Tan Cheng Cheng and others v Shamlal s/o Tuppani Bisaysar and another
[2024] SGHC 181 · HC/DCA 42/2023 · cites 15 cases (11 Singapore, 4 foreign)
Is returning a dead man's watch to his last home a conversion of it?
No. The High Court held the father had not purported to confer any right in the watch on the person he left it with, only returned it to the deceased's last residence, and dismissed the appeal.
Step 1: What happened
Mr Spencer Sanjay s/o Shamlal Tuppani was fatally stabbed on 10 July 2017 while wearing a Richard Mille watch; the exact model was disputed. The appellants, his widow Mdm Tan Cheng Cheng, her sister, and his ex-wife Mdm Keh Lay Hong, obtained letters of administration of his estate on 10 July 2018. They sued his parents, Mr Shamlal s/o Tuppani Bisaysar and Mdm Tham Poh Kwai, for conversion of the watch.
The day after the death, the police released the deceased's belongings, including the bloodstained watch, to Mr Tuppani, who had identified the body. He took them to the apartment at Leedon Residence that the deceased had shared with his long-term partner, Mdm Yeo Gek Lin, where Mdm Tham was then living. He testified that he left the bag on a table and told Mdm Yeo, "These are Spencer's things", and denied giving the watch to her. Mdm Yeo's affidavit, filed on Mr Tuppani's side, said the watch was later passed to Mdm Tham, but Mdm Yeo did not attend trial. Mdm Tan gave evidence of speakerphone calls in 2020 in which, she said, Mdm Tham admitted selling the watch. Mdm Tham denied ever receiving it, though she said she had received $160,000 in cash from a man after Mdm Yeo offered to sell a watch to help her. The District Judge dismissed the claim, and the appellants brought District Court Appeal No 42 of 2023.
Step 2: What the court had to decide
- Whether Mr Tuppani converted the watch by allegedly refusing a letter of demand or by leaving it with Mdm Yeo.
- Whether Mdm Yeo's out-of-court statements were admissible under s 32(1)(c) of the Evidence Act.
- Whether there was credible evidence that Mdm Tham received and sold the watch.
Step 3: How the court reasoned
The court agreed that the administrators had standing through the doctrine of relation back and that ownership was irrelevant, since conversion turns on a superior right to possession.
On Mr Tuppani, there was no evidence he received the letter of demand of 4 February 2020, and in any case the watch had left his possession over two years earlier; where goods have already been delivered to another, the earlier delivery, not the later refusal, is the relevant act. As to the delivery, conversion requires a dealing so extensive as to exclude the owner, and the intention behind the act matters in determining its character. Not applying his mind to who was entitled did not on its own decide the point. Applying the authorities, including Tat Seng Machine Movers Pte Ltd v Orix Leasing Singapore Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1101, the court found the appellants had not proved he purported to confer any right on Mdm Yeo. He had to put the watch somewhere, was traumatised, returned it to the deceased's last residence, and told Mdm Yeo the items were the deceased's things. This changed only the watch's position, not the property in it. It was unnecessary to decide the involuntary bailment point.
On admissibility, s 32(1)(c) requires that the maker knew the statement was against her interest, and there was no such evidence; Mdm Yeo was never sued, any claim against her appeared time-barred, and no police report was shown. Even if admissible, the statements would be excluded under s 32(3) because Mdm Yeo's interests were opposed to Mdm Tham's and she could not be cross-examined.
The burden was on the appellants to call Mdm Yeo. The court considered an adverse inference may not have been warranted since her absence surprised them, but this made no difference. Mdm Tan's account of the calls and her WhatsApp messages were belated, uncorroborated, partly inconsistent with her own sworn statements, and equivocal; Mdm Tham might only have admitted receiving proceeds of a watch sale. Without Mdm Yeo's testimony, there was no credible evidence of the transfer.
“Though Mr Tuppani’s act may be said to have involved a bare transfer of possession, its purpose was not to confer on Mdm Yeo any right over the property in the Watch, but merely to return or restore the Watch to the Deceased’s last place of residence.”
[2024] SGHC 181 at [75]
Step 4: The order
The High Court dismissed the appeal in its entirety, upholding the District Judge's decision that neither respondent had converted the watch. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents the costs of the appeal, with quantum to be heard.
The order in the court's words
Appeal dismissed“I dismiss the appeal in its entirety.”
Source: [2024] SGHC 181, High Court, decided 12 July 2024. Read directly from the judgment.
Terms in this case
- Hearsay
- A statement made outside court that is offered as proof that what it says is true. It is generally not admitted as evidence unless the law allows it, for example for certain business records.
Court record
Key facts
| Court | High Court |
|---|---|
| Decided | |
| Judge | Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi |
| What the case was about | Tort, Evidence |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed |
Source: [2024] SGHC 181, High Court, decided — eLitigation. Updated .
Judge
- Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi Delivered the judgment
Parties
- Keh Lay Hong (Guo Lihong) Appellant
- Shamlal s/o Tuppani Bisaysar Respondent
- Tan Cheng Cheng (Chen Qingqing) Appellant
- Tan San San (Chen Shanshan) Appellant
- Tham Poh Kwai Respondent
Counsel
- David Nayar and Associates Firm
- Ignatius J & Associates Firm
- David Nayar
- Joseph Ignatius
- Suja Susan Thomas d/o B Thomas
Statutes cited
Cases cited (15)
- [2013] SGHC 7
- [2023] SGDC 293
- [1997] 3 SLR(R) 430
- [2000] 1 SLR(R) 159
- [2005] 1 SLR(R) 154
- [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855
- [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1101
- [2010] 3 SLR 143
- [2013] 4 SLR 409
- [2014] 4 SLR 15
- [2015] 2 SLR 686
- [1963] 1 WLR 644
- [2002] 2 AC 883
- [2004] QB 286
- [2011] NSWCA 342
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Referenced in
Statutes interpreted in this judgment
Read the full judgment
The judgment itself is on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2024] SGHC 181)
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