QURESHI MOHAMED ASLAM v MAJLIS UGAMA ISLAM, SINGAPURA
22 cases cited
(20 SG, 2 foreign)
Catchwords
Practice Areas
Counsel (6)
Case Significance
In Qureshi Mohamed Aslam v Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura [2026] SGCA 19, the Court of Appeal — comprising Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Ang Cheng Hock JCA, and Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD — dismissed an appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant permission for judicial review of a decision by the Appeal Board constituted under s 55 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966. The appellant, Mr Qureshi Mohamed Aslam, had been the defendant in Syariah Court divorce proceedings brought by his first wife, and he challenged the Board's decision on the ground that it had breached a duty to give reasons. Ang Cheng Hock JCA delivered the grounds of decision on 17 April 2026 following a hearing on 27 February 2026, with Mohamed Ibrahim s/o Mohamed Yakub of Achievers LLC appearing for the appellant and a team from Allen & Gledhill LLP — Aaron Lee Teck Chye, Afzal Ali, and Sabrina Colette Theseira Hui Xuan — appearing for MUIS.
Summary
SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
17 April 2026
Case summary
Qureshi Mohamed Aslam v Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura [2026] SGCA 19
Court of Appeal – Civil Appeal No 35 of 2025
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Decision of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Ang Cheng Hock JCA):
Outcome: The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the General Division of the High Court’s decision to refuse the appellant permission to commence judicial review.
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
• The Syariah Court and the Appeal Board would generally be under a duty to give reasons: at [51].
• An appellate court may dismiss an appeal without expressly stating that it adopts the lower court’s reasoning as the inference may fairly be drawn that, in dismissing the appeal without setting out specific reasons, the appellate court has accepted the lower court’s reasons and agrees entirely with its decision: at [60].
• The inference might be displaced if there are circumstances which suggest that the appellate tribunal could not have simply agreed with the first instance tribunal’s reasons, for example, if there are substantively new arguments or points raised on appeal that had not been raised before or dealt with by the first instance court: at [62].
1 This was an appeal against the decision of a judge of the General Division of the High Court (“Judge”) in HC/OA 404/2025 (“OA 404”), dismissing an application for permission to commence judicial review of a decision of the Appeal Board (“Board”) constituted under section 55 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“AMLA”).
Background to the appeal
2 The appellant was the defendant in matrimonial proceedings at the Syariah Court, as the appellant’s first wife (“Wife”) brought an application for a divorce from him. Two issues arose which were of especial contention between parties:
a. Whether certain assets in the appellant’s name, in particular, a condominium unit at Watermark (“Watermark Condominium”) were matrimonial assets to be included in the matrimonial pool for division (“Assets Issue”).
b. The appropriate ratio to be applied in the division of matrimonial assets, considering the circumstances of the marriage and the appellant’s polygamous marriage with his second wife (“Second Wife”) (“Ratio Issue”)
The Syariah Court proceedings
3 On the Assets Issue, the Syariah Court disagreed with the appellant and held that the Watermark Condominium was transformed by its use as a matrimonial home into a matrimonial asset. On the Ratio Issue, the court did not accept the appellant’s reliance on TIG v TIH [2016] 1 SLR 1218 (“TIG”) to also consider the Second Wife’s contributions under the ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ANJ”) approach. The court explained that TIG did not involve a Muslim polygamous marriage, and there was no evidence from the Second Wife on her contributions to the matrimonial assets. Further, the appellant himself had taken the position that the Second Wife had left him, taken his money and collaborated with others to extort him. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the TNL v TNK [2017] 1 SLR 609 (“TNL”) approach on long single-income marriages did not apply, finding that the matrimonial assets should be divided 50:50.
The appeal to the Appeal Board
4 The appellant appealed to the Board. On the Assets Issue, he argued that the Syariah Court should not have found on the evidence that the Watermark Condominium had been used as a matrimonial home. On the Ratio Issue, the appellant again relied on TIG and ANJ, arguing that a 50:50 division was unjust in the context of a polygamous marriage. He argued that even if the TNL approach was rightly adopted, the court should nonetheless have considered that the marriage to the Second Wife was a long one which produced two children and ordered a one-third division among all three of them.
5 The Wife submitted that the Syariah Court did not err. While the Wife acknowledged that there were no reported Board cases and only one reported case in the High Court dealing with polygamous marriages and division of matrimonial assets, she submitted that the Syariah Court was right in declining to adopt the approach in TIG.
6 After hearing oral arguments, the Board dismissed the appellant’s appeal but did not issue any reasons.
OA 404
7 On 17 April 2025, the appellant filed OA 404, seeking permission to commence judicial review of the Board’s decision. The appellant sought a quashing order for the Board’s decision and a mandatory order for a differently constituted Board to rehear and determine the appeal.
8 The appellant, in his statement in support of the application, relied on illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and jurisdictional error. His main contention in his written submissions centred on the duty to give reasons as he argued that the Board, in fully accepting the Syariah Court’s decision despite a clear error of law pertaining to an unexplored area of Muslim law in Singapore, had acted illegally, irrationally and in breach of natural justice because the Board did not give reasons.
