YDR v YDQ

The parents have a son born in March 2016 and a daughter born in August 2017, in the Mother's care and control. A consent order made after mediation on 20 June 2025 gave the Father daytime access on 23 to 25 June and 28 June 2025, alternate overnight weekend access from 4 July 2025, and Tuesday and Thursday dinner access in the other weeks.

Access took place on 23 and 24 June. At the handover on 25 June 2025 the children said they did not want to go; the Father kept trying to persuade them, a commotion followed, and the Mother took them to the mall's customer service counter, where the police were called. The 28 June session did not happen after the Mother's lawyers proposed access at a counselling centre and the Father's lawyers refused. The Father then did not see the children from 25 June 2025 to 22 January 2026. A second consent order on 2 February 2026 set new arrangements.

The Father applied under s 126B of the Women's Charter 1961 to enforce the first order: ECAO 17/2025 for 25 and 28 June 2025, and ECAO 15/2026 for August 2025 to January 2026. The Mother accepted access did not happen, but said the order omitted terms agreed at mediation, she was not liable before formal service on 31 July 2025, the second application was badly served, and the children refused because they were traumatised. She also referred to allegations about the Father's past conduct, which the court did not decide.

1. Whether the first access order bound the Mother, including before it was formally served on her.
2. Whether the Father proved breaches beyond reasonable doubt, given the Mother's explanation that the children refused access.
3. Whether the first access order was superseded by the second access order.
4. What enforcement measures, including make-up access, should be ordered.

On validity, a consent order takes its force from the court, not the mediation discussions; the Mother's lawyers had confirmed the terms and called the draft good to be approved, and her later setting-aside application did not suspend the order. Section 126B liability does not depend on formal service where, as here, she knew the terms throughout. The service defects in the second application caused no prejudice.

On breach, the court applied the criminal standard, with the Mother bearing only an evidential burden to show cause. A care-parent must take positive steps even when a child refuses. For 25 June, she brought the children and the encounter escalated, and for 28 June her lawyers proposed a safer arrangement, so reasonable doubt remained. From August 2025 she offered only a bare assertion of continuing trauma, with no evidence of any step to address the children's reluctance, and she had consented to overnight access both before and after that period. The court declined to call or interview the children to fill gaps in her case.

On supersession, the second order was a comprehensive regime incompatible with the first, so it replaced it from 2 February 2026.

On remedies, a report was needed to understand the children's reluctance. Make-up dinner access should not wait, and the court held that two missed 1½-hour dinners may be combined into one three-hour Saturday session without exceeding the access lost, as s 126B(4) requires. Overnight make-up access was deferred, without any finding that the Father poses a danger.

The court allowed the applications in part: it dismissed ECAO 17/2025 for 25 and 28 June 2025, and allowed ECAO 15/2026 for 37 missed sessions (13 weekend overnight and 24 weekday dinner sessions). It ordered make-up dinner access with safeguards and an Access Evaluation Report, and reserved make-up overnight access and other measures until the report is available.