Pannir Selvam Pranthaman v Attorney-General of Singapore

Mr Pannir Selvam Pranthaman was convicted by the High Court on 2 May 2017 of importing not less than 51.84g of diamorphine and sentenced to death, and the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeals on 9 February 2018. A first scheduled execution in May 2019 was stayed, and his later challenges, including a criminal motion to review his conviction (CM 32), were dismissed. On 24 October 2024 he lodged a complaint with the Law Society against his former counsel in CM 32, alleging among other things that counsel had pressured and misled him into acting in person and had misled the court.

On 27 January 2025 the President ordered his execution for 20 February 2025. A single Judge of the Court of Appeal granted permission for a post-appeal application in a capital case (PACC application) and stayed the execution pending it. By Summons No 11 of 2025 in Originating Application No 5 of 2025, he sought a stay pending the Law Society complaint, and pending other prisoners' challenge to the drug presumptions, which had since been dismissed. After the first hearing, the court asked the Attorney-General to file an affidavit setting out the Ministry of Home Affairs' (MHA) policy on scheduling executions. Under that policy, a relevant pending proceeding is one that may affect the conviction or sentence; other proceedings brought by or for the prisoner are not relevant, though the MHA will also consider whether the prisoner's testimony is needed in proceedings brought by the State.

1. Whether Part 5, Division 4 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 creates a substantive right to a stay of execution or only sets out procedure
2. Whether the MHA unlawfully changed its policy on scheduling executions
3. Whether the MHA's distinction between State-brought and non-State-brought proceedings breaches Art 12(1) of the Constitution or is irrational

On the first issue, the court held that the PACC provisions, in force from 28 June 2024, are purely procedural. Their text deals with permission, timelines, filings and summary determination; the statutory examples point to grounds found elsewhere, such as the Constitution and judicial review; and the parliamentary debates described a new procedure, not a new power to stay executions.

On the second issue, the court did not decide whether the policy had in fact changed. Even assuming it had, the State may change its policies unless the change is unlawful on some ground. Art 12(1) guarantees equal treatment with others similarly situated at a given time, not equal treatment of one person over time. A legitimate expectation argument added nothing, as no unequivocal representation had been made to the applicant.

On the third issue, the court held that prisoners whose testimony is sought in proceedings they bring are not equally situated with those whose testimony is needed in State-brought proceedings. State proceedings serve the public interest, and the prisoner cannot control them, so they cannot be used to delay execution indefinitely, whereas there is no limit to proceedings a prisoner might bring. Any difference was justified by those distinct interests and by the principle of finality. Disciplinary proceedings are brought by the Law Society, not the State, whoever complains; the Law Society could expedite them or preserve the prisoner's evidence. The distinction was therefore neither discriminatory nor irrational.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no basis to stay the execution pending the Law Society complaint and treating the second ground as moot. It noted that its inherent power to grant a stay in exceptional circumstances remained, subject to a high threshold.