Andrew Cheah Kim Wee & Anor v Low Xiang Ping Jane

Facts

The second claimant runs an aesthetic and plastic surgery clinic, and the first claimant, Andrew Cheah Kim Wee, is its only plastic surgeon. The defendant, Ms Jane Low Xiang Ping, had been a patient there. Unhappy with her treatment, she posted a one-star Google review of the clinic and later amended it. The claimants sued her in defamation, saying the review falsely accused them of unprofessional and unethical conduct, of failing to follow proper procedures and of failing to advise her properly on surgery.

Ms Low, who acted in person, pleaded justification and brought a counterclaim seeking six heads of damages and an injunction. In District Court Originating Claim No 1505 of 2024, the claimants took out Summons No 2467 of 2025 to strike out parts of the counterclaim, including one head of damages and the injunction prayer. The application was heard by Deputy Registrar Evans Ng.

Issues

1. Whether the pleading that the court had earlier found the review to be fair comment and justified should be struck out
2. Whether paragraphs of the counterclaim containing evidence and personal matters, and the claim for emotional distress damages, should be struck out
3. Whether the injunction prayer was legally unsustainable or an abuse of process

Holding

The Deputy Registrar dismissed the striking-out application with costs, leaving every challenged portion of the counterclaim to proceed to trial.

Reasoning

On the first point, the claimants relied on the certified notes of evidence of an April 2025 hearing to show that the court had made no such finding. The Deputy Registrar held that this was better shown at trial; a separate hearing on one sentence was not an efficient use of court resources under O 3 r 1(2)(d) of the Rules of Court 2021.

On the second point, the impugned paragraphs described Ms Low's difficulties as a self-represented litigant, why she chose the surgery, and the effect of the lawsuit on her health and life. Much of this belonged in an affidavit, but courts had let irrelevant statements and evidence stand even in solicitors' pleadings (Hoo Su Hen v Sim Mao Sheng Desmond and another [2020] 3 SLR 720; Zhang De Long v Tea Yeok Kian [2012] 2 SLR 802), so a layperson deserved at least the same leeway, consistent with fair access to justice. The paragraphs were also relevant to her claim for emotional distress. If she proved medical malpractice that worsened her psychiatric condition, general damages for a recognised psychiatric illness or its aggravation were conceivable. A paragraph asking the court to weigh her circumstances in fixing costs was likewise allowed to stand.

On the third point, the prayer for a stay had plainly been abandoned through her continued participation, and the prayer barring further suits on the same facts, though superfluous, caused no prejudice. The prayer against harassment could rest on the statutory tort under s 11(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 2014, with relief under s 12(2); the lack of permission under s 16I(2) to sue in the District Court did not defeat the cause of action. Nothing suggested she knew the injunction was bound to fail, so there was no abuse of process. Striking out would not avoid a trial or simplify it, which weighed against the application.

From the judgment