Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani v Law Society of Singapore

Facts

Sunil Kishinchand Bhojwani, the applicant, complained to the Law Society of Singapore, the respondent, about Mr Hewage Ushan Saminda Premaratne, who acted for the applicant's sister, Ms Rita Kishinchand Bhojwani (RKB), in HC/S 848/2021 against parties including their mother. During trial, after RKB made concessions in cross-examination, Mr Premaratne obtained permission to speak to her that evening about a settlement letter while she was still on the stand. The next day the judge refused his request to speak to her about withdrawing claims, and RKB then sought to withdraw her concessions. She said in court that Mr Premaratne had explained the implications of her evidence and that her son, who was due to testify next, had joined the meeting. Mr Premaratne said he had discussed only the letter.

The head of complaint referred to an Inquiry Committee had two limbs: that Mr Premaratne discussed RKB's evidence while she was on the stand, and that he allowed RKB and her son to discuss her evidence before the son testified. The committee, relying on his affidavit and attendance note, found RKB's evidence unclear and recommended dismissal, and on 24 April 2025 the Council decided no formal investigation was needed. The applicant filed Originating Application No 617 of 2025 under s 96 of the Legal Profession Act 1966 seeking a Disciplinary Tribunal.

Issues

1. Whether the Council erred in accepting the Inquiry Committee's recommendation to dismiss the first limb of the complaint
2. Whether the second limb required further peer review by the Inquiry Committee before any referral
3. Whether the court should grant a mandatory order or an order under s 96(4)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966
4. Whether the Law Society should pay the applicant's costs

Holding

The High Court allowed the application. It granted an extension of time by consent and, under s 96(4)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, directed the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal to investigate both limbs of the complaint. It declined to make the mandatory order the applicant sought and made no order on costs.

Reasoning

On the first limb, the Law Society accepted the committee had erred. The court agreed: an Inquiry Committee need only find a prima facie case and should not resolve real factual disputes in an informal setting, as noted in Tan Ng Kuang v Law Society of Singapore [2020] SGHC 127. Here the trial transcripts showed a clear conflict between RKB's account and Mr Premaratne's, which a Disciplinary Tribunal should decide.

On the second limb, the Law Society argued that the committee never addressed it and so peer review was still owed. The court disagreed, relying on Whitehouse Holdings Pte Ltd v Law Society of Singapore [1994] 2 SLR(R) 485. The complaint clearly set out both limbs, Mr Premaratne's single denial answered both, and once the committee accepted it the second limb fell away. The ethical rules against discussing a witness's evidence mid cross-examination, and against preparing witnesses together, were undisputed, and the trial record supplied a prima facie basis. Sending it back would waste resources.

On the remedy, the court accepted that prerogative orders remain available alongside the statute, but held that s 96 is the procedure of first resort. Under CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2021] 1 SLR 977 a mandatory order requires exceptional circumstances, and the applicant's wish to avoid bearing prosecution costs could not qualify, since Parliament had placed that burden on complainants under s 96(5). An order under s 96(4)(b) was therefore made.

On costs, regulators are generally not ordered to pay costs absent bad faith or gross dereliction. The Law Society had made a mistake, but that was not gross dereliction.

From the judgment