XPX v XPW

Facts

After a lengthy hearing in SSP 442/2025, the mother (XPX) obtained protective orders on behalf of the daughter against the father (XPW), as decided in XPX v XPW [2026] SGFC 30. She then applied for costs. The father was legally aided: the Legal Aid Bureau (LAB) first notified the court of his application, then filed a provisional Grant of Aid on 13 June 2025 and later a full Grant of Aid. Under s 12(4)(c) of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1995 an aided person is not liable for costs to other parties in the proceedings covered by the grant, subject to the exceptions in s 14(3) for aid obtained by fraud or misrepresentation and for improper conduct in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings.

The mother first sought full costs of $85,000, arguing that both exceptions applied. She asked the court to call on LAB to explain why the father met the means test, pointing to his private-hire income of about $1,600 per month, his use of a car, three domestic helpers in the household, his degree and his conduct of the early mentions himself. She also said he had acted improperly by evasive and shifting evidence, new claims raised at the hearing, insisting on a transcription witness and disobeying orders. Alternatively, she sought $20,000 for costs incurred before the grant was filed. District Judge Kow Keng Siong heard the application.

Issues

1. Whether the father obtained legal aid by fraud or misrepresentation under s 14(3)(a), and whether LAB should be called to give evidence
2. Whether the father acted improperly in defending or conducting the proceedings under s 14(3)(b)
3. Whether the protection in s 12(4)(c) covers costs incurred before the Grant of Aid was filed

Holding

The court rejected the first submission and accepted the second, allowing the costs application in part. The father was ordered to pay the mother costs fixed at $20,000 (all in) for work done before 13 June 2025, payable within three months of the judgment.

Reasoning

The mother bore the burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation, and fraud needs cogent evidence, not suspicion. She identified no false representation to LAB. The court would not compel LAB, a non-party public authority, to explain its internal decision, and could presume that LAB had properly assessed eligibility. Anpex Pte Ltd v Cheng Yong Sun [2022] SGHC 294 did not assist her, since evidence was called there because of findings that the aided party may have had substantial funds. The matters she raised fell well short of that. Suspicions are better referred promptly to LAB, which holds the materials and can cancel aid.

On the first limb of s 14(3)(b), losing a defence is not improper; the defence must be plainly unmeritorious. Two of the six alleged incidents were not proved, one rested solely on the daughter's tested evidence and three involved material disputes, so the father was entitled to contest. On the second limb, guided by the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024, improper conduct means unreasonably increasing time, cost or complexity. The matters raised went to credibility or were separate from the conduct of SSP 442, and the father had not filed excessive applications or documents.

On timing, the words of s 12(4)(c) identify which proceedings are covered, not when protection starts. The filing of the grant is a mandatory first step, the Director is liable only for costs incurred while a grant is in force, and nothing in the Act protects earlier costs. A provisional grant counts as a Grant of Aid, so protection began on 13 June 2025. Therapeutic justice did not displace costs because the mother had clearly succeeded, and $20,000 was reasonable given the volume and complexity of the early work.

From the judgment