The Law Society of Singapore v Yeo Poh Tiang (Yang Baozhen)

The Law Society of Singapore brought Originating Application No 8 of 2024 before the Court of Three Judges against Ms Yeo Poh Tiang (Yang Baozhen), an advocate and solicitor since 12 July 2006, seeking that she be sanctioned under s 83(1) of the Legal Profession Act. A client had emailed her a lasting power of attorney (LPOA) form that the client had already filled in and signed. On her account of a meeting on 5 February 2018, Ms Yeo went through the form with the client, obtained her confirmation that the signature was hers, and had her sign blank boxes on each page. Ms Yeo then signed as witness, dated the form and affixed her stamp, knowing the second page had not been signed in her presence. The LPOA was registered by the Office of the Public Guardian.

The client later became unhappy with Ms Yeo's handling of her divorce and told the Office of the Public Guardian the form was pre-signed and, according to her, that she had not met Ms Yeo on 5 February 2018. The disciplinary tribunal did not find the client's version proved, but found the charges of false attestation made out. Before the court, the Law Society accepted Ms Yeo's account of the meeting, and Ms Yeo admitted the main and alternative charges, leaving only the sanction to be decided.

1. Whether the charges of false attestation were made out against Ms Yeo
2. Whether the sanction should be imposed on the main charge or the alternative charge
3. What period of suspension was appropriate

On the charges, the court held that false attestation is a form of dishonesty even without personal gain or improper motive. Under the Mental Capacity Act and its regulations, an LPOA must be signed in the presence of the certificate issuer, who witnesses it; the false attestation here rendered the LPOA invalid. Ms Yeo's steps verified the client's signature but were not witnessing, and following Law Society of Singapore v Sum Chong Mun [2017] 4 SLR 707 verification does not excuse false attestation. Her efforts were relevant only to sanction.

On the second issue, the court rejected the submission that she be sanctioned under the alternative charge. Where a respondent admits the main charge, the alternative charge falls away, as in Law Society of Singapore v Chan Chun Hwee Allan [2018] 4 SLR 859.

On sanction, both sides agreed suspension rather than striking off was right; the Law Society sought 11 months, while Ms Yeo argued for a shorter term. The court found the misconduct came from a serious lapse of judgment, not a character defect. It took nine months, as imposed in Law Society of Singapore v Thirumurthy Ayernaar Pambayan [2022] 4 SLR 462, as the starting point, noting that Ms Yeo, unlike the lawyers in the precedents, had met the client and performed some certificate-issuer duties. Her direct confirmation with the client, the signatures made in her presence, the apparent absence of earlier similar breaches, and her not contesting due cause justified reducing the term to four months.

The court upheld the tribunal's finding on the main charge under s 83(2)(b) and ordered that Ms Yeo be suspended for four months, starting on 7 May 2025 at her request, with costs fixed at $5,000 to the Law Society.