Sun Hongmin v Wo Wei Dong and others
[2026] SGHC 226 · HC/OA 953/2025 ( HC/SUM 2475/2026,HC/SUM 1960/2026 ) · cites 15 cases (10 Singapore, 5 foreign)
Can lying in an affidavit found committal proceedings for disobeying a court order or breaching an undertaking?
No, not under s 4 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016. The High Court held a false affidavit is not 'other process of a court' and its standard assertion of truth is no undertaking, refusing permission for committal.
Step 1: What happened
Mdm Sun Hongmin and Wo Wei Dong, both PRC citizens, are married with two children and were in divorce proceedings in the PRC. In HC/OA 953/2025 Mdm Sun sought a freezing injunction over US$1,095,000 held in the bank account of The Sub Rosa Capitol Pte Ltd, claiming the money was matrimonial property moved without her consent through a Hong Kong HSBC account held by Zeng Lixin, whom she said was Mr Wo's nominee. In her supporting affidavit filed on 26 August 2025 she stated that an employee of a group company had told her that Zeng opened the HSBC account on 22 November 2024 to hold assets for Mr Wo. An interim freezing injunction against Mr Wo and Zeng was granted on 14 October 2025.
The PRC divorce proceedings were dismissed on 31 October 2025, and Mdm Sun's appeal was dismissed on 2 March 2026. She then told the court she no longer intended to proceed, and on 14 April 2026 the court gave her leave to discontinue OA 953, discharged the injunction and ordered her to pay costs to Mr Wo and Zeng.
Mr Wo then applied ex parte in HC/SUM 1960/2026 for permission to begin committal proceedings against Mdm Sun. His case was that her statement about the employee was a lie and that she had in fact learned of the fund transfers by reading his Telegram messages without his consent. He first relied partly on s 3(1) of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016 (AJPA), but the Attorney-General refused consent, which s 30(1) requires. He therefore applied in HC/SUM 2475/2026 to amend his application to rely only on ss 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) AJPA. The court allowed the amendment at the hearing on 26 August 2026.
Step 2: What the court had to decide
- Whether a knowingly false statement in an affidavit breaches the "other process of a court" under s 4(1)(a) AJPA.
- Whether the standard statement in an affidavit that its contents are true is an express undertaking to the court under s 4(1)(b) AJPA.
- Whether an ex parte applicant's duty of full and frank disclosure is an implied undertaking to the court under s 4(1)(b) read with s 4(9) AJPA.
Step 3: How the court reasoned
Permission to bring committal proceedings requires a prima facie case of contempt and a sufficiently particularised affidavit, as stated in Neo Chin Heng v Good Year Contractor Pte Ltd [2024] 4 SLR 1102. The court accepted that the affidavit was particularised enough. The real question was legal: whether lying in an affidavit could fall within the sections Mr Wo relied on.
On s 4(1)(a), the court applied the ejusdem generis principle described in Public Prosecutor v Lam Leng Hung [2018] 1 SLR 659. The listed items, judgment, decree, direction, order and writ, share the feature of being binding obligations imposed by the court, which fits the section's heading about disobedience of court orders. The residual words "other process of a court" therefore cover only court processes that impose a court-ordered obligation, not the general procedure for filing affidavits. A purposive reading pointed the same way. Ministerial statements on the 2024 amendments showed that deceiving the court falls under s 3(1)(da), and proceedings under s 3 need the Attorney-General's consent. Reading s 4(1)(a) to cover false affidavits would let applicants sidestep that consent requirement, which Parliament could not have intended.
On the express undertaking argument, the court relied on the ordinary meaning of an undertaking as a formal promise to do something. The standard statement that matters within the deponent's knowledge are true is an assertion about the deponent's state of mind, required as a statement by Form 31 of the Supreme Court Practice Directions. An affidavit is retrospective and assertive, whereas a promise looks forward. The court contrasted the express undertakings in Schedule 1 of the freezing order, which were promises to do things such as pay third-party costs. Accepting the argument would again make every deliberate untruth in an affidavit a contempt under both s 3(1)(da) and s 4(1)(b).
On the implied undertaking argument, the court found that Kok Seng Chong v Bukit Turf Club [1992] 3 SLR(R) 772 used "undertakes" in the sense of taking on a duty, and later cases speak of a duty of disclosure, not an undertaking. The analogy with the Riddick undertaking failed for two reasons. That undertaking arose historically as an implied condition of a discovery order to protect privacy and confidence, while the disclosure duty exists because the other side is absent and the judge needs a balanced view. And the Riddick obligation can be modified or released by the court, whereas the disclosure duty cannot. Breach of the disclosure duty already carries consequences such as discharge of the order, costs and damages. Treating it as an implied undertaking would again cut across Parliament's choice that deception of the court be handled under s 3(1)(da) with the Attorney-General's consent.
