WVD and others v WUR and others

The respondents had obtained judgment against the applicants in FC/S 1/2020, in which the District Judge found that the 1st applicant, the sole executor and trustee of his late mother's estate, had breached his fiduciary duties, and directed him to produce the estate accounts. The 2nd and 3rd applicants were his children and nominal defendants; the 3rd applicant, a minor, was represented by her mother.

The applicants were out of time to appeal and filed HCF/OSP 6/2024 seeking an extension of time. The High Court dismissed that application on 6 March 2025 and ordered costs of $5,000 against the 1st applicant, $1,500 against the 2nd applicant and $1,500 against the litigation representative of the 3rd applicant. By HCF/SUM 116/2025 the applicants asked to pay those costs by instalments. The respondents objected on procedure and substance. The matter was Originating Summons (Probate) No 6 of 2024 (Summons No 116 of 2025).

1. Whether the General Division of the High Court has power to order costs to be paid by instalments.
2. Whether the applicants showed special circumstances of hardship justifying an instalment order.

The respondents relied on Tan Meow Hiang (trading as Chip Huat) v Ong Kay Yong (trading as Wee Wee Laundry Service) [2023] SGHC 286, where the High Court was said to lack a statutory power to order instalment payments. The court accepted that the express power sits with the State Courts under s 43(1)(b) of the State Courts Act 1970 and with the Family Courts under s 29C of the Family Justice Act 2014. It reasoned that Parliament could not have meant the High Court to have that power when supervising the Family Courts but not in matters brought directly before it. Drawing on an academic article, it compared judicial immunity, which superior courts enjoy at common law without a statute, as noted in AHQ v Attorney-General and another appeal [2015] 4 SLR 760. It also noted that the English procedural rule only facilitates such orders, and that Phan Pow v Tuck Lee Mining & Co (1959) 25 MLJ 32 showed instalment orders made without express legislation. The Family Division, as part of the General Division, therefore had inherent power to make the order.

On the merits, an instalment order balances the creditor's right to be paid against the debtor's hardship and needs special circumstances. The applicants' bank balances showed they could not pay in one sum. The 1st applicant, aged 64, had been unemployed since 2021; the 2nd applicant was unemployed; the litigation representative held two jobs. The court found a lump-sum enforcement might impoverish them, while the respondents were more likely to recover in full over time. Because the applicants had been late on their earlier plan, the court attached a strict default clause.

The court granted the application and ordered the debt to be paid by instalments of $500 a month, starting on the 15th day of the month of the judgment. If any payment was missed, even by a day, the whole balance would fall due within seven days, and the respondents could then enforce it.