Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng

[2026] SGHC(A) 13 High Court (Appellate Division) 28 April 2026 • AD/CA 69/2025 • 53 min read
14 cases cited (13 SG, 1 foreign)

Catchwords

Practice Areas

Judges (3)

Counsel (5)

Parties (2)

Case Significance

Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng [2026] SGHC(A) 13 is an Appellate Division judgment of 28 April 2026 concerning a property dispute between siblings who are tenants-in-common of 65 Taman Mas Merah. The respondent Lee Say Yng brought HC/OC 867/2023 against his sister Lee Cheng Mui claiming rental expenses incurred for alternative premises as a result of her alleged ouster from the property. The majority (Kannan Ramesh JAD, delivering, and See Kee Oon JAD) addressed the principles governing compensatory damages in tort for trespass to land, specifically whether and how the compensatory principle and the concept of reasonableness operate when a co-owner is ousted by another — including which party bears the burden of establishing reasonableness. Woo Bih Li JAD also sat on the panel. Counsel were GKS Law LLC (appellant) and UniLegal LLC (respondent). The case is a notable authority on ouster, trespass to land, and the quantification of compensatory damages between co-owners.

Summary

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
28 April 2026
Case summary
Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng [2026] SGHC(A) 13

Appellate Division of the High Court – Civil Appeal No 69 of 2025
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Decision of the Appellate Division of the High Court (delivered by Kannan Ramesh JAD for the majority consisting of See Kee Oon JAD and himself, with dissenting judgment by Woo Bih Li JAD):
Outcome: The majority in the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the judge below (“Judge”) that the appellant was liable for trespass by ouster and on the quantum of damages that should be awarded as a result. The Appellate Division also clarified the role that reasonableness plays in the quantification of compensatory damages in tort. The minority in the Appellate Division dissented on quantum and took the view that the respondent should instead only be awarded the equivalent of half the market rent of the Property in damages.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
•  The majority decision of the Appellate Division adopted a modified version of the framework stated in the High Court of Australia’s decision in Stewart v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2025] HCA 34 (“Stewart) on the role of reasonableness as a limit on the compensatory principle on the award of compensatory damages in tort (“Modified Stewart Framework”): at [70]–[73].
1 This was an appeal against the High Court’s decision awarding compensatory damages of S$146,400 to the respondent for trespass by ouster. The central issues were whether there was actual or constructive ouster by the appellant of the respondent from a property that they jointly owned as tenants-in-common in equal shares, and whether the quantum of damages awarded as a result was excessive: at [1]–[4].
Background to the appeal
2 The appellant and respondent are siblings and tenants-in-common of 65 Taman Mas Merah (“Property”). The respondent brought proceedings claiming rental expenses he incurred for alternative premises due to his ouster from the Property by the appellant between November 2017 and October 2024. At the close of the respondent’s case, the appellant had submitted no case to answer: at [2]–[3].
3 The Judge found ouster had occurred between 16 August 2021 and 11 April 2024 and awarded compensatory damages, as claimed by the respondent, for the rent he had incurred between 12 November 2021 and 11 April 2024 in the sum of S$146,400, for alternative premises he had rented, namely an apartment at Corals at Keppel Bay (“Apartment”). The Judge also awarded costs of the proceedings below to the respondent assessed on the State Courts’ scale at S$62,232.40. The appellant appealed both the finding on liability and the quantum of damages that was awarded. The appellant also appealed on the costs order made by the Judge: at [4].
The material facts
4 In August 2021, the respondent wanted to move back into the Property with his wife. In WhatsApp exchanges between 14 and 16 August 2021, the appellant gave the respondent two options: either buy her 50% share at market value or sell the Property and share the proceeds between them equally. The appellant stated “we cannot stay together as conflicts will arise”. The respondent was not agreeable to either option. The respondent renewed his lease for the Apartment: at [14].
The court’s decision
5 The majority dismissed the appeal in its entirety and held that the respondent had established ouster and was therefore entitled to compensatory damages, as claimed: at [41], [49], [58], [62], [98], and [104].
6 As regards liability for ouster, the court found that the Judge correctly construed the WhatsApp messages exchanged in August 2021. The appellant’s position that “we cannot stay together” together with her offer of the two options that were inconsistent with the respondent’s right to occupy the Property constituted a refusal to allow the respondent to return. The appellant’s failure to respond to the respondent’s wife’s WhatsApp message stating the appellant had told the respondent not to return was telling and confirmed the ouster. The court rejected the argument that the respondent’s wife’s message was hearsay evidence, and in any event found that the Judge did not rely on that message: at [9]–[23].
7 The court dismissed the appellant’s arguments on laches, on the Judge’s refusal to strike out the respondent’s claim, on the allegations made against the Judge and on the costs order made by the Judge: at [41], [49], [58], [62], and [104].
8 On the quantum of damages, applying the compensatory principle, the court held that the correct approach was to place the respondent in the position he would have been in but for the tort. The court adopted a modification of the framework stated in the High Court of Australia’s decision in Stewart. Under the Modified Stewart Framework, the claimant was required to prove that the steps taken were reasonably required, with the burden then shifting to the defendant to prove that there was a failure to mitigate. The court distinguished between proof of loss consequential on the tort, which was the claimant’s burden, and mitigation, which was the defendant’s burden: at [70]–[73].
9 The respondent had proved his loss. The respondent had to prove that the steps he had taken were objectively reasonably required to restore his position to that before the tort. Since the rent paid for the Apartment was lower than the Property’s market rent, the respondent had proven that his response of renting the Apartment was reasonably required to address the consequence of his ouster from the Property by the appellant. Thus, the respondent had proven his loss: at [74] and [80].
10 The appellant failed to discharge her burden of proving the respondent should have taken alternative steps that were reasonably available to him to mitigate his loss. The primary reason for this was because the appellant submitted no case to answer at the close of the respondent’s case and therefore elected not to give or lead evidence. Further, the court rejected the appellant’s arguments that the Apartment was a “luxury apartment” or that damages should be reduced on account of the fact that the respondent had sole occupancy of the Apartment when he would have had to share the Property with the appellant if he had not been ousted: at [85]–[86], [88]–[89], [91], [93], [95], and [98].
11 The minority dissented on quantum, finding that the fact that the respondent would have to share occupancy with the appellant at the Property should be taken into account in assessing the market rent of the Property which was in turn considered when assessing whether the respondent was entitled to claim the rent for the Apartment as damages. The respondent’s expert evidence was flawed because it assessed the Property’s market rent on a sole occupancy basis when the respondent was only entitled to shared occupancy. In the circumstances, the respondent had not discharged his burden to prove that the rental of the Apartment was reasonably required to repair the consequences of the appellant’s tort. Hence, the evidential burden had not shifted to the appellant to prove that the respondent had failed to mitigate his damages. The minority would have awarded the equivalent of half the market rent of the Property as damages: at [106]–[121].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.

