DFI v DFJ

[2024] SGHC(I) 4 Singapore International Commercial Court 1 February 2024 • SIC/OA 5/2023 • 39 min read
7 cases cited Cited by 1 case

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Counsel (8)

Parties (2)

Case Significance

DFI v DFJ [2024] SGHC(I) 4 was an application in the Singapore International Commercial Court (Originating Application No 5 of 2023) decided by Sir Vivian Ramsey IJ on 1 February 2024, with judgment reserved after a hearing on 4 December 2023. The claimant applied to set aside a Partial Award dated 10 February 2023 made in an arbitration under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce, relying on section 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) and Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law as incorporated under section 3 of the Act, on the ground that the arbitral process breached the rules of natural justice. The dispute arose from a technical proposal provided on 15 March 2017 for the design, engineering and supply of a 300 "tonnes crushed per day" raw sugar plant, with two agreements entered on 30 April 2017. Sir Vivian Ramsey IJ found there was no breach of natural justice and dismissed the application.

Summary

SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
1 February 2024
Case summary
DFI v DFJ [2024] SGHC(I) 4

Singapore International Commercial Court – Originating Application No 5 of 2023
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Decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court (delivered by Sir Vivian Ramsey IJ):
Outcome: The Singapore International Commercial Court (the “SICC”) dismissed the application to set aside an award (the “Award”) made in an arbitration (the “Arbitration”) on the ground of breach of natural justice, finding that there had been no such breach by the arbitral tribunal (the “Tribunal”).
Pertinent and significant points of the judgment
•  To succeed on a claim that the Tribunal failed to consider certain evidence, the claimant had to show, first, that there was relevant and material evidence which the Tribunal disregarded in coming to its decision. Having done that, the claimant would then have to show that this evidence, when considered in the context of the other evidence on that issue, would arguably have led the Tribunal to reach a different outcome in the Award. That evidence had to be of such importance that it would arguably have led to a different outcome: at [73].
Background
1 On 15 March 2017, the defendant provided the claimant with a technical proposal (the “Technical Proposal”) for the design, engineering and supply of a 300 “tonnes crushed per day” (“TCD”) raw sugar plant (the “Sugar Plant”). Thereafter, on 30 April 2017, the claimant entered into two agreements. First, a contract with a third-party company for the “design engineering and supply” of the Sugar Plant. Secondly, a contract with the defendant (the “Agreement”) for the supply, amongst other things, of a 0.5MW turbine (the “0.5MW Turbine”).
2 On 26 August 2020, the claimant commenced the Arbitration against the defendant. In the Arbitration, the claimant contended that, pursuant to the Agreement, the defendant was required to supply a turbine that was sufficient to meet the power required for the running and operation of the Sugar Plant and/or to supply what it had contracted to supply, that is, a turbine capable of generating 0.5MW of power. The claimant’s case in the Arbitration was that, in breach of the Agreement, the defendant failed to do so.
3 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was challenged by the defendant, and, on 16 July 2021, the Tribunal issued a Jurisdiction Award determining that it had the jurisdiction to continue with the Arbitration. On 10 February 2023, the Tribunal rendered the Award dismissing all of the claimant’s claims.
4 Thereafter, on 15 May 2023, the claimant commenced this present application pursuant to s 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) (“IAA”) and/or Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as incorporated under s 3 of the IAA, to set aside the Award on the ground that the arbitral process that led to the Award was in breach of the rules of natural justice. Essentially, the claimant contended that the Tribunal breached the fair hearing rule by disregarding a substantial portion of the evidence, submissions and arguments raised by the claimant in finding that: (a) the defendant had not undertaken to provide all the power needs of the Sugar Plant; (b) the defendant supplied what it had contracted to do; and (c) the spare parts claim should be excluded from the Arbitration.
Decision of the court
5 The claimant’s challenge to the Award was dismissed: at [104].
6 The Tribunal addressed the documents and correspondence between the claimant and defendant, as well as the evidence from the cross examination of the defendant’s witness, in finding that the defendant had not undertaken to provide all the power needs of the Sugar Plant. In any event, the Tribunal’s conclusion that it was not provided, expressly or impliedly, in the Agreement that the defendant would provide sufficient power for all the electrical needs of the Sugar Plant was a matter of contractual interpretation, and there was nothing in the evidence that would have arguably altered this conclusion or the other conclusions of the Tribunal on this issue: at [75]–[85].
7 While the claimant argued that the Tribunal inexplicably found that the defendant had supplied what it had contracted to supply when the Tribunal had also accepted that the 0.5MW Turbine was not able to achieve 0.5MW, it was important to distinguish between two points. The first was whether 0.5MW in power output was achieved. The second was why the load of 0.5MW was not achieved. The documents relied on by the claimant, which it said that the Tribunal failed to account for, were either not relevant to the cause of the lower output or had been considered and dealt with by the Tribunal in finding that the problems with the Sugar Plant were not the defendant’s responsibility: at [86][98].
8 The issue of whether the spare parts claim should be excluded from the Arbitration was expressly raised by the Tribunal and the claimant was given the opportunity to address this point: at [99][103].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.

What was decided in DFI v DFJ [2024] SGHC(I) 4?

Sir Vivian Ramsey IJ in the Singapore International Commercial Court dismissed the claimant's application to set aside a Partial Award dated 10 February 2023, finding no breach of the rules of natural justice in the arbitral process that led to the ICC award.

On what ground did the claimant seek to set aside the award in DFI v DFJ?

The claimant relied on section 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 and Article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, arguing the arbitral process that led to the Partial Award breached the rules of natural justice.

Statutes Cited

Cases Cited (7)

SLR (7)
[2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 [2013] 1 SLR 125 [2016] 4 SLR 768 [2019] 1 SLR 263 [2020] 2 SLR 453 [2022] 1 SLR 1080 [2023] 4 SLR 984

Cited By (1)

Referenced in

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Judgment

Read the full judgment on the official Singapore Courts portal.

Read on eLitigation

Source: eLitigation ([2024] SGHC(I) 4)