Johan Daniel Blomberg v Khan Zhi Yan

Mr Johan Daniel Blomberg and Ms Khan Zhi Yan were formerly married and have two young children. His harassment claim against her, DC/PHA 93/2020, was settled on 10 May 2021 by a protection order made by consent. In it she undertook not to make or file any statement or report about him in any court, or to any local or overseas public authority, without leave. Her later bid to set the order aside succeeded at first instance but was reversed by the High Court in HC/RAS 4/2023 on 30 August 2023, which held it was a contractual consent order with no vitiating factor and varied its wording for clarity, so that she needed leave of the Protection from Harassment Court before making any such statement.

Mr Blomberg obtained permission to bring committal proceedings, Originating Application No 5 of 2025 and Summons No 5 of 2025, alleging six breaches: a sentence accusing him of fraud in her affidavit of 3 June 2024 in his Singapore enforcement suit; three statements in her correspondence and defence in a Stockholm court action he had brought; an email to the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority on 6 January 2025; and a request filed in the Family Justice Courts on 3 March 2025, the last two saying he had not given her his address under an access order. She admitted making the statements without leave but denied contempt.

1. Whether the varied consent order barred every statement about the applicant, including reasonable ones made in litigation or to explain her position
2. Whether the order extended to statements made in foreign court proceedings
3. Whether any breach was excused as an honest and reasonable failure to understand the order under s 21 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016

The court held that a protection order made by consent derives its force from the statute, not the parties' bargain, so both the parties' intentions and what the granting judge intended matter. The High Court had already ruled that the undertaking imposed no restriction on subject matter, and that ruling bound the committal court. In any event the plain words covered every statement about Mr Blomberg, and her suggestion that she alone could decide which statements risked harassment would reduce the court's leave role to a rubber stamp. The affidavit, the immigration email and the family court request were therefore breaches.

The undertaking said "any court" but "any local or overseas public authority". The court gave that drafting difference effect: the judge who approved the order would not, absent a clear intention, have meant it to reach into foreign proceedings, given judicial comity, so the three Stockholm statements were not breaches.

Intention was otherwise shown, as she knew the order's terms and the High Court ruling. But on a balance of probabilities she made out the statutory defence. The order was imprecisely drafted even after variation; her statements were made defending a suit he brought or explaining genuine concerns, not to harass; his own complaints had focused only on allegedly false statements, suggesting he too read the order narrowly; she had not repeated the original conduct; she was unrepresented at the time; and she had reasonable cause to say he had not given a proper address, since he lived on a houseboat and declined her requests for details.

The Protection from Harassment Court (Judge Jasbendar Kaur) dismissed the committal application. The three statements in the Swedish proceedings were outside the order. The other three statements were technical breaches, but they flowed from an honest and reasonable failure to understand the order, so the respondent was not guilty of contempt and was excused.