SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
26 April 2024
Case summary
DBA v DBB [2024] SGHC(A) 12
Civil Appeal No 67 of 2023
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Decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court (delivered by Justice Debbie Ong Siew Ling):
Outcome: The Appellate Division of the High Court (“Appellate Division”) allowed an appeal in part against the decision of a Judge of the Family Division of the High Court (the “Judge”) made in respect of ancillary matters in divorce proceedings.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
• In classifying a marriage as a “dual-income” marriage or a “single-income” marriage to which the approaches in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) and TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) would respectively apply in the division of matrimonial assets, the focus of the analysis is on the primary roles carried out by the parties in the marriage; a marriage where one party was primarily the breadwinner while the other was primarily the homemaker for most of the marriage was a single-income marriage: at [13].
• Significant non-financial contributions from the spouse who was primarily the breadwinner would be recognised when considering the proportions of division in the TNL context, even if they did not displace the finding that the other spouse was the primary homemaker: at [19].
• A court’s judgment or grounds of decision on the division of matrimonial assets should set out clearly the total value of the matrimonial pool, the proportions in which this pool is divided between the parties, and the consequential orders that implement the main division order: at [25].
• The Judge ought not to have ordered that the parties’ Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts be repaid from the gross sale proceeds of the matrimonial home before distributing the proceeds between the spouses in the division ratio that she had determined. The consequence of such an order is that the parties will not be receiving the net proceeds in that ratio, as whatever amounts repaid into a party’s CPF account will effectively be additionally awarded to that party, over and above the share of the proceeds that had been awarded to them under the division ratio: at [32].
Background
1 The appellant (the “Wife”) and the respondent (the “Husband”) were married for 31 years. There were three children in this marriage, [B], [C] and [D], who are presently aged 26, 22, and 15 years old.
2 The Judge held that the parties were in a dual-income marriage and applied the ANJ structured approach in dividing the matrimonial assets. She ordered that the matrimonial assets be divided in the ratio of 77.5:22.5 in favour of the Husband.
3 The Judge ordered the matrimonial home to be sold in the open market and the sale proceeds less: (a) sales commission, (b) incidental expenses and refund of CPF contributions utilised by both parties in the purchase together with interest accrued on the withdrawals and (c) the mortgage outstanding as at the date of completion of the sale, be divided in the proportion of 77.5% and 22.5% in favour of the Husband and the Wife respectively. Similar orders on the sale of three overseas properties held in the parties’ joint names and one overseas property held in the Husband’s sole name were also made, save that the issue of CPF refunds did not arise for these properties, and there was a further order for net rental income (if any) derived from these properties pending completion of sale to be divided in the proportion of 77.5% and 22.5% in favour of the Husband and the Wife respectively.
4 The Judge ordered the Husband to pay monthly maintenance of $1,500 for [D] and to pay for [C’s] tertiary education in the sums of A$100,000 by 1 January 2024 and a further A$100,000 by 1 January 2025, in line with the Husband’s proposals. The Judge also ordered the Husband to pay $700 as monthly maintenance for [B] until he completes his tertiary education, as agreed by the Husband. The Judge ordered that there would be no maintenance for the Wife.
5 The Wife appealed, arguing (a) that the Judge erred in classifying the marriage as a dual-income marriage where instead it was a long single-income marriage to which the TNL approach should be applied in dividing the matrimonial assets; (b) that the Judge erred in not allowing the Wife to retain the matrimonial home as part of the division of matrimonial assets and in ordering that the CPF moneys utilised by the parties in purchasing the matrimonial home be refunded before distributing the sale proceeds to the parties in the division proportion that she had ordered; and (c) that the Judge erred in her orders in respect of child maintenance for [D] and in ordering no maintenance for the Wife.
Decision
Classification of the parties’ marriage: dual-income or single-income
6 The parties’ marriage was a long single-income marriage as the Husband was primarily the breadwinner and the Wife was primarily the homemaker for most of the marriage. The focus of the analysis is on the primary roles carried out by the parties in the marriage; a large disparity in income between the spouses does not in itself make the marriage a single-income marriage: at [10] and [13].
7 TNL envisaged that in some single-income marriages, the spouse who was primarily the homemaker may also have worked part-time or intermittently over the course of the marriage: at [12].
8 The fact that a party who was carrying out the main breadwinning role was not an absent parent, or contributed substantially to the welfare of the family, does not in itself render that party a primary or “joint homemaker”: at [15].
9 The Wife’s claim to have taken on more flexible (but less well-remunerated) work at the expense of her career in order to have time to take on the main child-caring role was generally corroborated by the Husband’s own evidence and [B]’s evidence: at [14] and [18].
10 The Husband had played an active role at home alongside his role as the primary breadwinner. The Husband’s non-financial contributions would be recognised when considering the proportions of division in the TNL context. There is no immutable rule requiring that each party in a long single-income marriage should receive a 50% share. The trends in precedent cases as well as the specific facts of each case must be considered: at [19]–[21].
11 It was just and equitable to divide the assets in the ratio of 60:40 in favour of the Husband. This would not undervalue the Wife’s homemaking contributions, while giving due recognition to the Husband’s generation of income in the marriage and his not insignificant non-financial contributions at home: at [22].
Consequential orders
12 A court’s judgment or grounds of decision on the division of matrimonial assets should set out clearly the total value of the matrimonial pool, the proportions in which this pool is divided between the parties, and the consequential orders that implement the main division order: at [25].
13 Identification and valuation of the total pool of matrimonial assets is necessary when applying the ANJ approach because the court is tasked with assessing the respective direct contributions of the parties as the first step in the exercise: at [26].
14 While the TNL approach does not specifically require the determination of the parties’ direct contributions ratio, an estimate of the total pool is nevertheless relevant as the size of the total matrimonial pool is a relevant factor to consider when a court exercises its discretion pursuant to s 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“Women’s Charter”) to reach a “just and equitable” division. It can assist in providing the court a sense of what the parties’ joint marital partnership was like and what material gains it produced. Further, a matrimonial pool of a very large size is a significant factor in the division exercise: at [29].
15 The Judge ought not to have ordered that the parties’ CPF accounts be repaid from the gross sale proceeds before distributing the proceeds between the spouses in the division ratio that she had determined. The consequence of such an order is that the parties will not be receiving the net proceeds in that ratio, as whatever amounts repaid into a party’s CPF account will effectively be additionally awarded to that party, over and above the share of the proceeds that had been awarded to them under the division ratio: at [32].
16 The parties’ five real properties were to be sold in the open market by 30 October 2024, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Any moneys required to be repaid into the Husband's CPF account were to be repaid from his share of the assets. The parties were to retain the assets held in their respective sole names. The Husband was to pay the Wife any outstanding balance due to her within one month of the completion of the sale of the last property: at [30].
Maintenance for child [D] and the Wife
17 The Judge should not have accepted a figure of less than $1,760 as the reasonable figure for [D’s] monthly expenses, as neither party submitted a figure below that: at [39].
18 Both parents had a duty to provide for their children under s 68 of the Women’s Charter. The Judge’s order for the Husband to pay a monthly maintenance of $1,500 for [D], which worked out to him bearing about 85% of $1,760, was not unreasonable. The Husband had ceased full-time employment for some years and was also providing maintenance for the other two children. The Wife was working, and she would receive a substantial share of the matrimonial assets: at [39].
19 The Judge’s order that there was to be no maintenance for the Wife was not disturbed. The Wife would receive a substantial share of the matrimonial assets. She was employed and able to earn an income. In contrast, the Husband had ceased full-time employment for some time and was bearing almost the entire burden of providing for the children: at [41].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.