“In my view, the correct interpretation is that only those processes of the court which impose a court-ordered obligation will fall within s 4(1)(a) AJPA.”
[2026] SGHC 226 at [22]
“A promise is a statement of intention or future conduct; it is prospective. An affidavit, in contrast, is retrospective and assertive.”
[2026] SGHC 226 at [32]
Step 4: The order
Justice Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi allowed the amendment application, HC/SUM 2475/2026, but dismissed HC/SUM 1960/2026, refusing Mr Wo permission to commence committal proceedings. His affidavit was sufficiently particularised, but none of his three arguments brought the alleged lie within ss 4(1)(a) or 4(1)(b) AJPA, so no prima facie case of contempt was shown under the provisions he relied on.
Terms in this case
- Affidavit
- A written statement of facts that a person swears or affirms to be true, used as evidence in court proceedings. Making a false statement in an affidavit can be a criminal offence.
- Ex parte
- Latin for "on behalf of one side": an application that is heard without the other party being present or told of it beforehand. Current court rules call this an application without notice.
- Full and frank disclosure
- The duty to put every material fact before the court, including facts that count against the party making the disclosure. It binds a party who asks for an order without the other side present, and a spouse in divorce or maintenance proceedings, who must disclose all assets and income.
- Mareva injunction
- An order that stops a defendant from moving, hiding or spending assets up to a stated value while a claim is decided, so that any judgment or award the claimant later wins can still be paid. It is usually made by a court, but an arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator may also make one.
- Prima facie case
- Evidence that, if accepted and not answered, would be enough to establish a claim or charge. In a criminal trial, the court calls on the accused to give a defence only if, at the close of the prosecution's evidence, there is some credible evidence on every element of the charge.
Court record
Key facts
| Court | High Court |
|---|---|
| Decided | |
| Judge | Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi |
| What the case was about | Contempt of Court |
Source: [2026] SGHC 226, High Court, decided — eLitigation. Updated .
Judge
- Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi Delivered the judgment
Parties
- The Sub Rosa Capitol Pte Ltd Defendant
- Sun Hongmin Plaintiff
- Wo Wei Dong Defendant
- Zeng Lixin Defendant
Counsel
- Setia Law LLC Firm
- Mah Hao Ran Ian
- Sarfaroj Ahmed Malik
- Ting Yue Xin Victoria
Statutes cited
Cases cited (15)
- [1989] 1 SLR(R) 161
- [1992] 3 SLR(R) 772
- [2007] 2 SLR(R) 518
- [2008] 4 SLR(R) 994
- [2018] 1 SLR 659
- [2018] 2 SLR 159
- [2023] 2 SLR 376
- [2023] 3 SLR 1401
- [2024] 4 SLR 1102
- [1917] 1 KB 486
- [1920] 3 KB 321
- [1977] QB 881
- [1991] 1 WLR 756
- [1965] 2 MLJ 174
Related cases
Other Singapore judgments on the same subject, most closely matched first.
-
Can breaching a freezing order by transferring frozen shares lead to immediate imprisonment for contempt?
High Court · 20 October 2026 · [2026] SGHC 217 -
Can a consent order letting each spouse keep assets in their own names found committal over disputed dogs?
High Court (Family Division) · 28 August 2026 · [2026] SGHCF 25 -
Is posting documents obtained through discovery on social media a contempt of court?
District Court · 23 July 2026 · [2026] SGDC 241 -
Is a director who missed an enforcement examination hearing by misremembering the date in contempt of court?
Magistrates' Court · 3 June 2026 · [2026] SGMC 67 -
Is a person in contempt for breaching a consent protection order she honestly and reasonably misunderstood?
Protection from Harassment Court · 26 May 2026 · [2026] SGPHC 2 -
Is a company director in contempt for missing an examination hearing because of a medical appointment?
District Court · 30 March 2026 · [2026] SGDC 113
Read the full judgment
The judgment itself is on the official Singapore Courts portal.
Read on eLitigationSource: eLitigation ([2026] SGHC 226)
This page sets out what the court decided, for learning. It is information, not legal advice. Disclaimer