Cheng Tze Tzuen (alias Zhong Zhixuan) v Dang Lan Anh
[2026] SGCA 42 · CA/CA 22/2025 · cites 20 cases (16 Singapore, 4 foreign)
Can a marriage of convenience entered before 1 October 2016 be declared void?
No. By a majority, the Court of Appeal held that s 105 of the Women's Charter lists the only grounds on which a marriage is void, none applied to the 2011 marriage, and dismissed the appeal.
Step 1: What happened
Mr Cheng Meng Koon (the Deceased) married the respondent, Ms Dang Lan Anh, a Vietnamese national, in Singapore on 26 January 2011. It was his second marriage. He died intestate on 8 January 2012, less than a year later. His main assets were a 14% share in an HDB flat he lived in with his sister and his CPF moneys. As his wife, the respondent stood to take half of his estate. The appellant, Mr Cheng Tze Tzuen, is the Deceased's only son.
The family said it learnt of the marriage only through a letter dated 2 March 2012 from the Insolvency and Public Trustee's Office. On the appellant's account, supported by relatives, the Deceased never told his family about the marriage, the witnesses at the ceremony were strangers to them, he never lived with the respondent, and she was absent throughout his terminal illness. He had reportedly been struggling with drug relapse, debt and loan-shark harassment, which stopped in the year of the marriage; the appellant suggested the Deceased had been paid by the respondent to marry her. On 16 July 2024 the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority told the family she had been deported for immigration offences in 2011.
On 14 October 2024 the appellant filed HC/OA 1057/2024 seeking a declaration that the marriage was void as a sham marriage or marriage of convenience, so as to exclude the respondent from the estate. The respondent never entered an appearance, below or on appeal. The High Court judge (Cheng Tze Tzuen v Dang Lan Anh [2025] SGHC 112) accepted on the unchallenged affidavit evidence that the marriage was one of convenience, but held that the Women's Charter gave no legal basis to declare it void and made no order. The appellant appealed. After hearing the appeal on 22 January 2026, the Court of Appeal invited the Attorney-General's Chambers to assist; the AGC replied on 26 February 2026 and on 31 March 2026 relayed the comments of the Ministry of Social and Family Development, which said the 2023 rewording of the licence declaration was not meant to change the law and that s 11A was not intended to operate retrospectively.
Step 2: What the court had to decide
- Whether a marriage of convenience solemnised in Singapore before 1 October 2016, entered into for an immigration advantage with gratification, can be declared void under the Women's Charter.
- Whether a third party seeking a declaration of nullity through the High Court's general civil jurisdiction is limited to the grounds listed in s 105 of the Charter.
- Whether a false declaration that there was no lawful impediment to the marriage invalidates the marriage licence, so that the marriage is void under s 105 read with s 22 of the WC 2009 (now s 13 of the WC 2020).
- Whether public policy can serve as an independent ground for declaring such a marriage void.
Step 3: How the court reasoned
The majority began with s 105, which states that a marriage taking place after 1 June 1981 is void on the listed grounds only, a point established in Tan Ah Thee v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957. The appellant argued that s 105 bound only spouses in matrimonial proceedings, relying on UDA v UDB and on s 7 of the Charter. The majority rejected this: the observation in UDA concerned which jurisdiction a third party invokes, not freedom from the substantive limits of s 105, and s 7 only describes how a marriage may end, without supplying grounds. A third party is therefore confined to the s 105 grounds.
All the s 105 grounds except s 13 concern capacity, which goes to essential validity. Section 13 (formerly s 22 of the WC 2009) deals with formal validity: the marriage must be solemnised on a valid licence by an authorised person. Its role as a ground of voidness is limited to formal defects, such as having no licence at all or a licence that has lapsed. The majority illustrated the point by noting that if the appellant's approach were right, couples who married abroad would escape the consequence entirely, because foreign law would govern the formalities.
The majority also relied on the settled principle, traced from Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 through Tan Ah Thee and Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737, that the law does not inquire into the private motives of people who marry. Section 11A, a narrowly drawn exception, was consistent with that approach rather than a basis for widening it. Sham marriages entered for other purposes, and marriages for an immigration advantage without gratification, are therefore valid.
On marriages of convenience before 1 October 2016, the majority held that Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng had read "lawful impediment" too widely. Treating a policy against such marriages as an undeclared impediment would let s 13 act as a side door for new grounds of voidness that s 105 does not contain. Before 1 October 2016 there was no lawful impediment to such a marriage, so there was nothing false to declare. The Parliamentary debates on s 11A and the MSF's comments showed that the policy on validity was fixed by s 11A from that date only. Criminal provisions punishing the conduct did not by themselves affect validity, and false declarations are separately punishable under s 37 of the WC 2020. Finally, relying on UKM v Attorney-General [2019] 3 SLR 874, the majority declined to treat public policy as a free-standing ground, since that would claim a power Parliament had not given the courts.
