LO KOK JONG v ENG BENG
25 cases cited
(10 SG, 15 foreign)
Cited by 1 case
Catchwords
Practice Areas
Counsel (6)
Parties (2)
Case Significance
Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] SGCA 28 was a civil appeal decided by the Court of Appeal of Singapore on 8 August 2024, with Steven Chong JCA delivering the grounds of decision of the court, sitting with Sundaresh Menon CJ and Tay Yong Kwang JCA. The appeal, in Civil Appeal No 4 of 2024, arose from District Court Suit No 1467 of 2020 in which Eng Beng was the plaintiff and Lo Kok Jong the defendant. The case concerned a claim arising from a road accident, which would typically comprise general damages for pain and suffering and special damages for medical and other expenses.
The central issue addressed in the grounds of decision was how government subsidies and grants that defray medical expenses interact with the rule against double recovery in tort claims. The court observed that such subsidies and grants are payable, subject to certain criteria, upon the incurrence of medical expenses generally and not only in the context of accident injuries, and that claims including subsidies not paid for by the victim would on their face offend the rule against double recovery. The grounds noted a tendency in some decisions to analogise government payouts with the recognised exceptions to that rule. The appellant was represented by counsel from Legal Solutions LLC including Yeo Kim Hai Patrick, Lim Hui Ying and Ooi Jingyu, and the respondent by VM Vidthiya of Victory Law Chambers LLC.
Summary
SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
8 August 2024
Case summary
Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] SGCA 28
Civil Appeal No 4 of 2024
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Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Steven Chong JCA):
Outcome: The court allows the appeal against the decision that damages claimed by a victim of a road traffic accident for medical expenses which were paid for by government subsidies and grants were not subject to the rule against double recovery.
Background
1 On 9 January 2020, the respondent was crossing a road when she was hit by a vehicle driven by the appellant. The respondent suffered personal injuries, including a fracture of her right ankle.
2 The respondent filed a negligence suit against the appellant, seeking general and special damages. By consent, interlocutory judgment was entered in the respondent’s favour at 85% against the appellant with damages to be assessed.
3 The Deputy Registrar (“DR”) awarded damages totalling $36,348.64, comprising (a) general damages for pain and suffering caused to the respondent; and (b) special damages for medical and transport expenses paid for by the respondent. However, the DR refused to award the sum of $39,515.08 (the “Disputed Sum”) claimed by the respondent in special damages for medical expenses which were paid for by certain government subsidies and grants (the “Subsidies and Grants”). On appeal, the District Judge (the “DJ”) affirmed the DR’s decision.
4 The Judge of the High Court below (the “Judge”) allowed the respondent’s appeal against the DJ’s decision but directed the respondent to return the Disputed Sum to the Ministry of Health (the “MOH”) (the “Repayment Order”) for the MOH to take any action it deemed fit, including whether to allow the respondent to retain the Subsidies and Grants. The appellant appealed.
Decision
The law on exceptions to the rule against double recovery
5 Damages are generally compensatory in nature and go toward compensating a plaintiff for the actual loss suffered. Thus, collateral benefits received by the plaintiff, which he or she would not have but for the injury, will prima facie be taken into account in calculating the damages to be awarded. This is one facet of the rule against double recovery: at [14] to [16].
6 There are two established exceptions to the rule against double recovery. First, under the Insurance Exception, where a plaintiff receives an insurance payout under a plan for which he or she has paid the premiums, such payouts are not deductible from the damages payable. Second, under the Benevolence Exception, moneys received by the plaintiff from the benevolence of third parties are not deductible from the damages payable. The list of exceptions remains open: at [17].
7 A rule of general application for deciding whether a payment should be exempt from the rule against double recovery remains elusive. Three types of reasoning have often been relied on by courts in this area of law: (a) causation – the idea that certain payments were caused not by the tort, but by some other factor (such as insurance premiums or the benevolence of other parties), and should therefore be exempt from the rule against double recovery; (b) the argument that certain payments are “collateral”, “res inter alios acta” (ie, matters between other parties), or “remote” matters which should not be considered in the assessment of damages; and (c) an intuitive sense of injustice if the tortfeasor were to pay a reduced amount in damages on account of the collateral benefit: [20] to [25].
8 These types of reasoning are not helpful in assisting the court’s analysis. First, causation analysis says nothing about the reasons for attributing causal responsibility to a certain event. Second, the terms “collateral”, “res inter alios acta”, or “remote” are vague and do not provide a practical test of general application. Third, relying on an intuitive sense of injustice is plainly flawed: [26] to [28].
9 A more principled test of general application for the deductibility of collateral benefits was developed in National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne [1961] Qd R 277 (“Espagne”), focusing on the intended purpose of a payment: at [32].
