YBG v YBH

Facts

This ex tempore judgment of the Family Court dealt with two linked applications between a former husband and wife. Their Interim Judgment for divorce, made on 13 February 2023 in a divorce the Wife had filed, contained a consent order (paragraph 3e) requiring the Husband to pay the Wife $2,000 a month as maintenance from the month after Final Judgment. Final Judgment was granted in May 2023.

The Wife filed MSS 1726/2025 in August 2025 to enforce that order under s 71 of the Women's Charter, saying the Husband had paid nothing. In October 2025 the Husband filed FC/OADV 709/2025 to rescind the maintenance order retrospectively. He claimed the Wife had told him that the $2,000 figure was only "symbolic" and that she would never enforce it. The Wife denied making those statements. The Husband accepted he had paid no maintenance, and his counsel accepted that the decision on OADV 709 would also decide MSS 1726. The court heard MSS 1726 as a trial with both parties giving evidence.

Issues

1. Whether the court's power under s 118 of the Women's Charter to rescind a maintenance order for misrepresentation applied to a consent order, and on what test.
2. Whether the Husband proved that the Wife fraudulently misrepresented that the maintenance order was symbolic and would not be enforced.
3. Whether the Husband showed good cause why an enforcement order should not be made for the unpaid maintenance.

Holding

The court dismissed OADV 709 in its entirety and allowed the Wife's enforcement application in MSS 1726. It made an enforcement order against the Husband for the full sum of S$68,000, ordered him to pay the arrears in instalments of S$2,000 per month on top of the monthly S$2,000 maintenance, and to show payment at the Family Justice Courts on 3 occasions from May 2026, with 3 days' imprisonment if he failed to do so. Costs were reserved for further hearing.

Reasoning

The court held that the correct provision was s 118 of the Women's Charter, not s 72, because the order was made in divorce proceedings under Part 10. For a consent order, the relevant misrepresentation is one made by one party to the other while negotiating the agreement behind the order, so contract-law principles apply. As the Husband's case was that the Wife lied to him, it was treated as fraudulent misrepresentation. The standard remained the balance of probabilities, but cogent evidence was needed given the seriousness of a fraud allegation.

The Husband's claim failed. His allegations were not properly particularised: he gave no exact words, no clear date and no detail of the alleged representations. There was no documentary evidence or witness, and the Wife denied the claim. His solicitors' letters did not help him. The first letter, sent months after the Wife's lawyers demanded payment on 20 June 2023, described an agreement on both maintenance and the division of assets, which was inconsistent with his present case. A later letter recorded the Wife's alleged willingness to "forgo" maintenance and the Husband bearing the costs of varying the order, which suggested he accepted the order was binding and was trying to renegotiate it. He also let long periods pass without acting. His own admission that the Wife's lawyer had mentioned that he ought to see a lawyer, which he ignored, put to rest any suggestion that he was misled or pressured.

On enforcement, it was not disputed that no maintenance had been paid since June 2023. The Husband's only defence was the alleged misrepresentation, not inability to pay, so he had no good reason for non-payment. The Wife's delay in suing did not count against her, as s 121 of the Women's Charter allowed her 3 years, and her silence was not a representation that she would not enforce. The Husband's salary had risen, and he was expected to adjust his spending. A $1,750 payment in June 2023 was left out because the Husband's counsel said it should not be treated as part payment.

From the judgment