The Chief Justice agreed that s 105 is exhaustive and that s 11A does not apply, but reasoned that the word "valid" in s 13 must carry weight. The Registrar must not issue a licence unless satisfied that the parties are not prevented from marrying by the Charter or any other law. Where parties seek the status of marriage solely for an illegal purpose and conceal this from the Registrar, the licence is not valid. In 2011 such conduct was already caught by s 5(b)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s 57(1)(k) of the Immigration Act. He agreed with the reasoning in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, and also noted that a challenge brought by an innocent third party may raise different concerns from one brought by a spouse.
“Thus, in our view, s 105 of the Charter sets out the exclusive grounds on which a marriage is void, and a third party, such as the Appellant, seeking a declaration of nullity may only rely on those grounds.”
[2026] SGCA 42 at [51]
“However, regardless of how compelling the public policy considerations against such marriages, the proper scope of that policy is ultimately a matter for Parliament to determine through the enactment of legislation.”
[2026] SGCA 42 at [93]
“For the reasons we have explained, we respectfully disagree with the reasoning in Gian Bee Choo and Kee Cheong Keng, and do not consider it good law.”
[2026] SGCA 42 at [98]
“It would make a mockery of the marriage licensing regime if a party who declares the truth to the Registrar is refused a licence, while a party who suppresses the truth from the Registrar can obtain a licence that is thereafter treated as unimpeachable.”
[2026] SGCA 42 at [131]
Step 4: The order
By a majority (Ang Cheng Hock JCA and Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD), the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Judge's findings and reasoning on the validity of the marriage. The marriage, solemnised in 2011, was valid because none of the exhaustive grounds in s 105 applied to it. The majority held that the High Court had jurisdiction under its general civil jurisdiction and that the appellant had standing, but declined to comment on the succession questions, which were not appealed. Gian Bee Choo v Meng Xianhui [2019] 5 SLR 812 and Kee Cheong Keng v Dinh Thi Thu Hien [2025] 3 SLR 1555 were held not to be good law. The appellant was ordered to bear his own costs. Sundaresh Menon CJ dissented and would have allowed the appeal and declared the marriage void for want of a valid marriage licence.
The order in the court's words
Appeal dismissed“We therefore dismiss the appeal and affirm the Judge’s findings and reasoning on the validity of the marriage in the present case.”
Source: [2026] SGCA 42, Court of Appeal, decided 21 October 2026. Read directly from the judgment.
Terms in this case
- Affidavit
- A written statement of facts that a person swears or affirms to be true, used as evidence in court proceedings. Making a false statement in an affidavit can be a criminal offence.
- Gratification
- In corruption law, the benefit corruptly given, offered or received as an inducement or reward. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1960 defines it broadly to include money, gifts, loans, fees, commissions, property, employment, services and other favours or advantages.
Court record
Key facts
| Court | Court of Appeal |
|---|---|
| Decided | |
| Judges | Ang Cheng Hock, Debbie Ong Siew Ling, Sundaresh Menon |
| What the case was about | Family Law |
| Outcome | Appeal dismissed |
Source: [2026] SGCA 42, Court of Appeal, decided — eLitigation. Updated .
Judges
- Ang Cheng Hock
- Debbie Ong Siew Ling Delivered the judgment
- Sundaresh Menon
Parties
- Cheng Tze Tzuen (alias Zhong Zhixuan) Appellant
- Dang Lan Anh Respondent
Counsel
Statutes cited
Cases cited (20)
- Cheng Tze Tzuen v Dang Lan Anh [2025] SGHC 112
- [2000] SGHC 176
- [1991] 2 SLR(R) 525
- [1992] 1 SLR(R) 335
- [1993] 1 SLR(R) 90
- [1995] 3 SLR(R) 233
- [1997] 3 SLR(R) 378
- [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957
- [2011] 1 SLR 737
- [2012] 4 SLR 476
- [2016] 5 SLR 693
- [2017] 2 SLR 850
- [2018] 1 SLR 1015
- [2019] 3 SLR 874
- [2019] 5 SLR 812
- [2025] 3 SLR 1555
- [1971] 2 All ER 1046
- [1983] 1 AC 145
- [1983] AC 145
- [1951] MLJ 164
Related cases
Other Singapore judgments on the same subject, most closely matched first.
-
Can a marriage of convenience entered before 1 October 2016 be declared void?
High Court · 1 July 2025 · [2025] SGHC 112 -
Does permanent resident status alone give a Singapore court jurisdiction over a divorce?
Family Court · 2 November 2026 · [2026] SGFC 145 -
Should a joint custody order give one parent the final say when the parents cannot agree?
Family Court · 2 November 2026 · [2026] SGFC 146 -
Is a private debt or unemployment cause for not paying court-ordered maintenance?
Family Court · 28 October 2026 · [2026] SGFC 143 -
Is a protection order needed when an adult son's family violence against his father was isolated and minor?
Family Court · 13 August 2026 · [2026] SGFC 112 -
Can a court refuse to rely on written statements a litigant prepared with generative AI?
Family Court · 30 June 2026 · [2026] SGFC 88
Read the full judgment
The judgment itself is on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2026] SGCA 42)
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