Sambasivam s/o Kunju v Tan Boon Huat

On 25 December 2019 Mr Sambasivam s/o Kunju was cycling along Yio Chu Kang Road when a taxi driven by Mr Tan Boon Huat collided with him. He sued, and on 18 May 2023 the parties consented to interlocutory judgment against the driver at 100% liability, with damages to be assessed. The claimant had suffered a Chance fracture of the L1 vertebra, which was operated on, and a displaced fracture of the coccyx. He also pleaded a surgical scar, a phobia of the road, erectile dysfunction and chronic back pain.

The assessment hearing began in May 2024. The claimant's lawyers later withdrew and he represented himself. Although both sides at various points intended to call the doctors who had written the medical reports, in the end neither did. The defendant did not consent to the court relying on the reports without the doctors, and in August 2026 sought permission to vary the consent judgment to state that causation was reserved, which the court did not grant.

Adopting the figures in the joint opening statement, the claimant sought S$140,000 for pain and suffering, S$240,000 for pre-trial loss of earnings, S$239,040 for loss of future earnings, S$55,055.98 for medical expenses, S$900 for transport, S$500 for his bicycle, and future medical and transport expenses. The defendant accepted the medical expenses had been incurred but argued that treatment after December 2020 was unnecessary and that the claimant should not recover the extra cost of choosing an unsubsidised Class A1 ward over a subsidised Class B2 ward, proposing S$17,063.36 instead.

1. Did the consent interlocutory judgment at 100% liability leave causation open for determination at the assessment stage?
2. Could the court rely on the medical reports when their makers were not called and the defendant objected?
3. What damages should be awarded for pain and suffering from the back injuries, scar, erectile dysfunction and chronic pain?
4. Did the claimant prove pre-trial loss of earnings, loss of future earnings or loss of earning capacity?
5. Was the defendant's objection to the Class A1 ward charges a matter of proof of damage or of mitigation, and was it made out?
6. What should be awarded for transport, the damaged bicycle and future expenses?

On causation, the court distinguished Lee Sim Leng v SMRT Buses Ltd [2025] SGHC 11, where the consent judgment spoke only of bearing 100% of the damages and was entered while the personal injury bar still routinely reserved causation. Here the consent judgment was framed as judgment on liability, and it was entered after Salmizan bin Abdullah v Crapper Ian Anthony [2024] 5 SLR 257 had rejected that practice. On Crapper Ian Anthony v Salmizan bin Abdullah [2024] 1 SLR 768, a judgment on liability establishes liability fully. The defendant's later challenges to causation showed only his own view, and the claimant's former counsel's silence did not amount to agreement. The defendant could contest only the extent and consequences of the pleaded injuries.

On the medical reports, those prepared for litigation fell outside the business-records exception in s 32(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 1893, and the defendant's early remark that they were prima facie admissible was a legal submission, not an agreement under s 32(1)(k). Only the discharge summary, generated in the course of treatment, was admitted. The court noted the defendant had been free to call the doctors himself, but the claimant bore the burden and had been warned of the risk.

For pain and suffering, the claimant's own evidence that his L1 pain had fallen to 1 to 2 out of 10 placed that injury at the low end of the moderate range in the Guidelines for Personal Injuries, a starting point of S$15,000. The court added S$1,500 for the scar, whose size was not proved, and S$8,000 as a reference for the coccyx fracture, which was treated conservatively but still caused some pain. After allowing for overlap and inflation, it awarded a composite S$30,000. The erectile dysfunction was accepted as caused by the accident but amounted to impaired function rather than impotence, already covered by the moderate category. The chronic pain and phobia attracted no separate award.

The earnings claims failed because the claimant, an undischarged bankrupt until 12 October 2021, relied on a 1994 military salary and a single year of business income from YA 2008, and showed no concrete plan to restart a business.

On medical expenses, the court applied the Modified Stewart Framework in Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng [2026] SGHC(A) 13. Treatment after December 2020 was reasonably required, since he had been referred for rehabilitation in November 2020. The Class A1 objection did not dispute that the treatment was needed, only that it could have been obtained more cheaply, which is a question of mitigation for the defendant to plead and prove. He had pleaded a bare denial and offered no evidence of the Class B2 rates or subsidy that applied at the time. Even treated as part of the claimant's proof, the objection failed for want of pleading under How Weng Fan v Sengkang Town Council [2023] 2 SLR 235. Transport was allowed at S$15.60 per trip for 47 trips. The bicycle claim lacked evidence of damage or value, so only nominal damages were given. Future expenses failed for want of admissible medical opinion on future treatment.

The court allowed the claim in part and assessed damages at S$85,889.18: S$30,000 for pain and suffering, S$55,055.98 for medical expenses in full, S$733.20 for transport, and S$100 in nominal damages for the bicycle. It made no award for pre-trial loss of earnings, loss of future earnings, loss of earning capacity or future expenses. It held that causation had not been reserved under the consent judgment, and that all the medical reports except the hospital's inpatient discharge summary were inadmissible. Interest and costs were left for the parties to agree, failing which they were to write in for directions.