Lian Chee Kek Buddhist Temple v Ong Ai Moi and others

Under a 1958 indenture, land in Paya Lebar was conveyed to trustees on trust for use as a place of public worship according to the Chinese rites of followers of Kwan Yin. The trust was self-perpetuating, with continuing trustees appointing successors. The three defendants, Ong Ai Moi, Ho Thien Chan and Tan Mary, were the current trustees and registered proprietors. Lian Chee Kek Buddhist Temple, as a place of worship, operated on the premises. In 2006 the Venerable Tjie Giok Sang, said to be its abbot, applied to register "Lian Chee Kek Buddhist Temple" as a charity, naming fifteen persons as charity trustees but not the defendants; the defendants said they did not know of it. The registered body then ran the premises and carried out alterations without the trustees' approval. After the defendants did not respond to requests to consent and to retire, its general meeting on 26 June 2021 purported to remove them and appoint new trustees.

In Originating Summons No 656 of 2021, the named plaintiff sought declarations that the removal and appointments were valid and that the premises vest in the new trustees. The defendants applied to strike it out on the ground that the plaintiff had no legal personality, and two management committee members applied to be joined as plaintiffs with the Attorney-General's consent. An Assistant Registrar dismissed the striking-out application and allowed joinder. The defendants appealed in Registrar's Appeals Nos 40 and 41 of 2023.

1. Whether the plaintiff was a trust, and in particular the trust created by the 1958 indenture
2. Whether registration as a charity under the Charities Act 1994 gave the plaintiff separate legal personality or capacity to sue under s 32
3. Whether the two management committee members should be joined as plaintiffs

The court held that the plaintiff was plainly not the trust. The temple building was part of the trust property, while the organisation of worshippers was an unincorporated association formed around 2006 under its own constitution. Charity registration did not change its legal form or override the indenture, and such an association has no existence separate from its members. The premises still belonged to the trust and were managed by its trustees.

Although the second question was moot, the court rejected the argument that s 32(1) of the Charities Act, which allows charity proceedings to be taken "by the charity", confers capacity to sue. Unlike the Societies Act, the Charities Act has no empowering provision. Section 32 adds qualifications for bringing charity proceedings, including the Commissioner's authorisation, but does not create legal personality. For a charitable trust, proceedings by the charity mean proceedings by its trustees.

On joinder, the court did not decide whether the Attorney-General's consent under s 9 of the Government Proceedings Act could be challenged. Even assuming the members were necessary parties, joinder was refused in the exercise of discretion because the originating summons was not in the right shape to resolve the real dispute. Its main relief, declaring the association's resolutions effective to remove the trustees, was misconceived, since trustees could only be replaced under the indenture or by the court under s 42 of the Trustees Act. Any breach of trust claim should be pleaded in an originating claim and tested at trial, with fresh consent from the Attorney-General and, for charity proceedings, strict authorisation from the Commissioner.

Philip Jeyaretnam J allowed both appeals. In RA 41 the court held that the plaintiff, an unregistered unincorporated association, had no capacity or standing to bring or continue the originating summons. In RA 40 the court dismissed the application for joinder. Costs were left to written submissions if not agreed.