence because no certificate of substantive assistance was issued, although the trial judge found his role was limited to that of a courier. His appeal in CA/CCA 4/2022 was dismissed on 11 October 2022. He later joined other prisoners in several constitutional and legal aid challenges, all struck out or dismissed.

The President ordered his execution for 30 July 2025. On the evening of 29 July 2025 his counsel filed Court of Appeal / Criminal Motion No 20 of 2025 seeking a stay. The supporting affidavit said that a chance meeting with another inmate led Mr Kishor to recall giving statements to the Central Narcotics Bureau about drug activity at a Toa Payoh block, and to recall that he had no knowledge of hard drugs such as heroin. Counsel wanted more time to obtain a second statement that had not been located and to consider whether review proceedings were viable. The Prosecution said no such statement existed and asked for personal costs against counsel.

1. Whether the procedurally defective motion could be treated as an application for permission to make a post-appeal application in a capital case.
2. Whether permission should be granted under s 60G of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 for a stay of execution.
3. Whether counsel should be ordered to pay costs personally.

The application was a post-appeal application in a capital case, which needed prior permission sought by originating application; it had instead been filed as a criminal motion under the Criminal Procedure Code. Given that the execution was set for that day, the judge overlooked these defects and treated it as a permission application, which a single judge may decide. The failure to serve the Singapore Prison Service by 6 p.m. the previous day, as the 2024 Regulations require, was noted for costs.

Applying the s 60G(7) factors set out in Roshdi bin Abdullah Altway v Public Prosecutor and another matter [2025] 1 SLR 605, the court found the application frivolous. Both statements post-dated the appeal by more than a year, and nothing explained how they could show his lack of knowledge of the drugs. His own knowledge was something he could always have testified to without anyone's prompting. Knowledge had been contested at trial, rejected with cogent reasons and affirmed on appeal. The application only sought time to look for grounds, so it did not even reach the question of reasonable prospects; any renewed challenge on knowledge would have no prospect of success. The court also noted it had earlier remarked that Mr Kishor could hardly be considered a credible witness.

On costs, procedural slips under extreme time pressure might be treated leniently, but filing a totally meritless last-minute application forced rushed work on the Prosecution, so a personal costs order against counsel was just.

The court dismissed the application for a stay of execution summarily, without an oral hearing, under s 60G(8) of the SCJA. It ordered counsel, Mr Hua Yew Fai Terence, to pay personally the Prosecution's costs fixed at $3,000.