RAMDHAN BIN LAJIS v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Facts

Ramdhan bin Lajis was convicted in the High Court of trafficking in not less than 29.51g of diamorphine under s 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act and sentenced to death. The trial judge found that he passed the drugs to a co-accused in a car in exchange for $9,200, relying on the co-accused's account, forensic evidence that two envelopes were manufactured consecutively from the same sheet, and the way cash was found in the car. His only defence had been that no transaction took place. His appeal, CA/CCA 23/2018, was dismissed on 1 March 2019. A first application for permission to seek review, CA/CM 46/2023, was dismissed on 1 August 2024, with grounds in Pausi bin Jefridin v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2024] 1 SLR 1127.

In Criminal Motion No 9 of 2025 he sought permission again under s 394H(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010. He relied mainly on a CNB letter dated 23 June 2022 stating that $13,050 seized from him was forfeited as being from illegal debt collecting activities, which he said fitted his claim to be a debt collector. He also attacked the evidence at trial, alleged non-disclosure of two witness statements, challenged the refusal of a certificate of substantive assistance, and said his former counsel had failed to raise these points in CM 46.

Issues

1. Whether the CNB letter or the other arguments were sufficient material under s 394J of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010
2. Whether the application was barred by s 394K(1) as a second review attempt
3. Whether the court's inherent power of review should be exercised

Holding

The court refused permission and summarily dismissed the application without a hearing under s 394H(7) of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, holding it plainly without merit and statutorily barred.

Reasoning

The letter did not help. It rested on a court order for forfeiture made on the courts' findings that the $9,200 was paid for the drugs, and the CNB officer's report to the Magistrate's Court described the cash as proceeds from drug trafficking. The letter was administrative and contained a clerical error. The challenges to the trial evidence could have been raised earlier with reasonable diligence, and re-characterising evidence is not enough (Kreetharan s/o Kathireson v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2020] 2 SLR 1175). The new debt-collection account was also wholly inconsistent with his defence at trial. The disclosure point had been raised in CM 46, no prejudice was shown, and the witnesses were not central to the findings. The certificate decision is the Public Prosecutor's, not the appellate court's, so it is irrelevant to review.

Under s 394K(1), only one review application may be made, and that bar extends to permission applications even on new grounds. Every argument could have been raised in CM 46, and former counsel had justifiably withdrawn rather than run unmeritorious points.

The inherent power to reopen an appeal is not ordinarily used without new material after a prior review application, and its requirements mirror s 394J, citing A Steven s/o Paul Raj v Public Prosecutor [2023] 1 SLR 637. There was no basis to use it.

From the judgment