Spackman Entertainment Group Limited v Woo Sang Cheol

Spackman Entertainment Group Limited (SEG), a film production company listed on the SGX Catalist board, sued Korean businessman Mr Woo Sang Cheol in Suit No 592 of 2020 for defamation, malicious falsehood and unlawful interference with trade. The suit arose from a long dispute between Mr Woo and SEG's founder, Mr Charles Choi Spackman, over Mr Woo's purchase of shares in a Korean company, in which Mr Woo obtained a Korean judgment against Mr Spackman in 2011 and has sought to enforce it in several countries, including Singapore. SEG says Mr Woo published defamatory statements in document preservation notices sent by his New York lawyers, Kobre & Kim (KK), to SEG's business associates, and in three online articles by Prof Mak Yuen Teen, which SEG says were published on Mr Woo's or KK's instructions. Mr Woo pleads justification and denies publishing the articles.

After an earlier discovery order, Mr Woo disclosed redacted emails between KK and Prof Mak and a contingency fee arrangement with KK. Three applications followed: Mr Woo's application for specific discovery (Summons No 1671 of 2024), SEG's application for an unless order for non-compliance with the earlier order (Summons No 1955 of 2024), and SEG's application to be released from the Riddick undertaking so as to use the fee arrangement and the emails for other purposes (Summons No 1956 of 2024).

1. Whether the documents Mr Woo sought were relevant and should be disclosed
2. Whether a disclosing party may redact irrelevant material without leave, and whether Mr Woo's redactions and alleged omissions breached the earlier order
3. Whether an unless order should be made
4. Whether SEG should be released from the Riddick undertaking for each proposed purpose, and how the cogency of evidence should be assessed

On discovery, relevance does not require that a document relate to an expressly pleaded fact; it is enough that it may help prove or disprove a fact in issue. Documents on the share swaps were relevant to justification and falsity, and an independent reviewer's report did not limit the inquiry. Documents on Mr Spackman's involvement after he resigned were not relevant, and two categories were reframed by reference to the events said to cause SEG's losses.

On redactions, a party may redact irrelevant parts of disclosed documents without leave, though courts will police abuse; the court read the earlier Kawabe decision as turning on its egregious facts. Having seen unredacted copies, the court found that some redactions, about a company's likely owners and Prof Mak's contemplated next steps, covered matters within the earlier order, while others did not. SEG showed no reasonable suspicion that further correspondence existed. Unless orders are a last resort for inexcusable conduct, and given Mr Woo's offer to show the court unredacted copies the threshold was not met; his counsel agreed to produce them.

On release, the court weighed the nature of the wrongdoing, the cogency of the evidence and the receiving authority, holding that cogency needs only a prima facie question to be investigated. The fee arrangement raised such a question about champerty and maintenance in Hong Kong. For committal, SEG showed at least a question whether Mr Woo gave false evidence, with little prejudice to him. For the securities purpose, the authorities had already been made aware of the articles and had their own powers to obtain documents.

The court allowed Mr Woo's discovery application in part, granting most categories on amended terms; dismissed SEG's unless order application; and allowed SEG's release application in part, permitting use of the fee arrangement for Hong Kong investigations and of the fee arrangement and emails for possible committal proceedings, but refusing release for Singapore securities investigations. Costs were awarded to Mr Woo on the first two applications and to SEG on the third.