10 The proper question is whether the plaintiff was intended to enjoy the relevant payment over and above the damages payable. In the absence of such intention, the default rule against double recovery should be reverted to. The corollary of this is that the question of intent is not concerned with whether it was intended that the tortfeasor should benefit from the payment – it would almost never be the case that such intention would be found. Hence, focusing on such intention would contradict the fundamental rule that damages for negligence are intended to be purely compensatory: at [34].
11 The appropriate test of general application is whether the intended purpose of the payment, objectively judged, was to provide the plaintiff with a sum to be enjoyed over and above the damages payable: at [36].
12 Several key indicia are helpful in applying this test: (a) whether the plaintiff contributed to the payment; (b) whether the payment was in the nature of an indemnity for the type of loss for which damages were sought; (c) the source of the payment; and (d) the group of persons to whom the payment was made available: at [56].
13 Excessive weight should not be placed on public policy considerations in deciding whether a payment should be exempt from the rule against double recovery: at [66].
Application to the facts
14 The position at common law is that government subsidies and grants going towards a plaintiff’s medical expenses are deductible from the damages payable by a tortfeasor: at [67].
15 This position accords with principle. All four indicia indicated that there was no intention for the Subsidies and Grants to be enjoyed by the respondent on top of the damages payable. The respondent did not contribute to the Subsidies and Grants, which were targeted specifically at the loss for which she claimed the Disputed Sum in damages (and therefore were a substitute for the damages claimed) and were benefits made available by the government to the general public to cover any medical expenses they might incur. Thus, the default rule against double recovery applied such that the Subsidies and Grants were deductible from the damages payable: at [75] and [80] to [81].
16 Noor Azlin bte Abdul Rahman and another v Changi General Hospital Pte Ltd and others [2021] SGHC 10 did not stand for the proposition that all government subsidies are not deductible from damages payable, regardless of their nature, type and the relevant application process. The test of objective intended purpose is a highly fact-centric exercise – in the context of government subsidies, this would naturally involve an inquiry into the specifics of the particular subsidy at hand. It was clear in the present case that the Subsidies and Grants were not targeted specifically at the respondent and were general subsidies available to all Singaporeans and Permanent Residents. Thus, no intention for the Subsidies and Grants to be enjoyed over and above the damages payable could be inferred: at [83] and [85].
17 The Repayment Order did not engage the rule against double recovery. The real issue here was whether the court had the power (and if so, whether the court should exercise this power) to order the proposed repayment: at [89].
18 Unlike in Minichit Bunhom v Jazali bin Kastari and another [2018] 1 SLR 1037, where there was a contractual mechanism in place for the victim to repay recovered sums from the tortfeasor to the victim’s employer, there was no legal basis for making a repayment order in this case: at [96].
19 Instituting a recoupment mechanism is a legislative and executive matter which clearly lies outside the province of the courts. There are also logistical problems associated with the court making repayment orders. Ultimately, it was both unprincipled and impractical for the court to institute a recoupment mechanism on its own accord: at [97] to [100].
20 The respondent’s chief complaint was that the ordinary taxpayer should not be made to bear the appellant’s liability. However, it is increasingly recognised that losses suffered by victims of motor accidents are a general social burden. Whether via the mechanism of insurance or government subsidies, society as a whole bears such losses. Thus, any notion of the “fairness” of making the tortfeasor instead of the government bear the victim’s losses is illusory. Ultimately, true fairness in the present case lay in respecting the fundamental compensatory aim of damages as well as the court’s role in this policy-laden area of law: at [101] to [104].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.
What did Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] SGCA 28 decide?
Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng [2024] SGCA 28 was a Court of Appeal decision of 8 August 2024 examining how government medical subsidies and grants interact with the rule against double recovery in a road accident damages claim, with Steven Chong JCA delivering the court's grounds of decision.
How did the Court of Appeal treat government subsidies in Lo Kok Jong v Eng Beng?
In [2024] SGCA 28, the court noted that government subsidies and grants defraying medical expenses are payable upon incurrence of expenses generally, and that including such unpaid subsidies in tort claims would on its face offend the rule against double recovery, with some decisions analogising them to recognised exceptions.
Statutes Cited
Pioneer Act
s 16(1)(f)
Cases Cited (25)
SG (4)
[2021] SGHC 10 [2022] SGDC 130 [2023] SGDC 307 [2023] SGHC 63
SLR (6)
[2000] 3 SLR(R) 31 [2013] 4 SLR 1317 [2017] 1 SLR 918 [2018] 1 SLR 1037 [2018] 2 SLR 655 [2022] 1 SLR 689
UK (10)
[1952] 1 KB 26 [1964] AC 326 [1970] AC 1 [1972] 1 QB 65 [1985] AC 20 [1986] 1 All ER 332 [1987] 1 WLR 336 [1988] AC 514 [1989] AC 807 [2004] 1 WLR 2683
AU (4)
[1961] HCA 48 [1983] HCA 16 [1994] HCA 50 [2009] HCA 52
MY (1)
[1980] 2 MLJ 39
Referenced in
Statutes interpreted in this judgment
Judgment
Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2024] SGCA 28)