9 The Judge held that there was no arguable case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the prerogative orders sought and dismissed the application.
a. Illegality: The Syariah Court had considered the appellant’s and the Wife’s submissions on s 52(14) of the AMLA on the definition of a matrimonial asset and the authorities cited and applied the law to the evidence before it. The appellant could not show that the Syariah Court and the Board acted outside its legal authority, exercised its discretion other than in good faith, or considered irrelevant factors or ignored relevant ones
b. Irrationality: The Syariah Court accepted the Wife’s evidence on the use of the Watermark Condominium. Further, the Syariah Court distinguished TIG not solely on the ground that it was not Syariah-based, as the court also observed that there was no evidence of the Second Wife’s contributions before the court. There was no basis to say that the outcome was one that no reasonable decision-maker would reach.
c. Procedural impropriety: Where a lower court has given full written reasons, an appellate court may affirm the decision without providing any reasons of its own. The Board was not obliged to repeat the reasons given by the Syariah Court or to give additional ones in a fresh judgment, if it formed the view that this was not necessary.
The appellant’s case on appeal
10 The appellant’s main argument on appeal continued to centre around the duty to give reasons. He contended that the High Court’s approach, in implying adoption without express words by the Board, was untenable because the appeal to the Board had raised distinct questions never addressed by the Syariah Court. The omission to give reasons constituted illegality, irrationality, a breach of natural justice and a reviewable jurisdictional error.
The Court of Appeal’s grounds of decision
11 In performing a judicial function, the Syariah Court and the Board would generally be under a duty to give reasons for their decisions: at [51].
12 A breach of a duty to give reasons may be analysed under the ground of procedural impropriety, which is premised on the decision-maker having reached a decision in breach of the basic rules of natural justice and/or failing to adhere to legislatively prescribed procedural rules in reaching that decision: at [53].
13 Whether reasons must be given depends on the particular facts and context of that decision. Where a decision is made by an appellate court, when the first instance court has already provided reasons, it would be sufficient for the appellate court to simply state in affirming the earlier decision that it agrees with the reasons given in support of it, if the appellate court is satisfied with the outcome and adequacy of the reasoning of the first instance court: at [58].
14 The appellate court, in appropriate circumstances, may simply state that an appeal is dismissed without expressly stating that it adopts the lower court’s reasoning, as an inference may fairly be drawn that, in dismissing the appeal without setting out specific reasons, the appellate court has accepted the lower court’s reasons and agrees entirely with its decision. The inference may be displaced if there are circumstances which suggest that the appellate tribunal could not have simply agreed with the first instance tribunal’s reasons, for example, if there are substantively new arguments or points raised on appeal that had not been raised before or dealt with by the first instance court: at [60]–[62].
15 The Board’s dismissal of the appellant’s appeal without giving any reasons must mean that the Board agreed with the Syariah Court’s GD, and that the Board had nothing to add to those grounds. There was nothing on the facts of the case that could displace this inference: at [63].
16 While the appellant identified four questions which he claimed were not addressed by the Syariah Court and raised only on appeal to the Board, these issues squarely arose in the Syariah Court proceedings and were dealt with in the Syariah Court’s GD. That being so, the Board was entitled to adopt the Syariah Court’s GD in dismissing the appeal: at [64]–[67].
17 The arguments that the appellant had raised to the Board were in substance no different from what he argued before the Syariah Court. The crucial point on the Second Wife’s share was that there was no evidence from her as to her contributions, and the appellant had said the Second Wife had abandoned him. On appeal to the Board, the appellant’s argument in substance was still that the Second Wife’s contributions should be considered in the division of matrimonial assets between him and the Wife, an argument that had been dealt with by the Syariah Court: at [69].
18 The Board did not breach its duty to give reasons because the inference is that it had agreed with and adopted the reasons in the Syariah Court’s GD. Therefore, it could not be said that there was a reasonable suspicion of a breach of natural justice and procedural impropriety. There was also no basis for the contention that the Board had acted illegally or irrationally: at [70].
19 As there was no basis to grant leave for judicial review as there was no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion, it was not necessary to consider the ouster clause in s 56A of the AMLA: at [73].
20 The appellant’s request for permission to present further arguments pursuant to O 19 r 34 of the Rules of Court 2021 was rejected. A party requesting permission to present further arguments after the court has delivered its decision on appeal must demonstrate exceptional circumstances so as to displace the finality principle and warrant a reconsideration of the court’s decision. The appellant did not articulate any exceptional circumstance, and the court did not see any which would justify the grant of the request. In any case, there were no merits to the appellant’s proposed further arguments: at [75]–[78].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s grounds of decision. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s grounds of decision.
What did the Court of Appeal decide in Qureshi Mohamed Aslam v MUIS regarding judicial review of the AMLA Appeal Board?
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 17 April 2026, upholding the High Court's refusal to grant permission for judicial review. The court found no breach of a duty to give reasons by the Appeal Board constituted under s 55 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966.
Statutes Cited
Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3)
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322)
Cases Cited (22)
SLR (17)
[1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 [2012] 1 SLR 676 [2012] 4 SLR 947 [2013] 2 SLR 844 [2015] 4 SLR 1043 [2015] 4 SLR 438 [2015] 5 SLR 1222 [2016] 1 SLR 1218 [2016] 3 SLR 135 [2016] 3 SLR 598 [2017] 1 SLR 609 [2018] 2 SLR 1378 [2019] 2 SLR 216 [2021] 1 SLR 809 [2022] 1 SLR 1033 [2024] 2 SLR 317
UK (2)
[1991] 4 All ER 310 [2009] 3 All ER 539
Judgment
Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2026] SGCA 19)