Who bears the burden of proving reasonable compensatory damages in a sibling ouster case in Singapore?

In Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng [2026] SGHC(A) 13, Kannan Ramesh JAD and See Kee Oon JAD examined whether the compensatory principle requires a claimant or defendant to establish reasonableness in damages for trespass, in a tenancy-in-common ouster dispute decided on 28 April 2026.

What was the dispute in Lee Cheng Mui v Lee Say Yng [2026] SGHC(A) 13?

Siblings Lee Say Yng and Lee Cheng Mui co-owned 65 Taman Mas Merah as tenants-in-common. Lee Say Yng claimed rental expenses for alternative premises after being ousted from the property. The Appellate Division addressed trespass to land, ouster, and the measure of compensatory damages on 28 April 2026.

Statutes Cited

Cases Cited (14)

SG (2)
[2017] SGHC 8 [2025] SGHC 126
SLR (11)
[1997] 3 SLR(R) 649 [2004] 3 SLR(R) 288 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 855 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 623 [2010] 2 SLR 1154 [2010] 4 SLR 1069 [2013] 2 SLR 543 [2014] 3 SLR 562 [2024] 1 SLR 964 [2024] 4 SLR 593 [2024] 6 SLR 555
AU (1)
[2025] HCA 34

Judgment

Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.

Read on eLitigation

Source: eLitigation ([2026] SGHC(A) 13)