Qureshi Mohamed Aslam v Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura

Mr Qureshi Mohamed Aslam was divorced by his first wife in the Syariah Court after a 56-year marriage in which she had been a homemaker without income. He also had a second, polygamous marriage. In dividing matrimonial assets, he argued that a condominium in Bangkok was bought with inherited money and was not a matrimonial asset, and that the High Court approach for a non-Muslim polygamous marriage in TIG v TIH should be applied to account for the second wife's contributions, giving him 85:15. The President of the Syariah Court found the Bangkok unit had been used as a matrimonial home and so became a matrimonial asset, declined to apply TIG because it was not a Muslim case and there was no evidence from the second wife about her contributions, and divided the assets equally. She gave 17 pages of written grounds.

The Appeal Board constituted under the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966 (AMLA) heard his appeal and dismissed it on 20 January 2025 without giving reasons. MUIS later explained that the Board issues grounds for novel or difficult cases and has nothing to add where it fully agrees with the first-instance reasoning. Mr Qureshi applied in HC/OA 404/2025 for permission to seek judicial review of the Board's decision, alleging illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and jurisdictional error, chiefly that the Board breached a duty to give reasons. A High Court judge refused permission, finding no arguable case and treating the application as a backdoor appeal. He appealed to the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No 35 of 2025.

1. Whether the Appeal Board was under a duty to give reasons for its decisions.
2. How a breach of the duty to give reasons fits within the grounds of judicial review.
3. Whether the Board breached that duty by dismissing the appeal without reasons.
4. Whether the appellant should be allowed to present further arguments after the appeal was decided.

The court held that the Syariah Court and the Board exercise a judicial function: they decide disputes through hearings, evidence and argument, their orders bind the parties and are final, and statute gives them jurisdiction over Muslim marriage and divorce matters. They are therefore generally under a duty to give reasons, and nothing in the legislation displaced that duty.

A breach of the duty can be analysed as procedural impropriety, since it may indicate that the decision-maker did not properly apply its mind, in breach of the fair hearing rule. The court's preliminary view was that it would not normally amount to illegality or irrationality by itself, though such an inference might be drawn in some circumstances; it left open the proper remedy.

On the facts, the court rejected the argument that an appellate body must expressly state that it adopts the reasons below. Where a lower tribunal has given full reasons, dismissing an appeal without more ordinarily implies agreement with them. That inference may be displaced, for example, where substantively new points were raised on appeal. Here the four questions said to be new, about polygamy, TIG, whether the inheritance had been transformed into a matrimonial asset, and the second wife's household, had all been argued and decided in the Syariah Court. The appeal merely repackaged those arguments, so the appellant could understand why he lost.

On the request to reargue, a party must show exceptional circumstances to displace finality, such as a highly material new authority. The appellant showed none, and his points either rehashed earlier submissions or wrongly suggested the Syariah Court should have warned him of gaps in his own evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no arguable case of reasonable suspicion that the Board breached a duty to give reasons. It also rejected the appellant's later request for permission to make further arguments. The court did not decide the effect of the ouster clause in s 56A of the AMLA, which neither side had asked it to resolve.