CLARENCE LUN YAODONG v LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE

Facts

Clarence Lun Yaodong, a solicitor, was suspended from practice for 18 months by the Court of Three Judges in disciplinary proceedings for acting as supervising solicitor to two practice trainees without the required years of practice. He was represented before the disciplinary tribunal and the Court of Three Judges by Mr Mark Seah of Dentons Rodyk & Davidson LLP, under a letter of engagement dated 20 September 2021 providing for time-cost billing. Mr Lun paid the first two invoices, which had been discounted, but the third and fourth remained unpaid and became the subject of taxation proceedings in HC/BC 123/2024.

On 30 April 2024 Mr Lun complained to the Law Society, alleging gross negligence or want of skill in Mr Seah's representation, and gross overcharging or fraudulent concealment of the basis of charging. A Review Committee found the complaint lacking in substance and directed the Council to dismiss it, noting among other things that Mr Lun had not disclosed the engagement letter or answered its queries. Mr Lun then applied in Originating Application No 1212 of 2024 for permission to seek a quashing order and a fresh review.

Issues

1. Whether the Review Committee irrationally failed to address what Mr Lun now described as at least four distinct heads of complaint.
2. Whether Mr Lun could rely on illegality, a ground not set out in his statement.
3. Whether the Review Committee's decision on each head of complaint was irrational.
4. Whether the decision was vitiated by procedural impropriety because Mr Lun did not receive or answer the committee's queries.

Holding

Andre Maniam J held that Mr Lun had not shown an arguable and prima facie case of reasonable suspicion, and dismissed his application for permission to seek judicial review, with costs to the Law Society. Mr Lun has appealed.

Reasoning

A Review Committee is a sifting mechanism working to tight statutory deadlines; it need not hunt for heads of complaint beyond those presented, and its report, which dealt with the whole complaint and gave reasons for each head, was fuller than the brief report upheld in Nalpon (HC). Illegality could not be raised for the first time in written submissions a week before the hearing, and in any case was hopeless.

On the first head, the committee's view that no facts showed negligence or lack of skill was not irrational. Contemporaneous documents answered each criticism: Mr Lun himself had repeatedly described Mr Goh Keng Haw as a shield on regulatory issues and approved submissions saying so; Mr Seah did point the court to the relevant affidavit paragraph; the attendance notes showed Mr Lun content for Mr Seah to run the case; it was Mr Lun who chose to sit in the gallery rather than attend by video; and Mr Seah had recorded preparation time as non-billable. A first disciplinary brief did not mean want of skill.

On the second head, the signed engagement letter contradicted the claim that the basis of charging had been concealed, and Mr Seah had told Mr Lun of the goodwill discounts. Under Law Society of Singapore v Andre Ravindran Saravanpavan Arul [2011] 4 SLR 1184, complaints of overcharging on taxable bills should go to taxation first, and taxation was already pending. Mr Lun's later stay application in favour of arbitration had failed.

There was no procedural impropriety. The committee was not obliged to pose queries, hold a hearing, chase a reply or send Mr Seah's response for comment, and the email had gone to the address Mr Lun used. Mr Seah's documents had answered the queries in any case.

From the judgment