Public Prosecutor v Annamalai Kokila Parvathi and Other Appeals

Ms Annamalai Kokila Parvathi, Ms Siti Amirah Binte Mohamed Asrori and Ms Mossammad Sobikun Nahar were each charged under s 15(1) of the Public Order Act 2009 with organising a procession to the rear gate of the Istana along a route they ought reasonably to have known was a prohibited area. The event, "Letters for Palestine", involved hand-delivering letters to the Prime Minister at the Istana. It was undisputed that Siti and Sobikun were the principal organisers, and Kokila, who advised them and helped gather participants, was found to be one too.

On 18 October 2023 the police had issued an advisory, exhibit P14, stating that no permit would be granted for events or assemblies relating to the Israel-Hamas conflict. On 2 February 2024 Siti, Sobikun and about 70 participants walked in rows from Plaza Singapura to the Istana's rear gate, and the letters were delivered to the mailroom.

The District Judge acquitted all three, finding a doubt whether they ought reasonably to have known the route was a prohibited area. The Prosecution appealed in Magistrate's Appeals Nos 9162, 9163 and 9164 of 2025.

1. Whether the "ought reasonably to know" limb of s 15(1) covers wilfully and recklessly failing to make the inquiries an honest and reasonable person would make.
2. Whether the District Judge erred in finding the mens rea not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Whether the Prosecution's failure to put certain questions to Kokila prejudiced her.
4. What sentence should be imposed if the acquittals were set aside.

On the law, it was common ground that "ought reasonably to know" refers to a state of mind in which known circumstances would put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry, and that it includes wilfully and recklessly failing to make inquiries. The District Judge erred by looking only at whether the respondents knew or could have known, without asking about inquiries. Publication of the Public Order (Prohibited Areas) Order 2009 in the Gazette does not by itself prove mens rea. The court set out a two-stage objective test: first, what circumstances would have put such a person on notice; second, what inquiries that person would have made and whether the accused wilfully and recklessly failed to make them.

The objection that questions were not put to Kokila failed, as her position was plain from her evidence and there was no real unfairness.

The court held the three factors relied on below to be irrelevant or neutral. Every designated prohibited area is publicly accessible, so regular pedestrian use of the pavement proved nothing. Absent signs were neutral. There was no evidence about the earlier letter walks, and an absence of enforcement does not make conduct lawful.

Each respondent knew of P14, which warned of security concerns and reminded the public that assemblies are regulated under the Act. Kokila raised it when advising Sobikun, Siti knew the Act restricted processions but left legality to Sobikun, and Sobikun discounted it because it did not mention letter delivery. The court held that P14 should have prompted each to check the Act and the Order or ask the police, and that failing to do so was wilful and reckless.

On sentence, the court accepted the respondents' submission of a $3,000 fine. Their culpability was lower than in Public Prosecutor v Wham Kwok Han Jolovan [2022] SGMC 14, where the accused had actual knowledge, allowing for the higher maximum fine under s 15(1).

See Kee Oon JAD allowed the Prosecution's appeal, set aside the acquittals and convicted each respondent of the s 15(1) charge. Each was sentenced to a fine of $3,000, in default one week's imprisonment.