Newspaper Seng Logistics Pte. Ltd. v Chiap Seng Productions Pte Ltd

Newspaper Seng Logistics Pte Ltd (D) lost a High Court trial on 22 August 2022, when the judge allowed a claim by Chiap Seng Productions Pte Ltd (P) for D's intentional disposal of P's assets. Under a service agreement, P had stored scaffolding and seating equipment at premises D leased from JTC Corporation for a monthly fee. When P fell into arrears, D seized the assets on 24 September 2020 and sold them for scrap for $42,800; P claimed they were worth far more. The judge held that the agreement was in substance a tenancy, that D's disposal breached the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020 and the Distress Act, and dismissed D's counterclaim for arrears.

Under the Rules of Court 2021, D had 28 days, until 19 September 2022, to file and serve a notice of appeal. Its solicitor wrongly assumed the Rules of Court 2014 applied and then miscalculated the deadline, so D tried to file on 20 September 2022 and the Registry rejected the filing as out of time. D applied the next day in Originating Application No 15 of 2022 to the Appellate Division for permission to file and serve its notice of appeal out of time. P opposed, citing prejudice and arguing that there was no serious question for appeal.

1. Whether the length of and reasons for the delay weighed for or against an extension
2. Whether D's intended appeal was hopeless
3. Whether P would suffer prejudice if the extension were granted

Applying the four factors in Lee Hsien Loong v Singapore Democratic Party and others and another suit [2008] 1 SLR(R) 757, the court noted that a delay of one day in a 28-day timeline was very short and that D acted promptly once it learned of the error. The reasons for delay, however, were weak. The solicitor's mistake came from failing to consider which rules applied, not from any real complexity in the new rules, and the method of calculating time had not changed from the old rules. The transitional learning phase for the new rules had ended before the judgment, and the court warned that unfamiliarity with them should no longer attract sympathy. It stressed that a stricter approach applies to filing a notice of appeal than to later appellate steps, because finality matters and the successful party should not be kept waiting.

On the merits, the test is whether the appeal is hopeless, not whether it raises a serious question as P argued. D intended to argue that the agreement was a service agreement, so that the two Acts would not apply; this involved interpreting the agreement and applying the law to the facts, and was not hopeless. On prejudice, delay in resolving the claim is not enough; some irreversible change of position is needed. P's wish to pursue the buyers of the assets did not qualify, since they appeared to be bona fide purchasers and P had been awarded damages. Weighing all four factors, the court exercised its discretion in D's favour, noting that P's solicitors had received notice of the attempted filing on the same day.

On costs, D had to pay because its own failure made the application necessary, and the court invoked the test for personal costs orders against solicitors, giving them an opportunity to be heard first.

The Appellate Division allowed the application and granted D leave to file and serve its notice of appeal within 3 days. Costs of the application were awarded to P, and D's solicitors were directed to make written submissions within 7 days on whether they should personally bear those costs.