SUPREME COURT OF SINGAPORE
2 June 2026
Case summary
DTH and another v DTF and two others [2026] SGHC(I) 5
Singapore International Commercial Court — Originating Application No 23 of 2025
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Decision of S Mohan J, Roger Giles IJ and Anselmo Reyes IJ (grounds of decision delivered by Roger Giles IJ):
Outcome: The Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) dismissed the application to set aside the tribunal’s decision, on the basis that neither ground for setting aside was made out. The tribunal’s refusal to award third-party funding costs neither conflicted with the public policy of Singapore under Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law, nor constituted a failure to adhere to the agreed arbitral procedure under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law.
Background
1 This application is a sequel to earlier proceedings in DPT v DPV [2025] SGHC(I) 29. In DPT v DPV, the respondents had applied to set aside the arbitral tribunal’s partial award (“Partial Award”). The Partial Award had found largely in the applicants’ favour on their claims against the respondents for breaches of their shareholder and investment agreements and for minority oppression, and ordered the first respondent to buy out the applicants’ shares for a total of US$14,736,000. The respondents’ application to set aside the Partial Award was dismissed.
2 The present application concerns the tribunal’s costs award (“Costs Award”), specifically the decision of the majority of the tribunal (the “Majority”) to disallow the applicants’ claim for third-party funding costs (“TPF costs”) of approximately US$14.6 million. The applicants had entered into a litigation funding agreement with a funder to finance the arbitration, and the practical consequence of the Majority’s decision on TPF costs was that, after paying the funder, the applicants would be left with almost nothing from their US$14,736,000 buyout award. The Majority’s principal reasons for disallowing the TPF costs were that neither the 2017 legislative amendments under the Civil Law Act 1909 legalising third-party funding, nor the parties’ agreement under Rule 37 of the SIAC Rules, conferred on the tribunal the power to order such recovery.
3 The applicants sought to set aside / remit the TPF decision on two grounds: first, that it conflicts with the public policy of Singapore under Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law (the “Public Policy Issue”); and second, that the arbitral procedure adopted by the Majority was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law (the “Arbitral Procedure Issue”).
Decision
4 The Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) dismissed the application on both grounds. On the Public Policy Issue, the applicants were required to identify a specific rule or principle of public policy with which the Costs Award conflicted, and to demonstrate that the conflict met the stringent threshold of “shocking the conscience”, “violating the forum’s most basic notions of morality and justice”, or being “clearly injurious to the public good”. This was additionally not an occasion to review whether the Majority had erred in concluding that it lacked the power to award TPF costs, as the policy of minimal curial intervention meant that even an error of Singapore law would not, without more, render an award contrary to public policy: at [40]–[44].
5 The applicants’ formulation of the applicable public policy, as one of ensuring access to justice for impecunious parties with meritorious claims, was impermissibly narrow in scope. Being confined to a specific class of impecunious arbitrants seeking TPF costs recovery, it could not properly be characterised as “public” policy: at [49] and [52].
6 Additionally, it conflated social policy with public policy in the strict legal sense: [54]. In any event, the SICC found that access to justice was compatible with less than full cost recovery, that the interests of the opposing party also had to be considered, and that Singapore’s own SICC costs regime expressly prohibited the recovery of TPF costs. It was therefore difficult to argue that their irrecoverability could shock the conscience or be injurious to the public good: at [71]–[75].
7 On the Arbitral Procedure Issue, the SICC held that Rule 37 is not procedural in nature. Article 34(2)(a)(iv) is concerned with irregularities in the procedural rules governing how an arbitration is conducted, such as timelines, submission requirements, and notification rules, and cannot be extended to the substance or outcome of an arbitral decision. Rule 37 governs the tribunal’s authority to dispose of costs, not the procedural manner in which it arrives at that disposition. Any error by the Majority in concluding that it lacked power to award TPF costs was therefore an error of substance going to the merits, and not a departure from agreed procedure: at [86] and [90]–[91].
8 In any event, even if Rule 37 were treated as procedural, it was for the Majority to determine what that rule authorised. That determination was not open to curial review unless the construction adopted was simply not open on any view of the text: at [94].
9 Finally, as an additional basis for dismissing the application, the SICC observed that even if a prescribed ground for setting aside had been made out, it retains a residual discretion to decline relief where no prejudice has been sustained. The Majority’s refusal to award TPF costs rested independently on the ground that the litigation funding agreement fell outside the third-party funding regime permitted under the 2017 amendments to the Civil Law Act 1909, such that the applicants would have failed on their TPF costs claim regardless of how the question on power was resolved, and no relief would have been granted in any event: at [99]–[108].
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s judgment. It is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Court. All numbers in bold font and square brackets refer to the corresponding paragraph numbers in the Court’s judgment.